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FOREWORD
The organization of seminars dealing with special problems involved in the
enforcement of the criminal law has been an important activity of the Institute
since its inception, and for some time it has been felt that the papers presented
at these seminars, containing as they do not only a great deal of factual
information but also the fruits of much practical experience, should be made
more freely available to all who are interested in these problems. -
With the assistance of the Department of Justice we have now been
enabled to publish reports of the proceedings of the Institute. These reports will
include all papers presented at the seminars together with a short summary of
the discussion which ‘follows. The present volume represents the ﬁrst of such
publications, and reports on two seminars, the ﬁrst, a judicial seminar on
sentencing, and the second a seminar dealing with the matter of ﬁtness to plead.
It is proposed that in future the proceedings should be published in three
volumes each year, each number being devoted to a particular topic or group of
related topics. These volumes will be on sale separately, to cater for persons
whose interest lies in a particular subject, or they may be obtained on
subscription by those with a more general interest in crirninological problems
within the community.
K. O. SHATWELL
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 SEMINAR ON SENTENCING
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE EXERCISE
“There is no decision in the criminal process that
is as complicated and difﬁcult as the one made by
the sentencingjudge.”
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967)
Report of the President’s Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice. Ch. 5 p.141.
The complexity and difﬁculty of the sentencing function has not always
been generally recognized even amongst those charged with that duty. As R. M.
Jackson says in his Enforcing the Law (1967), as late as “the nineteen twenties
and thirties it looked as if the judges were not willing to learn more about
sentences or to consider whether any changes should be made”. In recent years,
however, a variety of programmes have been developed to improve judicial
sentencing proficiency. Amongst those programmes the sentencing seminar has
proved to be one of the most popular and effective. Thus in the United States
during the last seven years the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration
of Justice has assisted in the organization of over 40 regional seminars which
were available to almost every trial judge sitting in a State Court of general
jurisdiction. The seminars included discussion of sentencing theories and
alternatives and the development of uniform sentencing criteria. In the United
Kingdom too a number of sentencing seminars have been conducted under the
auspices of the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Parker.
At these seminars judges, magistrates, members of the bar, penal
administrators, criminologists, psychiatrists and others involved in or concerned
with the sentencing process have studied a wide range of topics relating to
sentencing. The ﬁrst such seminar to be held in Australia was convened in 1967
by the Chief Justice of New South Wales, Sir Leslie Herron, and Professor K. O.
Shatwell, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney, as part of the
programme of the Institute of Criminology. The purpose of the seminar was
stated by Sir Leslie in his opening address as being “to promote a greaterjudicia]
understanding of the problems of sentencing and to achieve at least some
measure of uniformity”.
The seminar met for three sessions on September 4th, September 18th and
October 30th, and in addition to the opening address by the Chief Justice
addresses were delivered by the Hon. J. C. Maddison, Minister of Justice, His
Honour Mr Justice P. H. Allen, Chairman of the N.S.W. Parole Board, Mr John
Morony, Comptroller-General of Prisons, Mr W. J. Keefe, Principal Probation
Ofﬁcer, Mr F. D. Hayes, Principal Parole Ofﬁcer, Dr W. A. Barclay, State
Director of Psychiatric'Services, Mr Torsten Eriksson, Director General of the
National Swedish Correctional Association, and the Hon. Sir Stanley Burbury,
Chief Justice of Tasmania.
Whilst the ﬁrst session of the seminar was devoted to the delivery of
prepared papers, at the second session a different technique of deliberation was
adopted. The format followed that already employed in judicial seminars in the
USA. and the United Kingdom in that the judges and magistrates were divided
into syndicates and these syndicates were asked to consider a number of cases of
which details were supplied and to determine the sentence they would impose in
each case. Having deliberated, each syndicate reported its decisions to the entire
conference. The syndicate reports were followed by general discussion. The third
session of the seminar was devoted to a continuation of the general discussion,
followed by an address by Sir Stanley Burbury and the concluding address by
the Minister of.Justice.
The discussion indicated that many members felt that the information
available on the cases was insufficient to enable them to reach a proper
conclusion on sentence and that additional information such as the value of the
property stolen, the nature of the premises entered, the prisoner’s family
responsibilities, work record, psychiatric assessment and pre-sentence report
would have been extremely valuable. It was thought also that the lack of
personal confrontation by the accused and the inability to obtain such further
information as appeared to be relevant made it very difficult to ﬁx the
appropriate sentence with precision.
The value of the exercise was therefore seen not so much in a comparison
of the disparities in sentence as in a consideration of the reasons given for the
imposition of a speciﬁc sentence in each case. There appeared to be little
disagreement with the general principles of sentencing as enunciated by the
Chief Justice in his opening address, and discussion was directed rather to the
extent to which uniformity was possible, or in fact desirable, and to the proper
weighting of the various factors implicit in the sentencing process in the given
case. There was general agreement that seminars such as the present one would
do much to reconcile divergent opinions, reinforced of course by periodic
seminars and discussions along the lines of those presently organized by the
N.S.W. Stipendiary Magistrates. One speaker raised a suggestion for the holding
of pre-sentence conferences by Chairmen of Quarter‘Sessions, a number felt
there was need for a separate criminal jurisdiction to deal with indictable crimes
triable at Quarter Sessions, and particular reference was made to the desirability
of a specialized body to hear appeals from decisions of the Children’s Courts.
The facilities available for dealing with offenders after sentence were very
clearly outlined by the various speakers, with an indication of what could and
what could not be done at the present time in each field. Some unnecessary
overburdening of existing facilities was incidentally brought to light, as in the
case of the prescribing of over-long or unnecessary periods of probation
supervision or of recourse to psychiatric treatment in cases which are relatively
minor or of a type for which psychiatry can offer little or no assistance. A
particularly valuable discussion arose in the context of the present N.S.W.
syst’em"whi'ch‘ involves a prison sentence as the sanction for the non-payment of
fines and the fact that 30—34% of the prison population consists of persons
serving sentences in default of ﬁnes. At a time when the trend is against
institutionalization it was suggested that this was an area in which greater use
might be made of probation services, especially since the experience of
probation authorities is that a requirement that an offender shall make regular
payments under supervision (whether by way of penalty, restitution or
compensation) has proved to be a valuable aid to rehabilitation. The
Scandinavian experience related by Mr Eriksson illustrated the successful
extension of the use of probation in this area.
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Amongst other suggestions for improving the sentencing process was the
'. provision of up-to-date statistics showing the state of crime in the community,
increases in particular types of crime, trends in sentencing, the effectiveness of
particular sentencing practices in achieving the desired aims, the forms of
treatment available at any time, and the results of research done in these ﬁelds.
Mention was also made of .the need for greater ﬂexibility in the sentencing
options available to the courts and the ways in which this might be achieved.
At the conclusion of the discussion the Chief Justice expressed his
appreciation of those who had participated in the seminar in the following ~
words: ~
“It takes courage to come into an open forum of debate and express
one’s views. Those who oppose such'a seminar as this or by their absence
perhaps impliedly rebuke us for coming into the open are in my opinion
opposed to light being shed on this important subject . . . . It is ‘our aim, ,
those of us who are interested in this matter of sentencing, to discuss
fruitfully and frankly and openly these complex problems and reach, if we
can, a degree of uniformity based on sophisticated policies. I believe that
this is but a beginning, and not the end. With the experience gained from
the several seminars on punishment and sentencing I believe that we are
opening the door to a wider ﬁeld of endeavour and of information on a
very, very important and complex subject. We have all, I believe, beneﬁted
by listening to these seminars and the views expressed here, and [can only
assure you that as Chief Justice I am wholly in accordance with your
enthusiasm in coming along to obtain the information thus presented.”
The text of the addresses delivered at the seminar, details of the cases
considered, and a table showing briefly the results reached by thesentencin
syndicates are all included below. _
11
 CHAIRMAN’S OPENING ADDRESS
, The Hon. SIR LESLIE HERRON*
Gentlemen:
First of all, may I say how welcome you all are here. Speakin
g for the
Institute of Criminology, I say that you are very welcome gu
ests indeed. AS
some of you will know, besides being a guest of the Institute
I also have the
honour to be the Chairman of the Advisory Committee which
has brought us
together, for which thanks are due to the Institute, and particula
rly to Professor
Shatwell.
I think the great importance of this Sentencing Seminar is attest
ed by the
presence of so many members. of the Bench and distinguish
ed guests.- The
Attorney General, has seen ﬁt to be here in person, and the Minister
of Justiee,
members of the judiciary, both of the Supreme Court and the D
istrict Court,
and a great number of magistrates and those interested in sentenci
ng and the
prison systems (including, 1 notice, the Under Secretary for Justi
ce), as well as
the speakers mentioned on the business paper. We can all offer our serv
ices in
co-operating in this important exercise. '
The object of the exercise.
The purpose of the exercise is of course to promote a gr
eater judicial
understanding of the problems of sentencing and
to achieve at least some
measure of uniformity. We know that the public a
nd the profession alike are
disturbed by inconsistencies in sentencing, and it is
hoped that this seminar will
do som‘éthing towards avoiding disparity in sentences
. I would like to have said
some little more about this this afternoon by referenc
e to some recently decided
cases in the Court of Criminal Appeal in this State, but th
e programme has been
so tightly constructed that if we are to adjourn at
six o’clock it will not be
possible for me to diverge. But it may be that before
we are through the second
session of the seminar I will have had an opportuni
ty to say something brieﬂy
about the disparity of sentences and the difficulties of th
e courts.
We can approach this task, I feel, by restating the
principles underlying
sentences. That is the primary approach. And we can i
nform ourselves the better
as to the assistance that is now available, as never before, t
o the courts before
reaching a ﬁnal assessment of their task of sentencing.
With these very brief remarks I will attempt to put before you my
views
(and they are only my views, I assure you) as to the factors and consi
derations
affecting the carrying out of a Judge’s or a Magistrate’s senten
cing
responsibilities.
* K.B.E., C.M.G., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales
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 FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE CARRYING OUT
OF A JUDGE’S SENTENCING RESPONSIBILITIES
When in 1885 Sir William S. Gilbert wrote the words of the Gilbert and
Sullivan opera “The Mikado” he put into the mouth of the Emperor a simple
formula for punishinent which could be restated this afternoon as per se a valid
principle for us to follow. The verse reads:
“My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To let the punishment ﬁt the crime
The punishment fit the crime
And make each prisoner pent
Unwillingly represent
A source of innocent merrime'nt!
Of innocent merriment!”
The Mikado then invented all manner of punishments appropriate to those
whose social habits he deplored, ﬁnally ending with:
“The billiard sharp whom anyone catches
His doom’s extremely hard
He’s made to dwell . c
In a dungeon cell
On a spot that is always barred
And there he plays extravagant matches
In ﬁtless ﬁnger stalls '
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
With elliptical billiard balls.” .
But, like many fundamental legal principles, they are easily stated but
difﬁcult of application. ,
Parliament’s role.
As I see it, sentencing is one of the most difﬁcult parts of a Judge’s duties.
When after the trial is over and the jury convicts the accused or he has pleaded
guilty the Judge feels that the responsibility for the result is shared by the
legislator. If the elements of the offence, as deﬁned by Statute, exist there is no
alternative to conviction. This is true also of sentence. The penalty may be ﬁxed
by law, as in murder. In ﬁXing his sentence the Judge must consider the
maximum and minimum, if any, laid down by Parliament.
The principle of punishment broadly stated
The difﬁculty in laying down principles on penology is increased by the
fact that it is still the subject of profound and scientiﬁc inquiry and of much
controversy and that at present many of its problems appear to be-practically
insoluble. I believe, however, that we are on safe ground in stating in broad
terms that no system can be of any value if it does not contain, as its
fundamental basis, the protection of society.
14
 
 The purpose of punishment cannot be found in any single explana
tion, for
it depends both upon the type of offence and the offender. B
ut I repeat, all
purposes may be reduced under the simple heading of the protec
tion of society,
or, in other words, the protection of the community from crime.
Life in an orderly society would be impossible unless the
powers and
duties and the rights and obligations of the individual membe
rs are determined
by a set of rules. Criminal law is part of those rules, and if it i
s not obeyed life in
society will become impossible. The function of the Crimina
l Court is to force
ti}: pgblic to obey those rules. This is done by imposing a
punishment on the
0 en er.
The several elements in punishment
The Criminal Code prescribes five kinds of punishm
ent: death, the lash,
imprisonment, fine and forfeiture. Death is,
in New South Wales, limited to
crimes of treason or piracy. The lash, if ordered, w
ill not be sanctioned by the
Executive, and may be ruled out. Fines are perhap
s not used sufficiently, for
they act as punishment to a certain class of offender.
Writing in The New Statesman recently C. H. Rolph
said that this was a
time —
“When every form of imprisonment seems to stand co
ndemned on
results, when the monetary fine, purely deterrent as it is
, appears to be the
socially effective penalty for the generality of crimes,
and when probation,
the one really significant advance on nineteenth
century methods, is
coming to be seen as the right treatment, not for fi
rst offenders but for
young recidivists to whom prison is no longer a deterrent
mystery.
“The potential value of the really heavy fine has by no
means been
fully examined. I believe that there is still room for the
more frequent use
of large fines, reserving prison as far as possible for offen
ders whose crimes
constitute a serious or continuing threat to their fell
ow citizens. To quote
from a recent Bow Group Pamphlet: ‘Fines should be
imposed more often
in cases which are now dealt with by a short term of i
mprisonment’.”
Hence we must regard imprisonment as the only effe
ctive punishment for
indictable crimes. Here again we must turn to Parli
ament as our-authority, for
imprisonment is practically the only sentence prov
ided for indictable offences.
This has been so since the 1850’s.
This is not to say that I am unmindful of current tre
nds in penal practice,
for many writers and commentators regularly remin
d us that the future of
sentencing tends towards non-institutional treatmen
t rather than removal of
offenders from the community in enclosed resident
ial institutions. Nor am I
unmindful of the modern classification of prisoners an
d provision for differential
systems of treatment within the prison system, nor of
.the substitution of trade
and vocational training for penal labour, and of measu
res taken for rehabilitation
of offenders. Nor will I pause to discuss my reaso
ns for thinking that these
improvements in gaol conditions have been somewhat
ineffective in achieving
rehabilitation of offenders.
15  
  
But Mr Gordon Hawkins, Senior Lecturer in Criminology in the University
of Sydney, reminds us in his learned writings of the growth of the hostel system
for pre-release training, group counselling, part-time imprisonment,
quasi-institutional methods, attendance centres and citizen training centres,
periodic detention on the New Zealand plan, and like methods. But I mention
them merely to show that they have not been overlooked. My task is to discuss
principles of judicial sentencing as the law stands today and not what might be
laid down by Parliament some years hence. And I would close on this note; that
it is easy and not uncommon to exaggerate the amount of progress that has been
achieved.
Turning next to imprisonment, the law mostly ﬁxes a maximum penalty.
The Judge may then prescribe the penalty that he thinks fit, up to the
maximum. He may suspend the sentence or release the prisoner on probation.
Thus the following questions are posed for the judge:
I. [s it a case where the law allows me to dispense with imposing a penalty,
and if so, is this such a case?
2.? If not, what kind of punishment should be imposed?
3. How severe should it be?
Once a_ crime has been committed and the rules have been broken nothing
can be done to protect society from that particular breach of the law. You
cannot undo what has been done.
Thus inevitably arises an analysis of the elements of punishment, and
these, I venture to suggest, are as follows:
1. To ﬁt the punishment to the crime — the retributive or denunciatory
theory of punishment.
2. To deter potential offenders by example from committing the same
offence —— general deterrence.
3. To deter the particular offender from offending again — specific
deterrence.
4. To prevent the particular offender from injuring society again, by
incarcerating him for a long time —— the preventive theory.
5. To enable the offender to take his place as a responsible and law-abiding
member of society — the rehabilitative theory.
As to the first, that of retribution, as you cannot undo what has been
done, is any useful purpose served by retaliation? According to many people
today, when crime is on the increase (as it undoubtedly is), the instinct to hit
back at the wrongdoer requires stimulation rather than restraint. But I believe
the retributive element is generally regarded now as the least of the five
principles of punishment. It has been described as “ﬂogging a dead horse”. When
a man,is sentenced to prison he is punished by the loss of his liberty. While
there, we should try to reform and rehabilitate him. Men should be sent.,to
prison as punishment and not for punishment. Prisons should be for
conﬁnement of the punished, not for the punishment of the confined.
16
  
I will say a word about each of the other four elements.
The ﬁrst object of a Court is to deter persons from committing crime.
There is a tendency today to overstate the object of reformation of the offender
and allow a notion to get abroad that judges are Weakly merciful and that crime
can be committed with impunity. Thus the deterrent aspect may rightly
preclude the use of probation and it may be clearly in the interests-of society to
send the offender to prison as a warning to him and others. It is only when that
consideration does not arise that probation is preferable to imprisonment. I
believe that Parliament has so stated. In serious crimes like murder, the sentence
is ﬁxed by Statute and must be imposed irrespective of the possibility of
reformation of the offender. The deterrent principle is, I believe, the ﬁrst and
paramount consideration, but having considered it, and unless prevented from so
doing by the deterrent principle, if the Judge thinks there is an immediate
possibility of reformation he should give the offender a chance and release him
on conditions. ~
The factors to be considered
The factors to be considered are:
1. The gravity of the crime. As to this, the attitude of society is important
,
and this is best seen in the expressed will of Parliament for the maximum
sentence ﬁxed by Statute may be a valuable guide to the view of the
legislature. ' '
2. The motive. Was it for personal revenge by, or for reward to, the offender
?
-Was malice an ingredient?
3. The degree of premeditation or deliberation.
4. The amount of provocation.
5. The state of mind of the offender.
6. The age and physical condition of the offender, his family background.
7. If the Judge’s mind inclines him to leniency, the character and cr
iminal
record may or may not persuade the Judge to give way to such inclinatio
n.
8. The existing facilities in the penal institutions where he may be sent.
9. Finally (and this is I think an important and valid consideratio
n) the
frequency of the particular crime generally or in a particular area, e.g. pa
ck
rapes, hoodlums operating in gangs, armed robberies.
l have not attempted an exhaustive catalogue of these factors, for crime i
s
often a subtle demonstration of the subtleties of the human mind and is cap
able
of infinite variation.
There is one other controversial subject, namely, is it proper for a Judge to
take into account the ordinary remissions for good conduct by refere
nce to
Prison Regulations or to the fact that the offender may later be re
leased on
17
  
parole by the Board? If these considerations are over-valued there is a danger of
imposing a sentence far greater than could be justified by the nature of the
offence and the circumstances of its commission and the prisoner’s record. As
we are to have an address by the Chairman'of the Parole Board l will say but
little on this subject, for we have had only brief acquaintance with the new
Parole of Prisoners Act. I believe it is the duty of trial Courts to impose, in
accordance with established principles (including the protection of society) only
that punishment which the offence in the light of the attending circumstances
merits, after giving due weight to the mitigating circumstances and pleas for
leniency. I had intended to say something more about this subject, but I have
decided to reserve these cements in order to deal with the subject, should an
occasion present itself a little later, after we have heard from Mr Justice Allen,
who is the Chairman of the Board. But in saying what I have said, this doesn’t
suggest that the courts should underestimate the value of the non-parole period,
and it should be given careful consideration by the judges, for it is a distinct
advance in the penal system that makes it possible for judges to impose
sentences on a more objective basis in the knowledge of the probability that the
prisoner’s sentence will be reviewed and that he will have a real incentive to
reform.
Some of today’s complexities of sentencing.
Sentencing used to be a comparatively simple matter. The primary object
was to fix a sentence proportionate to the offender’s culpability, a system
loosely described .as “the tariff system”. The facts of the offence and the
offender’s record were the main pieces of information before the Court, whilst
the defence could bring up any mitigating circumstances. The information was
about past events. As I have said, courts always have had in mind the need to
protect society from the persistent offender, to deter potential offenders, and to
deter or reform the individual. But it was thought that the tariff system took
these other objectives in its stride. Giving an offender the punishment he
deserved was thought to be the best way of deterring him and others and of
protecting society. But today these other objectives have received increased
attention. The development has been most obvious in the increased weight
(sometimes, I suggest, in more than full measure) which the courts give to the
needs of the offender as a person. But this is not always the case, as a review of
decisions in the Court of Criminal Appeal in England will show.
Estimating the gravity of an offence.
In determining what sentence satisfies the concept of proportion in a
particular case the Court has regard to the nature of the offence itself and the
circumstances immediately surrounding it, but not to the previous history of the
offender. Thus apart from the legal nature of the offence the Court will consider
such factors as the degree of violence used, the amount of property stolen, the
relationship of the offender to the victim, the fact that the offender has misused
a position of trust, and the degree of premeditation, in determining what ajust
sentence would be. The result is a maximum figure, which will not normally bear
any relationship to the statutory maximum for the offence except that the
sentence in a case which is not a particularly bad example of the particular kind
of offence must be sufficiently lower than the statutory maximum to allow for
more serious examples of the same offence to be adequately distinguished. Thus
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 in a serious case of armed robbery the Court said that there w
as no need to
discriminate between the offenders on grounds of age or record, as
a deterrent
sentence was necessary. A deterrent sentence must not, of course,
exceed the
“just maximum” for the offence.
There are a number of cases of criminal activity where the sentencing
policy of the Court is clearly dominated by the need to emphasize that certain
kinds of conduct will be met with heavy sentences. The kind of conduct whic
h
attracts this approach will usually be distinguished by the nature of the of
fence
concerned, or by the nature of the offender. Occasionally the Court is concerne
d
to afford particular protection to some kind of interest which is especiall
y
vulnerable to criminal activity.
Two kinds of criminal offences which commonly attract heavy
sentences
for deterrent purposes are robbery and rape. That the emphasis
is on deterrence
in cases of robbery is made clear by the frequent references in t
he judgments of
the Court of Criminal Appeal to the need to deter, and by the fact
that in cases
of these offences the Court is less ready than in others to give w
eight to factors
which would normally be regarded as going in mitigation. Thus th
e young man
under the age of 21 who commits a violent robbery will not norm
ally escape a
heavy sentence of imprisonment even though a period of training
would be in his
best interest, and the adult first offender receives similar treatme
nt. In a number
of recent cases the Court has stressed the need for deterrent sente
nces in cases of
violent robbery. In R. v. Kelly the Court upheld a senten
ce of nine years’
imprisonment for a robbery with violence, saying that this ty
pe of crime was
prevalent and a deterrent sentence which took no account of t
he needs of the
individual offender was justiﬁed. In R. v. Curbishley sentences
of ﬁfteen years’
imprisonment were upheld for a number of men involved in
an attack on a
bullion van, the Court holding that the need for deterrent sentence
s outweighed
all considerations of age and record. Finally, in R. v. Henry
the Court upheld
sentences of thirty years’ imprisonment for a number of me
n involved in a
highly organized ambush of a rail train in which over £2,000,000 w
as stolen and
considerable violence used, saying that “severely deterrent
sentences were
necessary . . . . to demonstrate to others tempted to follow them int
o lawlessness
on this vast scale that if they are brought to trial and cOnvicted
commensurate
punishment will follow”.
In cases of rape, a pattern of sentencing similar to that in the robb
ery cases
is found (except that the extremely long sentences for highly orga
nized crimes
are not found). Neither youth nor previous good character indu
ces the Court to
avoid substantial sentences of imprisonment.
The third use of deterrent sentences is to protect particular
interests
especially exposed to criminal activity. One such interest is the p
olice ofﬁcer.
The Court will normally impose or uphold a substantia
l sentence of
imprisonment where an offence of violence is committed against a
police ofﬁcer
acting in the execution of his duty. Examples are R. v. Fagan and
Fagan, where
the Court ordered sentences of eighteen months concurrent for tw
o assaults on
police ofﬁcers in the execution of their duty to run consecutivel
y, thus in effect
increasing the sentences to three years’ imprisonment; R. v.D0n
0ghue, where a
sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment for the same offence was
increased to
two years; and R. v. Kent, where the Court upheld
asentence of two years’.
imprisonment for a youth of 17 who had used an air pistol with inte
nt to resist
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 arrest. In each of these cases the Court referred to the need for a deterrent
sentence for the protection of the police ofﬁcer.
I might state as brieﬂy as I can my conclusions as to an examination over
the years ofjudgments in the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Conclusions.
A survey of sentence appeals in recent years makes it clear that the Court
of Criminal Appeal has developed, and is continuing to develop, a complex series
of .principles upon which its sentencing decisions are based. I don’t wish you to
become disheartened by the fact that very often these decisions seem to be on
the face of them irreconcilable, and they are indeed complex. The position of
the Court is balanced between the competing claims of the traditional ideas of
punishment on a culpability or deterrent basis and more modern ideas of
rehabilitative treatment. Isolated decisions, such as the Great Mail Train
Robbery case, have been criticised, but when this case is seen against the
background of the general sentencing practice of the Court it becomes apparent
that it is the logical extension to an extreme point of an accepted principle of
sentencing in the face of an extreme crime. Many will feel that to extend this
principle so far is unacceptable, and that some qualiﬁcation of the principle is
necessary. Such is the rarity of crimes on this scale that the Court has not had
the opportunity to evolve a more reﬁned response to this kind of conduct and
necessarily falls back on an existing and familiar concept. It is possible that the
Court may move, in further cases of this kind, in the direction of sentences of
life imprisonment, leaving open the possibility of release on licence. Another
solution to the same problem would be to rely upon the Minister’s or the Parole
Board’s power to release on licence for all long term sentences. In relying on
deterrence, the Court is acting on an assumption the validity of which has never
been scientiﬁcally examined, and it has been recognized that the need for such
an investigation is urgent. Until a valid assessment of the effect of deterrent
sentences has been carried out, criticism of their use is of little value.
While cases such as the Great Mail Train Robbery tend to attract the most
publicity, an examination of the general policy of the Court reveals no lack of
readiness to experiment with rehabilitative measures where this can be done
without exposing the public to undue risk of injury, as the substitution of
probation for preventive detention in a number of cases shows. The area where
the older concepts tend to dominate still is the area of serious crimes such as
rape or robbery. Clearly, the use of rehabilitative measures in this area would be
controversial, although in many cases the prospect of success would be good.
The solution of this problem is clearly not an easy one, but an acceptance by the
general public of the idea of rehabilitative treatment as a major aim of
sentencing even in the case of serious crime may eventually lead to the intrusion
of the rehabilitative idea into this area of the sentencing policy of the Court.
It is recognised, I think, that whatever the punishment of the prisoner he
will eventually return to society, and sentences are increasingly passed with
deterrence or reform as the principal objects, and in assessing the offender’s
culpability his social and domestic background is more closely examined. There
can be no doubt that courts must pay special attention to the need to protect
society, and a special form of sentence, preventive detention, although going out
of favour, is, available for persistent offenders. '
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As this side of sentencing has developed these other objectives
suggest a
different sentence from the one which would have been impose
d under the tariff
system, and also one objective may suggest a different sentenc
e from another.
These competing claims have to be resolved and a decision re
ached as to which
consideration should be dominant. To take an example, a j
udge may have to
decide whether the protection of society demands a sentence
of seven years’
preventive detention as an habitual criminal on an inveterate th
ief whose single
offences never merit more than two years by themselve
s. A court may think
that probation offers the best chance of stopping
a petty offender from
offending again, but has to take into account that t
he offence is a serious one
deserving imprisonment. Yet again, a court may have
to decide whether to pass
an exemplary sentence on young offenders conv
icted of serious crimes of
violence where this may not appear to be the
best treatment for them as
individuals. Today, again, the range of prison treat
ment available is wider, e.g.
corrective training. In short, sentencing is becoming a
more complex task. In the
Supreme Court, with notable exceptions, the Judge ca
n still do little more than
punish the offender for what he has done after rightly
taking into account the
culpability of what he has done. But in a considerable numb
er of cases the
“tariff system” can no longer be relied on to ﬁt all consid
erations in the Court’s
mind. Finally, the need to deter the offender, to reform
him, to protect society,
to deter others, may offer conflicting considerations. Th
ese objectives have an
importance of their own and have a separate effect on t
he Court’s decision.
This wider range of objectives calls for wider informat
ion. The narration of
objective facts is one thing, information as to how the
offender should be
reformed is another, while modes of deterrence of p
otential offenders overlaps
again. Hence we have reports from (a) probation ofﬁ
cers; (b) prison ofﬁcers;,(c)
medical ofﬁcers, especially psychiatrists; and (d) a
n antecedent statement
furnished to police. These arrangements have de
veloped empirically and
piecemeal, which adds difficulties and anomalies.
For example, probation
reports vary from court to court. Ofﬁcials are unce
rtain as to how they should
express themselves in making a deﬁnite recommenda
tion. There is a difference
when the accused is on bail. It is difﬁcult to adjour
n the Court after conviction
for a suitable length of time, and inquiries have to be
compressed.
Courts are not always in possession of information abou
t what the various
forms of sentence involve and achieve. There is much
to be said for uniformity
of information to be provided in all cases. The objecti
ve facts can be stated as
past events, but when you seek to reform, deter or pr
otect you are seeking to
control future events. So is the Court to recomme
nd corrective training or
psychiatric assistance, or pass an exemplary senten
ce? In either case it must
believe that the one or the other will make a signiﬁcan
t contribution.
One fruitful source of inquiry could be observations
in other cases-stated
in seminars such as the present whether similar se
ntences imposed in similar
circumstances have had the desired result. Otherwise
courts must act on a hunch
and sentences aimed at controlling future events are
largely speculative and you
cannot know whether such objectives are practicable. S
o we might aim in future
to invite relevant experience on the effect of sentenc
es on offenders’ criminal
careers. A judge or magistrate might follow up some of
his cases by reports from
probation ofﬁcers so that an informed reappraisal is possibl
e. Such seminars as
these can provide a general objective study of the eff
ect of different sentences
on a cross section of offenders. We should hold th
em regularly. Particularly
would they help to survey the reactions .to exempla
ry sentences. As to this,
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 doctors, to whom we owe a great debt, have devoted a great deal of valuablestudy to psychiatric and psychological aspects and feel able to offer a prognosisof the offender’s tendency to continue to commit crime, e.g. because he appearsto be a psychopath. This is a welcome contribution, especially in violent cases.Information about recidivism would be helpful if relevant, reliable and
comprehensive. '
All this shows how the changing emphasis in objectives of sentencing havebeen accompanied by developments in the amount of information relevant tothese objectives. Sentencing is a growing subject and there is much more to belearned and applied than there used to be. Broad categories will be of much help.We are indebted to the.Institute of Criminology for keeping us abreast of thesedevelopments in what is the most difﬁcult of all judicial duties. '
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 THE ROLE OF THE PAROLE BOARD
IN THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
The Hon. Mr Justice P. H. ALLEN*
Mr Chairman, Gentlemen,
Before I refer to the Parole Board’s role in this setting I would wis
h to
make two preliminary observations. The ﬁrst is that as the Act
came into
operation only on 3lst January last, that is, at the beginning
of the First Term, I
am not able to speak to you with any length of experience and
of course some
of our procedures are necessarily experimental. But we are tryi
ng to make the
system work and are anxious to learn from experience. T
he other observation,
following the Chief Justice’s remarks, is this: that we recog
nize that the
sentencing of a prisoner is essentially a judicial act and that i
t is no part of the
Board’s duty or power to subtract anything from or add an
ything to the
sentencing process. So that any observations or any recommendat
ions from the
sentencingjudge are always to us of great importance.
The Board’s task, as all of you will know, commences after there
has been
a sentence imposed with a minimum period ﬁxed. The Act calls
it a “non-parole
period”, perhaps a rather awkward expression. It is then that the
re is a statutory
duty cast upon the Board to consider before the period expir
es every particular
case, and having done so, to take one of three courses: eithe
r to issue a parole
order which releases the prisoner on a date set (which cannot u
sually be before
the period expires), or to determine that parole be not granted,
or to defer the
matter for review from time to time. This last course frequentl
y is one which has
to be taken, for reasons which I will indicate in a moment.
if the Parole Order is made, the duration and the conditions of it are such
as the Board determines. The Parole period will usually, and incur
case so far
always has, run the full length of the original sentence. It expires
when the
sentence would without remissions. The conditions are usually standa
rd ones for
this sort of thing, such as, that the prisoner will not offend, will not
break the
law; will keep in contact with the parole ofﬁcer (particularly in relation
to place
of residence and employment), will submit to supervision; in some c
ases that he
will submit to psychiatric treatment if this has been recomme
nded by the
sentencing judge; and for those with a drink problem, a condition
that they
refrain from alcohol. We are, of course, well aware that o
ne doesn’t expect to
cure an alcoholic by a no-drinking clause in his parole order, but if
it is there it
gives the parole ofﬁcer 'who has the responsibility of his supe
rvision an
additional sanction to correct him and report him if he seems to be back in his
old haunts drinking again. And even in the short time we have had I t
hink'we
have seen some examples where this has had some practical and beneficial ef
fect.
There could be other special conditions applicable to a particular case. As
examples, a parolee may be prohibited from associating with particular persons,
he may be obliged to refrain from gambling, or if going interstate. he may be
required to submit to the supervision of the Probation and Parole service in
that
State.
* A Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and Chair
man of the
Parole Board.
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 There is a wide power to revoke, to amend or to vary the order that is
made. I might leave for a moment the effect of revocation, amendment or
variation of the orders. These are necessary powers to have but, apart from
revocation, in our experience it has not often been necessary to employ them.
Before I discuss what we in fact do in practice and how it arisesweek by
week I should perhaps observe that there are two other functions which the
Board has. One of these, which is now completed, was to ﬁx a minimum
non-parole period for every prisoner who had at the date of the commencement
of the Act still twelve months or more to serve having regard to remissions. With
regard to remissions, that phrase is not without signiﬁcance, because there is no
other reference in the Act to remissions. I would like to say something about
remissions, although the Chief Justice has already referred to them in the
sentencing process. It is well enough recognized that one doesn’t, in sentencing a
prisoner, add on the remission to be taken off subsequently nor increase the
sentence consciously because of a remission regulation. When it comes to the
ﬁxing of a non-parole period it is necessary (as the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions
have done so frequently in the last few months) to have regard to the practical
effect of what are called the ordinary remissions, as well as to others. We had,
then, if I might return for a moment to the matter referred to, to ﬁx a period for
each of these prisoners. These were mostly men. There were a few women, butthey were a very small minority, probably only half a dozen. But we had 721
persons who at the beginning of February hadone year or more to serve without
regard to remissions. They were in the majority of cases prisoners with past
records, some of them of course quite serious, some of them hopelessly
recidivist, and in a number of cases, as was the Board’s right under the Statute, a
non-parole period was not ﬁxed. There was no obligation to ﬁx it in every case,
but by and large we ﬁxed it in most cases where there was any sort of chance
that the review period would be useful. And, as a matter of interest, we did what
I notice most of the chairmen of the sentencing courts do, wedeterminedthe
period about halfway along the line. This, having regard to remissions to be
taken into account, generally achieved an effective time for review.
The other task that the Board had and has is to investigate, and to report
on following investigations, all cases which are referred to it by the Minister. The
greater part of that duty consisted in dealing with life sentence prisoners, of
whom at the time there were approximately 100 in this State and of whom
approximately 50 had served more than ten years’ imprisonment. The Board was
called upon to report upon each one of the 50-odd prisoners who had done ten
years or more of a life sentence. As you may imagine, in the great majority of
cases this was for murder or rape. We did this by interviewing each one
individually in the prisons where they were serving their sentences. This meant
visiting most of the prisons of the State, but it was thought that only in that way
could a reasonable impression be gained and a useful opinion be offered as to
what might or might not be done in relation to these men. In this State, as I
understand it, a life sentence is usually to the order of 20-odd years in practice.
That is rather greater than is the case in Sweden (the country where Mr Eriksson
is Director-General) and rather greater than I understand is the situation in
England. However that may be, those who were approached called for careful
review,the ﬁnal responsibility being of course not with the Board, which simply
makes a report, but with the Executive through the Minister.
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The other types of case which come to the Board include the
habitual
criminals. Under the Statute the Board’s power of release on a Parole O
rder does
not apply to indeterminate sentences, life sentences, does not ap
ply to “habitual
criminal” declarations, does not apply to persons detained at th
e Governor’s
pleasure pursuant to a special ﬁnding under the Mental Health Act, and
does not
apply to a certain number of other imprisonments, includin
g those for
maintenance default and the like. But the habitual criminals, as most of y
ou will
remember, are released after they have served ﬁve-sixthsof the sentenc
e. The
sentence may be reviewed after they have served two-thirds, and in
particular
cases it is referred to us to recommend release at two-thirds, ﬁve-six
ths, or
otherwise. And then there are the awkward and difﬁcult cases (and we ha
ve not
had many of them so far) of the “Governor’s pleasure” type where a p
erson has
been found not guilty on the grounds of mental illness (having been fo
und ﬁt to
plead), nevertheless being only a short time in prison and now reporte
d to be
sane in all relevant respects: what to do in such a case? That also goe
s back to
the Minister for his decision and is his ultimate responsibility, but the
Board
makes a report and recommendation.
The Board then has basically to consider the cases that are dealt w
ith week
by week, and these would probably be mostly from Quarter Sessio
ns, for that is
where the great number originate. I am told by the secretary that
since the Act
came into force there have been altogether in this State nearly 1,0
00 non-parole
orders made. We have had occasion to consider somewhere between
200 and 300
in the seven months’ period. Of course you will realize that the majo
rity of those
have been the ones ﬁxed by the Board, because up to the pres
ent time the
judges’ cases have not yet arisen for consideration in any numb
er. Since
June/July/August of course the cases ﬁxed by the Chairmen where they we
re six
months (the minimum period which can be ﬁxed for non-parole
) are now
coming up for consideration. As a matter of interest, I asked for t
he ﬁgures last
Friday, and of the cases we have considered up to last Friday we h
ave made
Parole Orders in 71 cases and refused parole in 32 cases and a number
have been
deferred.
Let me tell you just what does happen, why we act in that w
ay. We may
be wrong, but the practice, so far, is that each week the cases
which are due to
be reviewed in the next two or three weeks (their non-parole
period having been
ﬁxed by a judge or, as may have happened, by the Board as
that ﬁrst duty we
had) are being brought to each member in this fashion. An
extract is prepared
from the main ﬁle. This will include a good deal of information
of the crime
itself, the prisoner’s photograph (for what it is worth), his ag
e, and a full record
of his previous convictions. There may be a summing up or
a judgment from the
Court of Criminal Appeal. These two documents of course giv
e a quick and
accurate picture of the nature of the offence and a good
deal of information
about the offender. Then there is also a report of the Classiﬁ
cations Committee
from the prison made within two, three or four weeks after h
is admission to the
penitentiary, and this is a useful original document. It cou
ldn’t, of course, have
been before the sentencing judge. It is a classiﬁcation mad
e after sentence and
after some period of observation. It is generally in the for
m of a psychological
report and assessment. Then there is in this ﬁle which is put b
efore each member
of the Board during the week in anticipation of a meetin
g on Friday a report
from the various prisons in relation to the man’s conduct,
his behaviour, his
work performance, and there are a number of headings unde
r which each one is
given. There is also of course the report of a psychiatris
t when there is a
particular medical problem. There is the written application of the m
an himself,
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 usually handwritten, and not always much help, but sometimes quite useful.
And there is a 'document we rely on considerably, a report of the Parole
Service. The Parole Officer has been seeing each one of these prisoners for some
time prior to his expected release. This is not done the day before or the dayafter release, it is done some time before. I won’t endeavour at the moment todiscuss the detail of their work. the relevance of it, beyond mere reference,because I see that we have yet to hear from the Principal Parole Ofﬁcer. Nor willI concern myself with referring to probation as distinct from parole, because Isee also that the Principal Probation Ofﬁcer is to speak. But there might also bethe pre-sentence report available from the Chairmen of Quarter Sessions. Theremay also be, and sometimes is, an application from a member of the family orsome other person interested in the prisoner and his future. And there may besome recommendation from the Principal Parole Ofﬁcer collating the ParoleOfﬁcers’ reports and adding recommendations for special conditions.
This material, a good deal of which could not be before the sentencing
judge, is put before the Board, and if any essential aspect of it is not complete
then it may be necessary to defer the matter for perhaps a week or two, or it
may be a month, for instance, if the prisoner’s work/conduct reports are poor,
he is lazy, truculent, difﬁcult, and the like. Not often does this happen, in our
experience. But if it does, the whole consideration is deferred for, say, two
months. The prisoner is notified that it will be reviewed at a certain date in the
light of further prison reports, and this has nearly always had a remarkably good
effect. If it doesn’t make the man a better citizen the warning does make him a
better prisoner, and does make him realize that there' are sanctions which are
important. Again there may be an outstanding charge yet to be dealt with or
there may be some deportation arrangement to be implemented. There may be
s0me factor which indicates that‘his parole plan is not quite complete but is
expected to be in the near future. Any one of these examples may indicate to
you why it is desirable not to decide “Yes” or “No” on the case at this moment
but for it to be reviewed next week or next month. The Parole Ofﬁcer may say,
“I am seeing his family next week”: this is quite important to us because of the
aspects of accommodation and employment, both of which are frequently
persuasive of a favourable order.
All these matters are to be considered, and, as you can see, of the 100 orso cases in which an order has ﬁnally been made about two-thirds have resultedin a Parole Order and the rest have met with refusal, although there have been anumber of cases deferred. We take the view that it is our duty to reviewimpartially all the materials available, and have due regard to any observation orrecommendation by the Judge who sentenced and saw the prisoner. We maythen still ask him to be brought to the Board for interview. This doesn’t happenin every case, but it happens in a number of cases, and it is sometimes veryuseful to see the man before (some time before) the parole is granted. We havealso as part of the process occasionally adopted the practice of having the ParoleOfﬁcer, who has the supervision responsibility, to bring him in for interview, andthe Parole Officer will attend the Board’s meeting with the prisoner, who by thistime is released and is in ordinary clothes and has a job. The Parole Ofﬁcer, incollaboration with some Civil Rehabilitation Committee, has perhaps found hima suitablejob, but it is thought that if he sees the Board as a group rather than asa paper figure and we have one of us speak to the prisoner, ask one or twoquestions, endeavouring not to patronize or be dogmatic or didactic, this as theParole Ofﬁcers tell us, is often of assistance to them and the prisoner in hissupervision. I would myself like to see more of these persons face to face, and no
26
  
doubt ideally every one should be seen. It is not practicable
for us to do that,
but we are anxious to do all we can and we encourage the Pa
role Ofﬁcers to
bring a parolee to see us if any useful purpose can be served b
y our doing so in a
particular case.
Now perhaps I might diverge for a moment to remind you of the practical
effect of remissions, because we have had some problems in working this out
from our point of view. Where there is a sentence imposed of, say, two, three,
four, or perhaps six years, in that sort of sentence which as many of you know
is very common indeed, reflecting the frequent pattern of the break, enter,and
steal charge in the greater number of cases, most judges find that if you can
strike a balance between the time which would in fact be served and the period
for which it is desirable to have supervision, about a halfway mark will
effectuate this, for the following reasons. If the sentence is, say, six years, and
the prisoner has not served three months or more in the past, the normal
remission in his case will be one-third, so that six becomes four. In addition,
if
he undertakes a training programme designed and organized by the Department,
and perhaps later goes to an open security prison, he may get for either of these
factors two days a month special remission. These of course can be lost by
misconduct, but let us assume that he is an average prisoner and co-operat
es, as
most of them do. So let us assume that four years becomes something l
ess, say,
between three and a half and four. If the non-parole period is fixed at half
the
sentence, i.e. three years, there is then some time left if the prisone
r is to be
released at, say, three years and nine months, so he will have the beneﬁt
of a
nine months’ remission, if it be so termed. But the parole period, as l ha
ve
already mentioned, will last for the balance of the six years, and if the pa
role is
revoked, as it normally would be on further conviction and gaol
sentence, the
Board’s warrant of revocation returns him to prison where he serves the who
le of
the balance of the three years. Any time off parole does not count.
This is
different from licence because, as you know, a licence will run with the pr
isoner
and if he is released on licence and it lasts for most of the time (the
licence is
usually for five years) and then he has his licence revoked and he is re
turned he
will only have to serve the balance of the licence period. But the P
arole Statute
expressly provides that time off on parole is not taken into accou
nt. The
prisoner could of course, having gone back to serve the three years
, then earn
remissions on that three years, but the previous one has gone.
So, following what the Chief Justice says, it is to be borne
in mind that
this man, this prisoner, is coming out anyhow in perhaps a year o
r so, and the
question for us is: if the non-parole period has been fixed, is this
the right time
to release on parole conditions? If it is, what are the appropriate
conditions? Is it
better that he be released now, or in the near future following arr
angements for
his work and home to be synthesized under conditions reasonably practi
cal for
the balance of his period? ls society and the community then
protected by
having this man under supervision for the balance of that period (it
may be some
years), or do we release him uncontrolled, without sanction o
r order? The
answer in many cases seems to be obvious, yet on the other han
d there are a
great many dedicated criminals whose early release simply mea
ns that they will
return at once to a life of crime. The Parole Service is not unlimited i
n power or
numbers and cannot be expected to achieve miracles, and indeed
it would be a
wrong thing in these cases to risk the community’s safety with such
a prisoner,
and for that reason the power of denial is to be exercised.
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 As I have indicated, the ﬁgures will vary in the future for this reason: that
when the Board ﬁxed non-parole periods for the large number then coming
under the terms of Section 5 of the Act they were dealing more or less arbitrarily
with a large number many of whom had quite bad records, and one would
expect that many of them will never receive a Parole Order. The cases that the
courts ﬁx have very often been cases where the Judge has thought that six
months would be a suitable non-parole period, and in many cases that has been
the feeling of the Board upon further information. So that the number granted
and the number refused will, I would expect, change in future. It will perhaps be
more than two-thirds granted, but I am not able to determine that this will be
the fact.
There is one other aspect that I would think worth mentioning, and that is
to remind you that relevant to this question the ﬁnal section of the Statute
speciﬁcally reserves the right of the of the Royal prerogative of mercy: “Nothing
in this Act shall be so construed as to limit or affect the Royal prerogative of
mercy”. This means of course that there would be, or could be, no hindrance to
a sentencing judge to make (as was often done in the past) a recommendation
for mercy or for release on licence earlier, which I suppose amounts to the same
thing, without reference to the Parole Board. These are cases which are dealt
with by the Minister for early release. I suppose there could be no objection to a
non-parole period being speciﬁed and at the same time a recommendation of this
kind being made. Nor would I think any objection could validly be put to a
non-parole period being ﬁxed and the whole sentence, including the
speciﬁcation, being suspended if that was thought to be appropriate. But these
are matters which the District Court Judges know so much more about than we
do, or than I do.
This Board, as most of you know, doesn’t sit in public. It consists of,
besides myself, a Deputy Chairman (Judge Levine), the Comptroller-General of
Prisons, the former Under Secretary of Justice (Mr Simpson Wallace Ramsay),
the former Registrar of the University of Sydney (Miss Margaret Telfer), and Mr
Harold Warnam Robertson, 3 leading citizen. The last two are what might be
referred to as “lay” members. We sit at present only once a week, but we have to
consider between now and the end of the year some 500 cases.
But I understand my brief to be limited to simply telling you something of
the way in which this new Board takes its part in the sentencing process. We of
course accept the sentence as a proper one, frequently conﬁrmed by the Court
of Criminal Appeal, and we have the non-parole period ﬁxed. If it is ﬁxed at a
time too close to the expiration of the sentence this can create a problem. In a
case of, say six years with a non-parole period ﬁxed at four years and some
months it might very well happen that he is due for release by the
Comptroller-General before the non-parole period is up. What happens then? If
the period has almost expired the prisoner would prefer to have no parole
provisions. He would not wish, for the sake of two or three weeks’ earlier
release, perhaps to submit to a two or three years’ Parole Ofﬁcer’s control. To
strike the balance between what is thought to be the minimum he should serve
and the period he is to be supervised, yet leave the prisoner some margin in
which he can be encouraged to co-operate in his own rehabilitation would seem
to us desirable.
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 THE ROLE OF THE PRISON SERVICE
IN THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
J. A . MORONY"
Mr Chief Justice, Gentlemen:
I did want to make some observations on the purpo
ses of punishment. The
Chief Justice has already covered this topic ver
y adequately, but there is a
difference, I think, in the position from which
he sees the problem and the
position from which I see it. One might say that
he is on top of the pole looking
down, while I am nearer the bottom of the pole l
ooking around, and I think this
does make some difference in the emphases.
There are some hypotheses that, from the priso
n administrator’s point of
view,lare so valid that they ought to be enunciat
ed every now and then. They are
axiomatic, almost cliches, but they need to be
made. The ﬁrst of these is that
crime is a social occurrence. It would tax your i
ngenuity to ﬁnd any crime, apart
from attempted suicide, that a person can com
mit on his own, that is, without
involving other people. The second is that as lo
ng as people have lived together
there has been crime and there has been punish
ment for crime. And the third of
these is that as crime is essentially an urban
phenomenon, the larger our cities
become the larger becomes our criminal rate,
and this is not an arithmetical
progression but rather a geometrical progressio
n.
The Chief Justice has very properly said that
imprisonment is only one of
a number of punishments. Imprisonment i
s also (with the exception of
probation, if you call probation a punishment)
probably the newest punishment.
It is less than two hundred years since John
Howard became High Sheriff of
Bedford, and the prisons about which he was so
critical were not prisons as we
know them today. They were not prisons desi
gned to keep people ordered to be
imprisoned for punishment. They were to c
ontain people who were held in
custody for one of two reasons: either to
ensure that they would appear at
Court to be tried or, having been tried, to
be held until such time as the
punishment ordered by the Court was carried
out. And that punishment might
be one of a variety of measures: it could
have been a money penalty, or
execution, or ﬂogging, or banishment, or the
holding up to public ridicule in the
stocks or pillory. Prisons built to be primarily
places of punishment are probably
no more than a hundred and ﬁfty years old. A
nd I ﬁnd it a matter of regret that
some of the original prisons built for this pu
rpose are Still with us and in use,
because this has a very great bearing on what
sort of rehabilitative treatment is
possible.
The prison administrator must bring to acc
ount also the type of persons
comprising his prison population. I did not
come with a whole list of statistics
this evening, but the prison population in
New South Wales today is about
3,700. The number of prisoners received in
a year in New South Wales is about
17,000. The great majority of prisoners c
ome in for very short sentences.
Something like 60 per cent of them are c
ommitted for non-payment of ﬁnes.
This I ﬁnd to be rather incongruous: that
an offence is considered a lesser
 
* F.R.I.P.A., Comptroller-General of Prisons for New
South Wales.
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offence and therefore is met with a money penalty, but the only alternative tothe payment of the money penalty is imprisonment. If the penalty is properlythe payment of money then surely this ought to be the penalty. But in ourprisons there are a great number of people who are serving short sentences, lessthan six months, very many serving lesser periods, and mostly in default of ﬁnes.
In 1906 there were just 2,000 prisoners in New South Wales, with ageneral population of 1,500,000. Between then and now the prison populationhas risen 80% while the general population has risen by 200%. Why thedifference in rates of increase? I suggest that there could be three reasons for
this: that there are fewer people committing crimes, that there are fewer people
being sent to prison, or that the people who are sent to prison are sentenced tolesser periods. It must be one of those three, but which it is is a propositionwhich cannot be proved. It is, however, an interesting speculation.
What is punishment for? I must agree with the Chief Justice that the veryobvious answer to this question is that it is for the purpose of protecting thecommunity, but when one moves further from this general statement one getsinto controversy, because there are very diverse views as to the best way toprotect the community by punishment. For this reason I make little apology forsetting out brieﬂy from the penological point of view the practical theories of
punishment.
Punishment is designed, as the name implies, to punish the offender. It can
be referred to as retribution. It is sometimes referred to as vengeance. It is in fact
an attitude of the community. It is an attitude that we all adopt. How often
does one hear it said, “He got what he deserved” or “He didn’t get as much as he
deserved”. This is retribution, and I think that this is a very proper purpose of
punishment. I think this is the political purpose of punishment, and I don’t use
“political” in any other sense than the legislative purpose of punishment. This
expresses the opinion of the community about the offence, and expresses the
opinion about the offence rather than about the offender.
The next of the classical theories is the theory of expiation, and this is, in
my view, esoteric, theological and out of date.
Let us now move to one of the more contentious issues: that of
deterrence. There are, as you are aware, two aspects of deterrence: there is the
aspect of general deterrence and the aspect of particular deterrence. To deﬁnegeneral deterrence, there is undoubtedly great force in a view that people are
constrained not to offend because the law has said that this is an offence and apunishable offence and teeth are given to enactment by the actions of the courtsin imposing sentences. But I am not so sure that specific or particular deterrence
really operates. I think one of the dangers here is that legislators and judges and
prison administrators tend to look at this problem from their own points of
view, not the point of view of the rather inadequate, maladjusted person from
the sub-culture in the community who is generally the offender. The Chief
Justice very properly said that there are no statistics taken of it and therefore it
is inappropriate to make any comment. With great reluctance, Sir; I propose to
make one comment: that there is one offence which is always discovered, wherethe offender is almost always taken, where a conviction always results and the
punishment is always cumulative, and that is the offence of escaping from lawful
custody. Now, this offence and its consequences have all the ingredients of
deterrence, but it still doesn’t stop people from escaping, or rather, it doesn’t
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 stop everybody from escaping. I don't know how many people it
does stop from
escaping, but it doesn’t stop everybody from escaping and so it h
as no universal
application. And this, I think, is probably the strongest area of det
errence that
one can vizualize in this State’s law.
The fourth of the classical theories is the theory of r
eform or
rehabilitation. May I suggest that it is worthwhile looking at t
hese words. We
talk about “reform”, “rehabilitation”, but is the prefix “re”
really appropriate?
If we take “rehabilitation” to mean “reclothing”, we are dealing with
a lot of
people who have never been “clothed” in the sense of that usage
. However, that
is in passing. What does happen is that a prison provides a measur
e of training or
treatment for convicted offenders, and before referring to s
ome of the
difﬁculties and some of the constructive things that can b
e done I must
emphasize that there is no universality. You cannot treat ever
ybody so as to
make each one a better person than he is. If you could, the churc
hes would have
succeeded two thousand years ago. This is something for which
we have not yet
discovered proper answers.
The ﬁnal purpose of punishment is one which has recently receiv
ed a new
name from the Americans. It is the one they call incapacitat
ion, which means
simply that if you put a person in prison he cannot commit
crimes in the
community so long as he remains in prison. This is of course
entirely valid, but
at some time or another he must be released.
Are there any new concepts? 1 don’t know of any, but I thin
k that this is
an area in which a search might well be made, because the p
roblem is one from
which the community is suffering very severely. Far too much
of the time and
wealth of the community is being applied to its erring member
s. For instance, it
can take four years and several millions of dollars to build a
new prison to take
300 or 400 prisoners and yet (as this year has shown) this numb
er can be added
to the prison population in a matter of six weeks. With all the m
oney and all the
goodwill that you have, you cannot keep up with this increas
ing rise of criminal
population. This is very important when one comes to the qu
estion of what can
be done in a prison in the way of treatment and training. And o
f course it is not
only the increase in crime that causes an increase in the prison p
opulation; there
are other matters which are related, but not directly r
elated. For instance, with
an illustration I have used before, one person getting one y
ear’s sentence is a
daily average population of one, so are twelve people each ge
tting a month, and
so are 365 people each getting a day. So that the length of sen
tence has a bearing
in the same sort of way as the number of people.
It is commonplace to say that we are at the crossroads in the
treatment of
the offender, but it perhaps does make a starting point t
o look at this as a
stage in the treatment of the convicted offender. In the
past lie isolation,
punishment,vengeance, call it what you like, all achieved, a
s the Chief Justice
succinctly observed, through the deprivation of a man’s lib
erty. May we hope
that in the future there will be a careful study of the man and
his actions and an
intensiﬁed search for a curative programme.
But let me not talk too glibly about curative programmes.
This is
undoubtedly one of the hardest things that man has ever unde
rtaken. Let us
simply assume that the purpose of imprisonment may in future
be an effort to
turn out the man a better man than when he came to pr
ison. As I have said, we
can talk much too glibly about rehabilitation, reform, re-educatio
n, but only too
often is there too little to rehabilitate or reform. One of the
things we have
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 learned in recent times is that the prisoner in general represents the proﬁle of
failure as a citizen. By and large he is the unintelligent, the illiterate, the
under-educated, the truant, the unemployed or the sporadically employed, the
vocationally unskilled, the domestically unattached — in fact, the man at the
bottom of the pack. How can we seek to place, or replace, in such a person those
normal and personal attributes which home (if he has ever had one), or school,
or community, has so signally failed to instal?
I think, too, that we must be clear about what we mean by training or
treatment. There are a number of things a prison can do; if the prisoner is
willing, they should be done. We can educate (we have, as you know, people
studying at university level), and in some cases this is having a signiﬁcantly
curative effect. We can teach people to be tradesmen. We can teach them habits
of work. We can teach them something of social living — not enough, but
something. We can provide an interregnum, as it were, during which time they
may mature, and when all is said and done I think it is maturation which really
changes a person from being a criminal to being a conforming citizen.
But having said that, let us look at what the restrictions may be. The first
one is: how do you train a person who is serving a very‘short sentence? You may
remember that I referred to sentences in default of ﬁnes, and these are almost
invariably very short sentences. These people are in prison, and all they do is to
clog up the works of the prison.
Secondly, how much treatment or training is possible in an overcrowded
prison? I was reading the other day that in one province in West Germany there
was a waiting list for prison, and I thought this a most delightful idea.
Apparently at the time this article was written there was a six months’ waiting
list, so that if you were sentenced today you would have to wait six months
before you started to serve your sentence. Unfortunately, although this was
published as a news item, I find it rather difﬁcult to believe. Certainly we have
no power here to put up a “House Full” sign. Those the courts send to us we
must take, and we must take them for the length of time the courts send them
to us. Overcrowding forces criminals into closer association with one another, it
leaves many of them workless, it overtaxes the educational facilities and
psychiatric and medical resources, and spreads ever more thinly the personal
contact of ofﬁcers, and therefore the remedial potential.
The third of these factors is the long sentence. Treatment applied during a
very long sentence is a rather difﬁcult term to interpret to the prisoner. I
suppose in any event there is a very marked difference of opinion even in this
audience as to what- constitutes a very long sentence. But let us look for a
moment at what is a very common occurrence: a 19 or 20 year-old youth
convicted and sentenced to, say, 12 years. The sentence is rather too long for a
19-year-old to realize its full length. We often ﬁnd at this point of sentence
either apathy or despair, and neither of these are very good bases for starting a
treatment/training programme. But how does an ofﬁcer set to work on this?
You reckon that training in the trade skills usually takes about three years. Do
you use the ﬁrst three years for training and the next period of the sentence for
him to forget what he has learned? Or do you use the ﬁrst years simply to be in
prison, and the last three for training? I maintain that these are the simple
choices and real problems to be looked at. It seems that this is one place where
the parole legislation passed last year ﬁlls a gap very neatly. Lest I be
misunderstood on this point I want it to be abundantly clear that I believe that
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long sentences are essential for various people at various times for various c
rimes.
My plea is that we do not try to justify long sentences on, particularly, t
he
grounds of rehabilitation. ,There is ample justiﬁcation for them in terms
of
retribution or in terms of incapacitation, and if they are justiﬁed on tho
se
grounds this tends to avoid some of the ambivalence in the minds of ofﬁc
ers
who are working with them as prisoners. '
Practically everything I have said has been dealing with the larger group of
prisoners whom I have described as inadequate, maladjusted people. It is
necessary, to keep the picture in perspective, to assert that there is a very much
smaller group of prisoners who, in their inﬂuence, in their potentiality‘to cause
trouble, outweigh their more numerous colleagues, and who, simply because of
their malignant inﬂuence are, and should be, classed apart, and to whom what I
have said may well be inapplicable.
The essential point, in my view, i.e. the prison administrator’s point of
view, is that when an offence is committed it is the job of the police to solve the
crime, it is the job of the courts tovdetermine guilt or innocence, the problem (or
the difﬁculty) of the judge to impose a sentence for the offence, but what
arrives at-the gate of the prison is a person, a whole person, with both strengths
and weaknesses. And as I was listening to the Chief Justice I thought that I
might conclude by misquoting Gilbert and saying that as it is the court’s
function to make the punishment ﬁt the crime, it is the prison’s task to try to
make the punishment ﬁt the criminal;
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 THE ROLE OF THE ADULT PROBATION SERVICE
W. J. KEEFE*
Mr Chief Justice, Gentlemen:
Adult Probation has changed considerably since the rudimentary era of
John Augustus in Massaschusetts and the London Court Missionaries of the 19th
Century. Probation has now generally been incorporated in the overall system
designed for the prevention of crime and treatment of offenders. In 1951 the
United Nations Economic and Social Council urged all governments to consider
the adoption and development of Probation.
The modern Probation Service is State controlled with trained personnel
and is interwoven into the legal system. Probation is aimed at the offender in a
positive way with an overall responsibility to the community. It is generally
closely allied to the courts. Recently a comment was made that “Probation is
the eyes and ears” of the Court.
The New South Wales Adult Probation Service has been organized as an
adjunct to the Courts of Quarter Sessions for the purpose of furnishing
pre-sentence reports and supervising offenders released on probation. Since the
inception of the Service in 1951 every effort has been made to maintain and
develop the Service at a high standard with case loads set at a level where
probation supervision can be a real factor in the life of the person on probation.
It has been the unfortunate experience of many other probation services that
whilst highly qualiﬁed ofﬁcers are employed; they are swamped by the number
of persons under their control and can barely maintain even cursory contact
with their probationers. Probation under these conditions appears to be a waste
of time and money.
For the purposes of this Seminar the aims of the New South Wales Adult
Probation Service may perhaps best be illustrated by a description of the
functions and comments based on the experience of Probation Officers.
Pre-sentence Reporting
Individualization of sentence obviously requires reliable information
concerning the circumstances and background of the offender. The pre-sentence
report prOvides an objective account of the offender’s family background, home
environment, ﬁnancial circumstan~.:es, education, employment history, mental
and physical health, general reputation, social and sporting activities, associates
and habits, together with his reaction to his environment and circumstances.
Special attention is directed to the circumstances of the offence, the factors
leading to his involvement, his reaction to arrest, his remorse and his plans and
attitudes as to the future. During the course of the pre-sentence inquiry
members of his family, his employers, his friends and other persons who have
known the offender are interviewed. Their opinions are assessed and can be
extremely useful in considering the offender’s prospects for rehabilitation.
 
* Principal Probation Ofﬁcer, Adult Probation Service of N.S.W.
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Objective pre-sentence reporting not only assists the Court to determine
proper sentence but protects public interest by enabling the Court to recognize
not only the factors which indicate that an offender has the resources to respond
to positive treatment but also to recognize where such treatment may be
misplaced.
At present it is the practice to invite selected accused persons to
co—operate in the preparation of pre-sentence reports before they appear for
sentence. This has certain advantages in that the report is available when the
accused appears. However for many reasons it is not practical to prepare reports
on all offenders where such would be desirable. In these cases the Court may
remand the accused person, either on bail or in custody, until a report is
prepared. Whilst this is often done some persons are sentenced without the
Court having the benefit of a report. Sometimes, the Court may be asked to act
on unreliable information supplied by the accused, or by well meaning but
uninformed persons, or certain aspects of his background may be concealed
from the Court. Some offenders are discouraged from co-operating in the
preparation of reports where it is known that there are unfavourable factors in
their backgrounds. It is not suggested that a poor background is a barrier to
rehabilitation but it is essential that there be frankness on the part of the
accused person for any prospect of success. ’
With the advent of new Parole legislation the intormation contained in the
pre-sentence report is of value not only to Judges and Magistrates but also to the
Parole Board in those cases where the offender is imprisoned. It may well be
worthwhile considering, whether in some categories of offenders, either by
administrative arrangement or by legislation the preparation of a pre-sentence
report prior to sentence should now be mandatory.
Supervision
Adult Probation offers further protection of the public interest by
providing ofﬁcial facilities for responsible supervision and guidance of offenders.
The unavoidable risk involved in releasing offenders on recognizance can be
minimized if such offenders are supervised. The supervisory aspects of probation
are distinctly authoritarian and probationers are required under penalty of
breach of recognizance to be of good behaviour, to remain in employment, to
support their families, to avoid undesirable associations and to comply with any
other special conditions which may be imposed by the Court. Without
supervision, a Court is rarely aware of any failure to observe the foregoing
obligations until a further offence is committed. Under supervision these aspects
of a probationer’s mode of living are under close scrutiny by a trained ofﬁcer.
Any indications that a probationer is likely to lapse are quickly noted and action
can be taken to deal with the situation before the probationer’s conduct
deteriorates to.a stage where further offences occur. Probation supervision, of
course, is not infallible but there is greater prospect of compliance by unstable
and irresponsible persons where they are supervised and must regularly account
to the Court through their Probation Ofﬁcer for their day to day conduct. In
this regard Probation is not a “let off” but is a discipline under which many
young offenders learn to accept responsibility for the first time. At the same
time they are not subject to the negative aspects of imprisonment.
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The guidance functions of probation ensure appropriate treatment for
each individual offender. Probationers vary greatly in their ability and readiness
to respond to the opportunities available to them. Most have a desire to take
advantage of their opportunities and comply with reasonable demands but often
require encouragement and direction. Probation is aimed at developing the
positive qualities and correcting the deficiencies of each person as a means of
achieving a reasonable adjustment to their circumstances and the normal
demands of society.
Probation does not seek to deal with offenders to whom its techniques are
not suited and who merely seek their release to continue their criminal
behaviour. Probation is not necessary for those fortuitous offenders to whom
the experience of arrest and conviction is salutary and who have the capacity to
ensure their own future good conduct.
General
Probation like any social reform can only succeed when it has a reasonable
degree of public approval. The New South Wales Adult Probation Service has not
sought publicity but has rather sought to become merged in the processes of the
law and to be judged by the work done. Good results have been achieved and
most persons released on probation have completed their period, of probation
satisfactorily. However the greatest benefits for society from probation cannot
be expressed in percentages. Abstract factors of maturation, correction of
character defect, acceptance of responsibility, better moral values and more
responsible family life are c0nsidered to be of greater importance on a long term
basis.
A practical aspect of probation is that it is economical compared with
imprisonment. Probationers remain in regular employment contributing to
production and spending their earnings in the general economy. Their
dependants are maintained instead of being a charge on social service beneﬁts.
This is achieved whilst the probationer is under official surveillance and in most
cases unlikely to resort to crime to satisfy his needs. Many offenders can be
required to compensate their victims, pay fines, or awards based on extent of
injury, pain and suffering.
Comments
It is considered that ataSeminar on Sentencing the persons attending,
particularly Judges and Magistrates, will appreciate some cements as to the
effectiveness of the various sentences imposed as seen by persons required to
deal with'offenders for some time after they have appeared before the Court.
The following comments are offered for consideration and perhaps to stimulate
discussion. Of necessity they refer only to matters within the province of the
Adult Probation Service.
1. Persons released on probation without a pre-sentence report do not
reSpond as well as those who have such report prepared.
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 There are many reasons for this but the signiﬁcant feature is that
when a report is prepared prior to sentence the offender is anxious and
uncertain and more willing to frankly discuss his position and to reveal his
problems. The offender who receives a bond without this experience has
achieved his freedom and often this is done without the extent of his
difficulties or his basic defects being examined. Sometimes he has deceived
the Court and there is a danger that he can see himself as having come out
of his joust with the law quite convinced that he can try again with the
same result.
The period of supervision speciﬁed by the Court is often too long. It has
been the experience of ofﬁcers of this Service that probation supervision
makes its greatest contribution during the ﬁrst year — most breakdowns
tend to occur during this period. It is suggested that in most cases
probationers could be released from their obligation to report at the end
of two years. This can either be done by making discharge a matter for the
discretion of the Probation Service —— a formal discharge by the Court at
this period or by limiting the period of supervision when the original order
is made.
It is not suggested that discharge from probation should release an
offender from the other conditions of his recognizance which will often
extend for a longer period. It is, in fact, suggested that generally the
requirements of good behaviour etc. should extend beyond the period of
probation. Similarly supervision should continue whilst compensation is
unpaid.
Conditions as to abstinence from alcohol and being on premises where it
may be obtained. Whilst there are some circumstances where such a
condition may have a beneﬁcial effect, it is generally a matter of
considerable difﬁculty.
The tendency is often to impose this condition on persons least
likely or least able to comply with it. This leads to a situation where
probationers cannot be frank about their drinking problems and Probation
Ofﬁcers are often compelled to deal with this situation knowing that their
charges are drinking but will not discuss this aspect of their conduct. The
Probation Ofﬁcer cannot interpret the Court’s decision too liberally as the
probationer will feel encouraged to ﬂout the condition still further and
unless there is a flagrant breach it is not practical to refer the matter back
to the Court.
Conditions as to compensation. Whilst there is a point of view that courts
are not .debt collectors and that other processes should be invoked to
obtain ﬁnancial redress from offenders it is felt that in the efforts towards
prevention of further offences and the rehabilitation of the offender,
payment of reasonable compensation is of paramount importance.
Anything which encourages an offender to avoid his responsibilities
or creates the impressions that his defalcations are in the nature of a
business debt is, in the opinion of experienced Probation Ofﬁcers,
extremely detrimental to the prospects of rehabilitation. The slow and
methodical repayment of compensation is an important factor in the
rehabilitation of many offenders, who not only discharge their legal and
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 moral obligation in this way but often gain a measure of self respect and a
more responsible outlook in the process. Some develop attitudes which
enable them to convert their habits of compensation payments into a
methodical saving programme for the future.
Conditions as to psychiatric treatment. Probation Ofﬁcers are always
guided by medical opinion on this aspect both as to whether treatment is
required and as to when it shall cease.
Most offenders released on probation are placed on probation as a speciﬁc
condition of a Common Law Bond. This has proved to be an extremely
satisfactory process with great ﬂexibility. There has been nothing to
suggest that this procedure should be altered in any way. There is
provision in the Crimes Act for the making of regulations in regard to
Probation but to date no regulations have been made andnone are sought
by this Service, save perhaps in regard to reciprocal arrangements between
States to provide for supervision of interstate offenders.
In some cases, particularly offenders released from Courts of Petty
Sessions, persons are released on probation as a condition of a
recognizance granted under Section 558 of the Crimes Act. No serious
problems are encountered by this Service although it is understood that
some legal difﬁculty exists in taking aCtion where the breach is only failure
to comply with reasonable directions given by a Probation Ofﬁcer. This is
not usually a practical problem as “failure to report” is the most common
breach and this is invariably associated with failure to report to the Police
who can readily take action.
In many cases Judges and Magistrates have seen ﬁt to remand offenders for
ﬁxed periods prior to ﬁnal sentencing. This is considered by-Probation
Ofﬁcers to be a valuable process with certain offenders, particularly those
who are doubtful risks if released on bond or those who are convinced that
they will get a bond because of some faulty reasoning on their own part or
that of their friends and associates. In both cases a period of uncertainty
has a marked effect — sometimes a short period in-custody is involved — in
others there is a fairly lengthy remand whilst under supervision. During
this period the offender will endeavour to build up “credit” for when he
retums to Court. At this time positive methods can also be used.
Frequently the improved conduct of this period has lasting effects as
faulty habits are broken, unsatisfactory associations are terminated and
the benefits of regular employment and steady income are realized.
Another procedure of considerable merit is that Judges and Magistrates
require periodical reports from Probation Ofﬁcers as to the conduct and
progress of persons placed on probation. The offender is aware that such
reports are being submitted and may be called up if his conduct is
unsatisfactory. These reports enable Judges and Magistrates to study the
effects of their sentence and enable them to understand the functioning of
the offender in the community. The Probation Ofﬁcer is encouraged in his
efforts and there is an incentive for him to ensure that he carries out his
job at the high standard expected.
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THE ROLE OF THE PRISON FIELD SERVICE
F. 0. HA YES* '
Mr Chairman, Gentlemen:
I
The parole, after-care and prison social work services of the New South
Wales Prisons Department, are carried out by the Parole Ofﬁcers of the Prison
Field Service. This unit consists of 24 ofﬁcers and trainees, all of whom are
qualiﬁed social workers or are in training at the University of New South Wales.
The basic principles of operation for this Service are:
(1) Parole is regarded as an integral part of the rison ex erience. Therefore,. P P
personal contact w1th prisoners by Parole Ofﬁcers must be made as early
as possible during sentence.
(2) The institutional contact made by Parole Ofﬁcers must extend to families
and the dependants of prisoners so that, on release, the problem that may
have previously existed in respect to the home or neighbourhood may be
more satisfactorily met. The personal contact made in prison is carried
through into society by Parole Ofﬁcers after the release of the prisoner.
(3) The standard of training for parole and after-care must be on a
professional basis which will permit social casework services to be provided
both within the institution and on release. .
(4) The services of the Parole Ofﬁcers must be closely linked with a wide
cover of voluntary community services which, in conjunction with the
Prison Field Service, would provide:
(i) material and personal assistance to released prisoners;
(ii) assistance to the families and dependants of prisoners;
- I
(iii) local extension of statutory supervision exercised by Parole Ofﬁcers;
(iv) development of a well-informed body of public opinion on prisoner
rehabilitation and the need for community action and support of
such measures.
Institutional Work
V Within this framework, Parole Ofﬁcers from the Parole Training Unit
commence work at the Reception Board stage within the Metropolitan
Reception Prison. The Parole Ofﬁcer’s function on the Reception Board is as a
social .worker. He is concerned with the immediate material and personal
problems which may cause anxiety and concern to the new prisoner. These
problems may range from a serious personal or domestic problem to such
matters as ascertaining whether, a prisoner’s job can be kept for him, or the
collection of luggage, or the passing on of personal messages related to the
imprisonment and whereabouts of the prisoner.
* B.A., Dip. Soc. Stud. (Sydney), Dip. Soc. (N.S.W.), Principal Parole Ofﬁcer
(now Director of Probation and Parole Services).
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 Depending on the circumstances of the case, the Parole Ofﬁcer may either
act directly or he may refer the matter immediately to one of the community
groups associated with the Parole Ofﬁcers, or make a referral to the Prisoners’
Aid Association for immediate welfare assistance. It must be remembered that
the number of men being received into gaol and interviewed by the Reception
Board may be over 200 prisoners each week. In view of these numbers, it is not
possible for the Parole Ofﬁcers to deal at length personally with every case. It is
necessary therefore to refer to community bodies represented on the Civil
Rehabilitation Committees for assistance, particularly in welfare work.
Contact at the Reception Board enables the Parole Ofﬁcer not only to give
what personal assistance is possible to the newly arrived prisoner, but it also
permits him to refer cases to the other Parole Officers once the prisoner is
classiﬁed, so that eventually the case can be followed up by a Parole Ofﬁcer and
personal contact maintained whilst in another institution.
It has been found that the earlier a prisoner is seen by a Parole Ofﬁcer the
better. A helpful relationship made at an early stage in prison is far more
effective than contact made only after the prisoner is released. It is a fact that
prison is a community which fosters and generates its own values, often in
distinct opposition to the values acceptable to a law-abiding community. The
process of “prisonization” affects most prisoners despite the efforts of prison
staff to overcome or modify this difﬁculty, which is one of the in-built hazards
of institutional life. It is essential therefore that either through individual case
work or group work there be a form of personal and helpful contact with
prisoners by Parole Ofﬁcers. This contact must be on a practical basis directed
towards helping the prisoner with any personal matters which he wishes to
discuss. It must also give the prisoner sufﬁcient time to talk about these
problems and his future in a way which will allow planning to be undertaken for
the rebuilding of his life after release. In fact it is at this stage that the
framework of a parole plan is developed, so that eventually a comprehensive
pre-release report can be prepared for the Parole Board.
At the Classiﬁcation stage Parole Ofﬁcers are involved in the training
programme, particularly where it is felt that personal interest in a prisoner and
his family should be maintained. As social workers the Parole Ofﬁcers link the
training programme with the development of post-release plans.
The essential element in the assistance given by the Parole Ofﬁcers to
prisoners during sentence is its practical nature. It deals with the “here and now”
problems and extends such assistance to aspects related to the future life of the
prisoner. The institutional work of Parole Ofﬁcers is principally getting the
prisoner back on his feet and in so doing helping him to keep out of trouble.
Help and advice given during sentence not only build up trust and conﬁdence in
the Parole Ofﬁcer, but also enable a prisoner as far as possible to clarify his
future plans and link his prison training, such as education and vocational
interests, with-a new life after release.
In order to maintain contact with prisoners, Parole Ofﬁcers travel regularly
to all institutions within the State. Personal contact with these institutions
permits:
(1) A follow-up of cases seen at the Central Reception Prison or referred by
the Classiﬁcation Committee or by other Parole Ofﬁcers.
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 (2) To arrange whatever assistance is required by a prison
er or his family in
the event of release.
(3) The preparation of a pre-release report for the Parole B
oard in respect to
those prisoners who have had non-parole periods set by the Co
urt. This
report will cover signiﬁcant points relative to the materia
l side of a
prisoner’s resettlement and will present an evaluation of the po
ssible
future success of the prisoner on his return to the free commu
nity.
Knowledge of the prisoner and his difﬁculties enables the Parole Ofﬁ
cer to
suggest the inclusion within a Parole Order of additional san
ctions
considered necessary to assist the prisoner on release and facilitate c
ontrol
during a period of conditional liberty.
Field Work
A basic'task is the preparation of the prisoner for release and the success
of later parole supervision is contingent on the quality of this form
of
institutional work, Supervision in the community therefore is developed in
accordance with the framework of control set prior to release by the Parole
Order. However, supervision must also be a helping, enabling process, which
ensures that the released parolee:
(l) obtains employment without much undue delay;
(2) has adequate accommodation and in the cases of homeless e-x-prisoners has
some personal contact in the community;
(3) remains in contact with the Parole Ofﬁcer who can assist and guide the
parolee during this period of conditional liberty.
The conditions of parole are made clear to the parolee and these sanctions
are enforced through careful oversight.
Field supervision means personal contact with the released prisoner based
on the needs of the parolee and the necessity to afford an effective means of
community protection during the parole period. Therefore, as far as possible the
family of .a parolee is involved, and contact also is maintained with signiﬁc
ant
people in his life.
Community Work
The contact with each parolee maintained by a Parole Ofﬁcer must be
limited simply because of the time available for institutional and supervis
ory
work. Therefore, a system of community aid has been developed in New So
uth
Wales which is based on the involvement of organizations and citizens thro
ugh
the Civil Rehabilitation Committees. These committees are established in
the
following areas:
Sydney Berrima
Newcastle Northern Regional
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 Cumberland ' Canberra—Monaro
Bankstown & District Lithgow
Wollongong St 'George —Sutherland
Northern Suburbs Penrith
ManlyV—Warringah Bathurst
‘ Dubbo Tamworth
The ﬁrst objective of the Committees is to ensure that no prisoner is
stranded on release. Where possible, employment is arranged or a personal
contact is maintained with the prisoner until a job is obtained._Accommodation,
either in hostels or in boarding houses, is arranged; or the ﬁnancial means are
provided for the prisoner to obtain his own accommodation if he so desires.
Many prisoners may require clothes or working tools and these too are obtained
through the agency of the Civil Rehabilitation Committees. The Committees are
comprised of ofﬁcial representatives of the Churches, R.S.S.A.I.L.A., Chamber
of~.Manufacturers, Trades and labour Council, Sydney Legacy, Howard Prison
Reform League, Prisoners’ Aid Association, Parole Ofﬁcers, Commonwealth
Employment Service, Representative of the Comrhissioner of 'Police,
representative of the Chief Justice of New South Wales. In the regional
Committees, the Committees’ membership includes many local organizations,
e.g. Service Clubs, local charitable groups and private citizens. Each Committee
works in contact with a Parole Ofﬁcer who is there primarily to facilitate the
work of the Committee and to inform them of cases of prisoners who may
require assistance.
The primary aim is the provision of material aid, but it has been made
clearly evident that if post-release assistance is restricted merely to material help
it will soon degenerate into a “handout”. It is essential, therefore, that a close
personal interest be maintained in the prisoner and if possible in his family, until
it is felt that the released man or woman has settled down in the community.
This work must be carried out with a strong measure of common sense, so that
me Committee’s activities do not become a form of surveillance, nor do they
ecome an unwanted intrusion into the private affairs of the released prisoner.
This form of community work overseas is well developed in certain
countries. In Sweden there are over ten thousand citizens who work in
conjunction with the Swedish Probation and Parole Ofﬁcers. In the Netherlands
there are approximately eight thousand voluntary workers involved in this form
of social work, whilst in Denmark there are nearly six thousand citizens
.associated with the Danish Welfare Society that provides aftercare and prison
welfare services within that country. Steps are being taken for the further
development of voluntary aid within New South Wales. It has been
demonstrated already in our own State that citizens working with Parole
Ofﬁcers can provide a service which involves not only public interest but can
actually strengthen supervision measures.
One important issue which must underpin all parole activity, is the need to
have a well-trained Parole Service which can provide effective supervision,
reinforced by community assistance, and working with manageable case loads.
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 Once a case load exceeds a realistic level of ﬁfty cases per ofﬁcer, the deg
ree of
supervision that can be afforded is adversely affected. lf case loads increas
e well
beyond this ﬁgure the valuable work that can be carried out in rese
ttlement and
supervision is negated by the inability of parole staff to maintain t
he degree of
necessary ﬁeld oversight. A Parole Service must work within
a reasonable
framework which permits the application of a specialized form of so
cial work
aimed both at individual and community welfare. ‘
It is necessary also to realize that parole will deal with the failures of all
correctional systems. lnto ' this process will at times come some o
f those
individuals referred to by J. Edgar Hoover as “the mad dogs of socie
ty”. These
are the combustible, violent elements, who irrespective of the
amount of
correctional treatment and the quality of ﬁeld supervision, may at so
me time
commit crimes which will shock society. It is necessary-therefore to
see parole
not as a panacea of correctional ills, nor as a form of ﬁeld supervision t
hat can
successfully resettle every released prisoner, but simply as one of society’
s means
to reduce the incidence of crime amongst released prisoners and satisf
actorily
resettle as many as possible within the community.
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THE ROLE OF STATE PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
IN' THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
Dr W. A. BARCLA Y*
Mr Chairman:
I will be looking primarily at the question of what facilities and services
are available with respect to those convicted of crimes, ,with a view to giving you
some ideas of the practicality of psychiatric treatment for offenders and
enabling you to know what is likely to happen to people for whom you make
some psychiatric recommendation.
Firstly, the section which assumes most attention in the literature, but
which is probably the smallest group, comprises those who in this State come
under the heading of “persons under detention”. Probably very few of you
would ever become involved with such individuals. They have usually. committed
fairly serious crimes and are brought under Part VII of the Mental Health Act.
Nevertheless I think it is important you should know what facilities the State has
for these people, or perhaps what facilities we do not have.
The number of persons under detention in mental health hospitals at any
time usually does not exceed some 80 persons. We have 60 maximum security
beds at the Morisset Hospital,'where quite limited facilities for treatment are
available. One of the problems of psychiatric hospitals is that, in common with
most rural medical services, it is quite impossible to maintain an adequate level
of professional stafﬁng in country areas. So that, by an historical development,
we have our patients who are under detention put “out of sight, out of mind” at
Morisset — a beautiful place, but quite isolated .from professional services. These
60 patients who are there under security provisions receive extremely limited
treatment. They have a restricted regime because of the necessary security, and
psychotherapy is for such patients virtually unobtainable.
At Callan Park, where we take up to 20 patients, there are greater
facilities
available and better diagnostic facilities. Sometimes in order to
assess a patient
adequately we have to send him to Callan Park in the ﬁrst ins
tance. Those of
you who read your newspapers will know that we cannot describ
e those facilities
as offering maximum security, and this is a constant problem to
us: that in order
to provide what we often regard as desirable and appropriate tre
atment facilities
we must place a patient in circumstances where even we are not enti
rely satisﬁed
with the security that is available. This is due in part to the difﬁ
culty of making
these places more secure, but it is as much due to a great relucta
nce on our part
to turn mental hospitals into prisons and to promote an ambiv
alent and very
uncertain attitude on the part of nursing staff, who in one
ward are being
preached at to be more permissive and more liberal and to take
a few chances in
the interests of encouraging the rehabilitation of the patient, an
d in another are
told that they must be more security-minded and are liable to dis
ciplinary action
if a patient so much as sets foot outside the limited security arrange
ments.
* B.Sc. (Med.), D.P.M. (Sydney), M.Sc. (Adm. Med.)
Columbia), M.A.N.Z.C.P.,
Director of State Psychiatric Services.
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 So thus stands our situation with respect to persons under detention. Verylimited facilities are available for their treatment and we must face the fact, as Iwill mention later, that attempts to provide psychotherapeutic treatment underconditions of security are extremely difﬁcult. Indeed conditions of securityargue against the provision of an adequate psychotherapeutic regime.
To consider the facilities available for the other, much larger, group ofpeople who may come within the purview of most of you, we should lookbrieﬂy at some of the types of problem that are likely to arise and the mostlikely treatments. We lack data from our own State on this sort of problem. Wedo not collect adequate statistical information about forensic psychiatricservices, nor probably about forensic services at all. However, we do have someclues, which could be good enough for our discussion, from ThorburnThompson, who examined 1,000 consecutive offenders in New York City Court.Of these people 20% had a ﬁrm psychiatric diagnosis, so that one-ﬁfth of thesepeople could be given a psychiatric label. 40% were described as “balanced andwell-adjusted” in the author’s own terms (which is probably reasonable),criminals by accident, by association, and certainly- no psychiatric diagnosis isapplicable to these people. This in itself is useful, but it is something thatpsychiatrists are often loath to do, i.e. to say, “This man is as normal asanybody”. But this certainly would be helpful to the Court. 40% were aborderline group with personality deviation not amounting to abnormality andhere again I am using the author’s own terms: “not amounting to abnormality,but with characteristics of aggressive, egocentric, primitive or unstablepersonality structure”. In this group it is very doubtful what the role ofpsychiatry should be, or can be. Certainly we may be able to contributesomething to an understanding of this individual’s behaviour and to theantecedents of what has brought him to this particular state at the time, but sofar there is not a great deal of hard evidence to suggest that psychiatry as such,or psychiatric hospitals, have a great deal to offer to this 40% of borderlinecases.
.
So that our main ﬁeld, or the ﬁeld in which we can at least feel conﬁdentof our ability, is in the area of those 20% to whom a ﬁrm psychiatric diagnosiscan be attached. Now what of this 20%? They were made up of some l‘xé% whowere clearly psychotic, who were insane.-There were 2%% who were mentallyretarded, mentally defective. There were 7% neurotic and 7% psychopathic, andthe other 2% of this 20% fell into a wide range of other psychiatric abnormalitieswhich the authors don’t quote. I assume there was some sexual deviation amongthis group, some organic mental disorders, some alcoholism, and so on.
What of the psychotic group? What sort of people would they be, andwhat can psychiatry offer? What is the average position, the unequivocalposition, that most psychiatrists will agree about? The two largest groups ofpsychotic disorders that you are likely to see will be schizophrenia and themanic-depressivegroup of disorders.
Now, schizophrenia is the commonest mental disorder. It is verywidespread in the community and schizophrenics make up more than half thepopulation of psychiatric hospitals at any time. It is a chronic disease,punctuated by acute episodes of florid psychosis. You probably never obtain atrue cure of a schizophrenic, so that to expect psychiatrists to say aboutschizophrenics that they are cured, or that they are not mentally ill, as theMental Health Act requires and as we sometimes say, is in fact expecting theimpossible. Most psychiatrists would agree that once a man has had a serious
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 episode of schizophrenia you can always detect residual signs of the disease, and
that it leaves him with some permanent disability. 1 am not troubling you with
the few exceptions and the debates in psychiatry about this. Most psychiatrists
will agree that the treatment of schizophrenia is emerging as drugs (mainly
tranquillizing drugs) and social rehabilitation for his residual disabilities. A secure
setting is likely to cause regression. The syndrome of institutionalization is well
recognized and the schizophrenic who is incarcerated in a secure setting will get
worse and will regress. This group of patients can reasonably be referred to any
psychiatric setting for their care, and there is probably no particular psychiatric
hospital or psychiatric clinic or facility which offers advantages over another.
Most psychiatrists can handle the problem of schizophrenia and will treat them
satisfactorily with tranquillising drugs.
One comment should be made, and that is that the schizophrenic is
singularly unpredictable. He will do things at times when you least expect them.
Patients who have been 15 years in an open ward situation and have never given
any problems will suddenly abscond, commit suicide, or commit some other
unpredictable act. A classic example of the psychiatrist’s dilemma is‘ the patient
under detention who had been given, after a period of ﬁve years in a mental
hospital, reasonable freedom of the grounds. After some three years of being
free in the grounds and working with the working-out gang, he was finally
released. He had ceased to be subject to imprisonment and so was able to be
released. Within 24 hours of being released he had purchased a rifle and had
taken a shot at the man whom he had attempted to shoot before and which had
led to his being brought to the hospital. For three years he had been perfectly
free to walk out of the hospital. He could have left at any time and nobody
would have known until he was well away — we would have known first by
reading it in the midday paper. But after this long period of completely good
behaviour, on release he went out and started to do what he had attempted to
do before. And this is characteristic of the schizophrenic, this complete
unpredictability.
The manic-depressive syndrome is the other major depressive syndrome
that you are likely to come across. These are the people who perhaps attempt
suicide, women who kill their children or men who kill their families. If you read
in the paper that a man has killed all his family and attempted to shoot himself
he is probably suffering from the depressive syndrome: recurrent episodes of
excited uncontrollable behaviour (the manic phase) or recurrent episodes of
profound depression. These may occur separately or together. You may just get
recurrent depressions, you may get recurrent mania, or you may get both. There
is no known way to prevent the recurrence of the manic-depressive syndrome.
Each episode must be treated as it occurs, and you cannot know when the next
is going to occur. Generally the treatment of any particular episode is extremely
effective. It is one of the things we are very good at, treating an episode of mania
or treating an episode of depression. But we are not very successful in predicting
— in fact we cannot predict — when it will occur, and the only way we are likely
to prevent its recurrence is by regular out-patient supervision of the patient to
detect a recurrence as early as possible.
I might say that ﬁfty years ago many depressives, and certainly many
manics, never got out of hospital, because the belief then was that you shouldn’t
take the risk of letting them out because the mania or depression was likely to
recur. And yet, during the interval they had periods of great lucidity and of
normal behaviour. Now our modern liberal view is to let them out and take the
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 risk. You have got to recognize that there is a risk associated with this and that it
will always recur. A person who has committed a family crime in such an
episode may well never have the opportunity to do so again even though he may
become depressed, but there have been circumstances where a person hascommitted one murder of family or relative, has remarried and, perhaps inanother episode of depression, has repeated the same act. This is rare, butpossible. So, then, for the psychoses we are rather uncertain in our abilities. Wecan accurately diagnose them, we can treat individual episodes, but we do nothave a very glossy crystal ball to be able to tell the future.
Another group is the mentally retarded, and we need make only a few
comments on these. No signiﬁcant improvement in a brain-damaged person or in
a mentally-retarded person can be expected by psychiatric treatment or by the
passage of time. Improvement in social behaviour and in capacity to cope with
the world may come about as a result of training. These people are best dealt
with by a special referral to the Department for the attention of our Division on
Mental Retardation, and in particular of the Director, Dr Jennings. One can
always look around for an appropriate setting for the mentally-retarded person
and make the setting ﬁt the patient. We have these facilities available, but it does
take inquiry, and it can take time.
The next group of people in this 20% of firm psychiatric diagnosis includes
the neuroses. These need to concern us little except to say that this is the group
that comprises obsessive compulsive syndromes, anxiety states, hysterical
behaviour disorders. These are usually best not treated as in-patients, so that
they do pose a problem where some proposition is made that instead of being in
a prison they ought to be in a hospital, because hospitalization is equally bad for
them, creating dependency and promoting introspection and graver concern with
their neurotic disorder than they had to begin with. They need out-patient care,
and they need individual or group therapy if they are to be cured. They receive
drugs purely for symptom relief. So that if we are dealing with the neurotic
disorder you have got to think of this in terms of requiring long-term
psychotherapeutic treatment. Drug treatment will relieve their anxiety, make
them sleep better, make them better able to cope with their'symptoms, but drug
treatment is not likely to cure these people.
I think it is important that we say a few words with respect to
psychopathic disorders. Psychopathic disorder is a personality disorder to a
severe degree and of such a type that the individual and/or society suffers as a
result of the disorder. It is not amenable to the normal social or personal
restraints, and these people frequently seek immediate gratiﬁcation of desires
without regard to the consequences either to themselves or to society. They
constitute in the borderline group a large proportion of those who commit
offences. The treatment here is very uncertain. It is usually a combination of
interpretive understanding of their behaviour and directive psychotherapy with
clear setting of limits. The problem here is that it is questionable as to how
successful psychiatric treatment is for this group. If anything, this is the area
where psychiatryhas probably been most oversold at the present time, and it is
wise to regard treatment programmes as frankly experimental with the
psychopath. The therapeutic community was designed for the treatment of
psychopaths, but the therapeutic community has a history of considerable
failure in the treatment of psychopaths, and indeed many therapeutic
communities which set out to treat psychopaths soon abandoned the task in
favour of some of'the more rewarding groups of psychiatric patients.
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 The mental hospital may be the least suitable place for the tre
atment of
the psychopath, and the British Mental Health Act recognized
this by offering
the opportunity to many medical superintendents to refuse ad
mission to them if
they saw fit. An enlightened penal system may in fact be the b
est place for the
treatment of the psychopath,‘ where psychiatric insights, and ps
ychological and
sociological insights, are available to direct and mould the soc
ial environment
within which the individual is to be treated —— not necessarily a
programme run
by a psychiatrist, but where clear limits can be set, where ma
turity can take
place, and where the individual can be constantly tested out
against increasing
responsibility, so that he is offered a greater opportunity
to test out his
new-found skills or perhaps some new maturity, and where i
f he fails he can go
back a step and start over again.
The other group which will often present for psychiatric consider
ation
includes the sexual deviations. I am not going to venture into
this ﬁeld because
this is a very complex area and a subject for a talk all of its o
wn, and it is not
really my ﬁeld.
Now it has to be appreciated that for persons within the
se groups of
disorders if the Court is going to make some sentenc
e of which psychiatric
treatment is an essential component, it may take time
to arrange this. Also, not
everybody is suitable for psychotherapy. In our present
state of knowledge, even
though a person has an illness which we know to be
only really treatable by
psychotherapy, when we come to apply our criteria half
of these people who are
offered for treatment will often be eliminated.
Another point I would make briefly is that there is a difference
between
understanding an illness or being able to apply a label to it an
d being able to
treat it. This is a particular trap into which you can fall in the
courts, because
your psychiatric reports will nearly always come from a psychi
atrist who has no
personal responsibility for providing treatment. He may in th
e first place be the
advocate’s psychiatrist for one or other side, in which case he
is concerned to
present the case for one side or the other in the best possible
light. If he is for
the patient he will give you a long report of psy
chodynamics and
psychopathology and usually tell you a terrible tale of woe a
bout the patient’s
family background, .but he doesn’t have the responsibility of
taking the patient
on for treatment and when it comes to the point of the psychiat
rist deciding to
treat the patient it is altogether a different story. It is not a ba
d test to ask the
advocate’s psychiatrist whether he is prepared to be the treatin
g psychiatrist, and
you may hear a different tale.
There is- also a lot of doubt being cast these days on the va
lidity of this
concept of a bad family background and a bad outcome. We are
discovering that
many people who adjust satisfactorily to life have absolutel
y terrible family
backgrounds, and we have got to find out a great deal more a
bout what is called
“coping” behaviour, instead of what is called “defensive reacti
on”. We want to
know a great deal more about the positive aspects of personal
ity development
which enable many people with terrible family storie
s, and a terrible
psychodynamic history to live successful, and indeed highly
successful, lives.
So that it is important to realize this point: that it m
ay be very
appropriate to accept the views of psychiatrists about understa
nding or labelling
a case in the trial process or in determining sentence or dispo
sal, but when it
comes to post-trial, to determining sentence or disposal, then
the only report
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 worth having is the report of the man who is prepared to take on the
responsibility of treatment, because each psychiatrist here must make some
individual contact with the patient to treat him, and the report of the man who
saw him in the prison or in the trial process is of limited value to thatpsychiatrist because these were aimed at quite a different audience and to havequite a different effect on that audience.
With respect to providing psychotherapeutic treatment, we can provide it
at Broughton Hall or at North Ryde or we can provide it at the Prince Henry,
Prince Alfred and Caritas Centres, these representing somewhat slim possibilities
because of their other commitments as university teaching centres. We have a'
very short list of psychiatrists available to provide individual or group
psychotherapeutic treatment. Every case must be arranged on a personal basis.
The patient may be there as an in-patient, but you must accept the fact that the
treatment will be so prolonged that he must ﬁnish up as an out-patient with
probably at most an hour once a week, or perhaps twice a week contact and
maybe a social worker he can see from time to time.
There is a tendency sometimes for the advocate’s psychiatrist to become
the treatment psychiatrist. He nearly always comes from private practice, and I
personally would never be happy with the proposition that a bond is given on
condition that the patient enter into treatment with a particular psychiatrist,
particularly if that psychiatrist is in private practice. 1 think it quite
inappropriate to make it a condition that he should have to pay out money to a
private psychiatrist. You do see this occasionally, though rarely.
The therapeutic community is more ﬂexible, is more able to absorb
patients. It is questioned by many psychiatrists as to whether it is of valid
efﬁcacy. It is always an open setting. If we are going to send a patient to, say,
Fraser House at North Ryde, or to Bayview House at Callan Park, or to
Cumberland House at Parramatta, or to the Tarban Clinic at Gladesville, then
you must accept the fact that there is no psychotherapeutic treatment available
in a secure or closed setting. It is always open and always will be, because most
psychiatrists do not accept the proposition that' you can provide truly adequate
psychotherapy for any patient (not just for the criminal group) in a closed
setting. So that if the patient is going to get a psychotherapeutic regime, be it in
an individual group or in a therapeutic community, it is going to be in an open
setting, and you have got to be aware of that.
Finally, I would like to make a comment about the role of the Probation
Ofﬁcer. 1 think Mr Keefe is a bit too modest and defers a bit too much to the
medical profession in this regard. I think the psychiatrist who takes on the
psychiatric treatment of an offender as a condition of a bond needs the
Probation Ofﬁcer and should not be placed in the position of having to make the
sort of decisions that the Probation Ofﬁcer who has the responsibility is able to
make. The psychiatrist does not want to be placed in the position of having to
“dob the patient in”, because it is the same problem as Mr Keefe raised about
alcoholism: your relationship with the patient depends on his being able to
communicate freely with you, and this is hampered if he thinks that the things
he is going to tell you are going to lead to his being placed back in prison, and sothe psychiatrist needs the Probation Ofﬁcer to act as an agent.
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First of all, the Probation Ofﬁcer can do the work of arranging for
psychotherapy or psychiatric treatment, and, as l have tried to explain, that will
take time. So often we get a frantic telephone call from somebody to say, “The
Court has remanded him for three days, 'and we want an answer by Wednesday”,
and I just have to say, that this is impossible. But then you have to try to find a
psychiatrist, and sometimes it will take six telephone calls before you can even
get one to listen to you, and when he does, he says, “Well, OK, but you have
‘got to realise that l have got a waiting list for 5% months for psychotherapy..’
This is the sort of thing you are up against, so fixing psychiatric treatment takes
time. .
There is one other little point I want to make, and I will put it in here:
don’t drag psychiatry in where it is not necessary. If the offence is a r
elatively
minor one it is often better in the interests of the patient to disp
ose of it. The
presence of mental illness in an individual does not necessarily acqui
t him of all
responsibility. He may be psychotic he may be severely neurotic, he m
ay be a
sexual psychopath, but he may know very well what he was doing
and that what
he was doing was wrong. So often in minor offences psychiatry is dra
gged in,
while it is kept out of major offences, and perhaps it ought to be the
other way
round. ,If a short sentence is going to dispose of a matter we often
see the
situation where the atient himself would like it disposed of and then h
e could
. get on with his psyc 'atric treatment. I‘think you have got to look at
this as a
. possibility: that it is not always in the interests of the patient to leave h
im with
something hanging ﬁre, unless you are going to use that as a de
liberate
manoeuvre to get him into psychiatric care. It" may be better to di
spose of it,
have it done with, and then get on with the psychiatric, treatment in
an open
setting where nobody has any worries about whether he is going to run away or
' do the wrong thing.
Finally, one can see here many of the same trends in the penal system as
have occurred in the mental hospitals. As Mr Morony was describing, and
as
~others have said, you have got what we had ten years ago: a rising adm
ission
rate, a rising population, no power to refuse admissions, a syndro
me of
institutionalization where incarceration does more harm than good, a recognit
ion
that the prevailing system is not providing the desired results. This isrexac
tly the
situation of the mental hospitals ten years ago. In this State we have c
ome to
grips with the problem (by a move towards community psychiatry. It wo
uld
appear that the present penal system is in the midst of a movement towa
rds
community penology. I can only offer the comment that we in the psychiat
ric
service can anticipate most of the problems that you are going to strike
(we are
already receiving the unfavourable publicity that doubtless you are going
to get
your share of), and perhaps we may, by our knowledge and our awaren
ess of
these problems, by the throes of anguish we have gone through in transf
orming
custodial institutions into therapeutic institutions, be' able to offer you
some
modest help.
 
 SENTENCING: A SCANDINAVIAN VIEW
TOHRSTENERIKSSON*
Mr Chairman, Gentlemen,
I am very honoured to have been invited to speak to you tonight, and
I
will show my respect for that honour by being very brief.
The ﬁrst comment I want to make is one of congratulation. This idea of
having a seminar for the kind of people you are, is an excellent idea.
We have
reached the same stage of development in my country, and when I go
back I will
have to take part in a number of seminars of the same kind, doing ab
out the
same kind of thing as you are doing, i.e., trying to ﬁnd the right ways to devise
the best kinds of sentence. I have had an opportunity to study the crim
inal
political situation (if that is the right expression) in not less than 47 countries,
and it is my experience that where the judiciary is interested in the situati
on of
the institutions and of the non-institutional treatment it is always good fo
r the
prisons, probation and parole, and that where they are more or less disinter
ested
these three are always backward.
Mr Chief Justice, you mentioned the theory of general deterrence and the
theory of speciﬁc or particular deterrence, and in fact the value of these t
wo
theories is discussed all over the world. As you may remember from your visit
to
us, they have been completely abandoned not only in Sweden but all o
ver
Scandinavia. There is very little belief in deterrence any more and the term,
the
concept, is not used. The concept we use is general prevention and habit
ual
prevention. By “prevention” we mean that the legislature and the courts act to
underline a moral code, so to speak. The things they react against are thi
ngs
which shouldn’t be done. But it is not in order to deter them or to make them
frightened to commit such acts, but rather to build into them, to inculcate in
them, a feeling that “This is a thing I cannot do”.
This operation can be done in various ways. We know, for example, that in
the Soviet Union they don’t have to rely very much on the courts or on the
police. This is because everybody is so much under control there, and crimes are
so seldom committed there just because of this control exerted by everyone over
everyone. For example, if you enter a bus in Moscow you see that the driver is
by himself and doesn’t look at the passengers, but the passengers themselves pay
their fares, and they exert control over each other. I asked'in France, “Suppose
such a system were installed in Paris, what would happen?”, and one of the
Justices in Paris said, “Well, nobody would pay”. This is not an invention by the
Russians. It was the same under King Arthur of England. You can read in David
Jones’ History of England that so strong was King Arthur’s control over every
citizen that property was not touched. It is also so in the Soviet Union. [lear
ned
that in a study tour which I made together with my Minister of Justice 3 year
ago — that they fear the courts less than what are called the “Comrades Courts”.
These cannot impose punishments of a civil nature — that is reserved for the
criminal courts — but they would prefer to be brought before the criminal court
rather than before their own comrades in the factory or in the ofﬁce.
 
* Director General of the Swedish National Correctional Associatio
n.
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 And now a little bit on the theory of prevention. When we in Sweden, forexample, send every drunken driver to prison instead of giving him probation ithas, over the years, underlined for every citizen that you have to be careful withthe liquor when you intend to drive. As a result, the general rule for Swedes isthat they do not touch a drink after midnight if they intend to drive next day.Of course I know that there are drunken drivers, and I get a great number ofthem, but the rule has had an effect on the general population. That is one littleobservation [wanted to make.
Another one has to do with the theory (Jeremy Bentham’s old theory) of
what the punishment should contain. “It should contain”, he said, “retaliation,
incapacitation and reformation”, and we now know that this is an absolutely
impossible thing. We have a Swedish word for it — “tulip-rose” — which means aplant which doesn’t exist and which cannot be made.
Also, the sentence quoted by the Chief Justice: that they are sent to
prison not for punishment, but as punishment. I believe it was Alexander
Paterson who formulated that, and it is a very nice sentence, but personally I
don’t think it is true. They are sent there for punishment and they feel it as
punishment, and it doesn’t matter what you say to them, it is punishment. The
new Criminal Code which came into force in Sweden in 1965 has in a way
accepted this. The courts now try to ﬁt the punishment to the criminal instead
of trying to ﬁt it to the crime. It is also recognized by the penal code that
measures such as ﬁnes and probation should be used as extensively as possible,
and that deprivation of liberty should not be used unless the Court feels that it is
absolutely necessary to take such a step. This has of course reduced the number
of commitments to institutions, and not only that, but it has also reduced the
length of sentences, so that a sentence of over six months is now regarded as a
long sentence.
The ﬁnes have undergone a change also. Instead of the old type ofmonetary ﬁne we have now introduced a system of day ﬁnes. We try to be
democratic even when we compose our ﬁnes, so a day ﬁne is supposed to be a
man’s daily income, i.e., what is left for him to spend after he has paid his
upkeep, his taxes, etc. So if a very Wealthy man has been involved in a streetﬁght with a poor man and they are both sentenced to the same number of day
ﬁnes (let us say, 10 day ﬁnes), then for the rich man each day ﬁne might be
1,000 crowns while for the poor man it might be ﬁxed at 10 crowns. So in a way
it is democracy: it hits them both equally and makes them equal before the law.
Another thing comes into the picture here. It was about thirty years ago
that one of our Ministers of Justice said that the legislation must be altered so
that if the Court sentenced an offender to be ﬁned then it should be a ﬁne and
nothing else, not a deprivation of liberty. So the ﬁnes can be paid by
instalments, and if the man doesn’t pay he is usually brought before the Court
and put on probation. But the ﬁne should be extracted from him, that is the
general rule. So it is now very rare for a person to undergo imprisonment for
non-payment of ﬁnes. Earlier we had thousands of them coming in and going
out, and Mr Morony and others who are concerned with prisons will know what
a burden they are, these people who just come in and go out.
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 Probation is now so much in use that in the correctional ﬁe
ld it has
become the No. 1 service. I have under me the whol
e correctional
administration. We have 16,000 men on probation a
nd 4,000 men on parole,
which makes altogether 20,000 outside institutions, while on
ly 5,000 are inside
institutions. It is very common for the courts to give one proba
tion order after
another. They do not give up, but try and try and try again.
That has been the
, practice especially since 1965, and apparently most people
are satisﬁed with it.
There is a general disbelief in prisons. I myself am pro
bably a little bit
responsible for this as, like most prison ofﬁcials, I always say t
hat prison is not
good, it is not good at all.
‘ ,
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 CASE HISTORIES
CASE No. 1
ALFRED was aged 22 years and 2 months when he became
involved in a series
of offences of car-stealing.
As a child of 12 years, he had been before a Children’s Court
for stealing,
when he was bound over, and nine years later was ﬁned $20 for being i
n
possession of an unlicensed pistol. He is single and resides with his mo
ther in a
provincial suburb about 50 miles from Sydney. Although his father
was still
alive, Alfred was the sole support of his mother and contributed ﬁve-
sixths of his
wages to her as board and lodging. He was employed as a ﬁtter’s labo
urer, 'was
regarded as a “fair” employee with an aptitude for mechanical appliance
s, and
his conduct brought adverse reports only as to‘punctuality and failure t
o comply
with foreman’s instructions.
As a person, psychological examination shows him to be an unintelligent,
uneducated young man of poor appearance and personality. Somewh
at
efferninate in appearance and manner, he is weak-willed, foolish
and
irresponsible, but withall, quite good-hearted. (Because of his defects
of
personality, there is an obvious chance of further offences.)
With a youth under 18 years (or perhaps two brothers, both
under 18
years), he stole 13 vehicles in a period of ﬁve weeks. Only one
of the vehicles
was recovered without either road damage, theft, or damage occa
sioned by theft.
The dates of the thefts are in themselves somewhat interesting,
thus:
one theft on 29th January —- Sunday
one ” ” 4th February —— Saturday
one ” ” 5th February — Sunday
two ” ” 11th February —— Saturday
two ” ” 12th February -— Sunday
one ’ 18th February —— Saturday
two ” ” 4th March — Sunday
three ” ” 5th March — Monday
t. v so
He was arrested when a stolen car which he was driving crash
ed when
being chased by a Police car early on the morning of Monday
, 5th March. The
pattern of thefts at week-ends is extraordinarily clearly shown.
All stolen cars
were Holdens.
The two offenders shared the stolen goods.
What would be an appropriate sentence for Alfred?
CASE No. 2
RAYMOND, who was born in Queensland in 1
941 , first came into contact with
the law in 1957 when he was committed to an insti
tution in N.S.W. for breaking
and entering. Returning to Queensland, he was sen
tenced to six months H.L. on
a similar charge. He then came back to N.S.W. and
in respect of four charges of
this nature was bound over to be of good behaviour.
He went on to Melbourne
and was awarded two years H.L. in respect-of a tota
l of six charges of breaking
and entering two garages and store rooms. He must ha
ve earned early release on
the Victorian charges, because he appeared again on t
he N.S.W. South Coast in
1961, and, for 8 charges, was awarded a total sentence
of 3% years. On release,
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 he again wandered'throughout Australia, and convictions followed in Melbourne,
Maryborough and Truro, but the sentences were comparatively light. He now
appears before another N.S.W. country court on one charge of break, enter and
steal, to which he pleads guilty. ‘
He is a man of below average intelligence who is a cheerful, assertive
swaggerer, grossly optimistic, but-likely to turn at times into a nasty customer
because of a dogmatic, pig-headed streak of wilfulness whi’ch inclines him to
brush aside the opinions of others. In many ways a likeable man, his success or
failure is, generally speaking, of no great significance to him. Because, however,
of the apparent conflict in his make-up, he has been subjected to psychiatric
observation, and the reports, while expressing the view that it was difﬁcult to
know what psychiatry , had to offer him, suggested several aspects for
consideration:
(a) no knowledge of and a strong hostility from early age towards mother;
(b) a realistic assessment of himself, even if it be a pessimistic one;
(c) a dissatisﬁed, impulsive man who has rebelled against his upbringing, who
is not likely to regard punishment as a deterrent; ‘
(d) supervision at liberty would be a preferable means if the risks were not too
great.
This is, therefore, a fairly clear case of a damaged personality who, while
undoubtedly legally responsible, must reasonably be regarded as not having
contributed to his own original failing. There are many such cases.
What would be an appropriate sentence for Raymond?
CASE No. 3
TONY is a well educated youth of 18 years who, having obtained his Leaving
Certificate, became a student at Sydney Technical College and a cadet ofa large
industrial undertaking as an electrical engineer. His parents were reputable
people who lived in a good middle class residential suburb. He took part in
community activities, being a member of a Church Fellowship, a keen (Rugby
Union) footballer, and a Surf Life Saving Club member. Well above average in
intelligence, Tony is socially backward, but impressively truthful.
There is some background as an asthmatic, and his father has been a TB.
sufferer since Tony was about 5 years of age.
There were no previous convictions of any kind.
During summer holidays Tony, with two younger boys, one of whom was
his brother, saw an unlocked Holden car. In his own words, “I had heard how to
start a Holden, so took one outside the Picture Show. . . .We each had a turn at
driving, and while returning along Mona Vale Road it got out of control and
rolled over”. The younger persons appeared before a Children’s Court.
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What is an appropriate sentence for Tony? Especially, how does one equal
deterrence with rehabilitation in a case where the continuation of a technical
cadetship (or apprenticeship) Could seem to ‘void punishment?
CASE No. 4
LANCE was just over 18 years of age at the time of his conviction. His father, of
Chinese blood, was a very heavy drinker who had little or no interest in the
welfare of Lance or any other member of the family. Lance left school at the age
of 15 years, and in the same year his mother, a half-caste aboriginal, died. He
was the youngest of five children, and lived in very sub—standard conditions with
a married sister. ’
In the three years elapsing between school days and the offence, he had
had three separate periods of employment, each of about one month’s duration.
On three occasions, commencing at age 15, he had been sent to Child
Welfare institutions for theft, and had responded well to encouragement and
interest. Around the country town of his residence, he did not associate with the
criminal element but with “juveniles”, younger of course than he was, and the
arresting police constable, who had no prior knowledge of him, formed an
impression, after questioning the juveniles, that Lance had a bad inﬂuence upon
them.
A_ 13 year old girl, returning from school, was talking to Lance and five
young boys and, by implied arrangement, went to a paddock, the boys
following. At the paddock, all of the boys interfered with her. Darkness fell, and
she feared to go home. Eventually only Lance remained with her, and further
acts of familiarity took place. In Petty Sessions evidence — and Lance was not
represented — she admitted earlier similar incidents, in one only of which Lance
was involved.
The ﬁve younger male offenders appeared at a Children’s Court and were
released on probation. '
What is an appropriate sentence in Lance’s case?
CASE No. S
SYDNEY, who is 26 years of age, was born in Australia, the second of four
children. He was educated at a Technical High School up to and including
second year.
At the age of 20, probably because of domestic incompatibility, he left
home to go to sea as a deck hand, and at the age of 20 married in England. The
marriage did not last, and after about five years he returned home to Australia.
His only employment other than as a seaman was as a retail assistant, although
he has some capacity as a musician. He took a house on the perimeter of the
inner city of Sydney and either rented or allowed other people to live in the
residence. He was arrested for having in his possession a prohibited drug and for
administering the drug to himself. The drug was cocaine. He claimed that he had
,become aware that cocaine had been buried in the baékyard of the residenc
e,
but it seems much more likely that it was stolen from a pharmacy.
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 He lacks concentration, and although his intelligence is a little above
average he does not seem to have used that intelligence adequately. On the face
of his own statement about his life, he has crowded more into it than most
people crowd into a long lifetime, and there is so little about his story which can
be checked that one must be suspicious as to whether he is an exaggerator and
false pretender. Notwithstanding frank admissions to narcotic addiction, there is
sound ground for belief that he is not truly addicted, but rather likes to circulate
with the addicts, pretending experiences that he has not had. His musical and
poetic abilities are not supported to anything like the levels he claims they have,
and here again it is problematical whether these are real achievements.
Nevertheless, the charges against him are being in the possession of a drug and of
administering it to himself, and he has pleaded guilty to both charges.
What is an appropriate sentence for Sydney?
CASE No. 6
BRUCE, a single man of 221/; years, was the youngest of three children. His
parents are alive and living in another State, in which Bruce had been educated
and had performed well up to 8th grade.
At the age of 16 years he appeared at a Children’s Court in Queensland
and was committed to a Farm Home until he was 18 years of age. After his
discharge he came to Sydney, resided in Darlinghurst, and obtained work as a
waiter ~ but he was not always employed. He associated with a homosexual and
bohemian group, and was possibly homosexual himself. Over a period of about
three months he broke into a number of shops and offices, mostly in the
Cremorne — Crows Nest region, and stole, in all, from six incidents, money in
the amount of $220 and clothing and property valued at about $70. He pleaded
guilty to these offences and was sentenced to 12 months hard labour on each
charge and declared to be an habitual criminal. He served the sentences of 12
months and thereafter an additional period of just 16 months, at the expiration
of which he was released on license.
Unable to return to his people in Queensland, Bruce remained in Sydney.
After 6 months at liberty, he made two abortive attempts at factory breaking,
was re-arrested, and it is these charges which are being considered.
Bruce is above average in intelligence and has special aptitude for clerical
work. Not only is he intelligent, but academically he is well equipped, and his
vocational potential and wage earning capacity are undeniable from this point of
view. His difficulties are obviously more centred in his personality itself. Two
contemporaneous estimates refer to him as “cheerful and frank” on the one
hand, and on the other as “resentful, dirty, and inclined to be cheeky”. The first
opinion, in amplification, refers to a degree ofimmature irresponsibility but says
he is “highly capable, quick, alert but volatile”. The second opinion says that
although he claims to be bookkeeper he is only a labourer and has no idea of
trying to do a goodjob. ’
The facts (or opinions) are contradictory from equal sources.
What is an appropriate sentence in Bruce’s case?
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The first N.S.W. conviction occurred before the 1957 Amendment t
o the
Habitual Criminals Act. Is there any consensus on the value, pro or co
n, of the
sentence imposed on his first appearance before the court in N.S.W.?
CASE No. 7
SARAH and HAROLD (aged 27 years 8 months and 25 years 3 m
onths
respectively) have been convicted of conspiracy to. murder. Sarah has
been
married to Thomas for six years, but there are no children of the marriage. F
or
five years of the marriage Sarah had an adulterous relationship with Harold, a
s a
result of which a child was born. Sarah had been separated from Thom
as on
more than one occasion, but Thomas had resumed co-habitation w
ith Sarah after
intervals of several months although realizing that she was continuing
to see
Harold. Sarah and Harold eventually agreed to get rid of Thomas so tha
t they
could marry. Although conﬂicting versions of the agreement between the
m were
given, it appeared that the plan evolved was to knock Thomas on the
head and
make him unconscious, to place him in his car, to drive the
car to a deserted
place, and set it alight. In pursuance of this plan, Sarah gave Harold a duplicate
ignition key to Thomas’ car and an old overcoat to wear so that the
blood would
not splatter on Harold’s clothing. Harold then waited at night in the
garage of
Thomas’ home for him to arrive in his car. When Thomas alighted from
his car
he was struck by Harold over the head with two gun barrels which had be
en left
in the garage. Although wounded, Thomas managed to struggle free, and
Harold
ran off. Subsequently, Thomas was admitted to hospital with woun
ds to the
head, concussion, abrasions to the face, and shock.
Thomas was a quiet, slightly built man of ingratiating manner who was
dominated by Sarah. Harold was dull intellectually, although strong phy
sically.
He is a person who lacks initiative, and was younger than either of the o
ther
parties to the triangle. Probably he, too, was “persuaded”, if not act
ually
dominated, by Sarah. Sarah, although most certainly the organizer was
not very
intelligent, and it could be that her plan was a shortsighted attempt to plac
e her
child‘s father in what was, to her, his rightful place. She certainly cared fo
r the
child properly.
Thomas bears little, if any, ill will towards the others, and tends
to
exculpate his wife.
What are appropriate sentences for Sarah and Harold? Should they be
differentiated, and, if so, on what grounds?
CASE No. 8
REX (aged 27 years 1 month) had held an ordinary driver’s licence for 3
years.
He was employed as a driver for a firm of furniture removers in another
State
which did not require a special licence. On a fine night in late winter h
e was
driving his firm’s pantechnicon on the Hume Highway from Sydn
ey to
Melbourne. The vehicle was carrying a load of furniture and had a lad
en weight
of 6V2 tons. Rex approached a “snake” bend in the highway signpo
sted with an
advisory speed of 35 mph. Rex was, in fact, travelling at this speed and d
id not
seek to reduce it, as he entered the bend. Whilst seeking to ma
noeuvre his laden
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vehicle around the bend, Rex lost control and the pantechnicon veered across
the centre line of the road and struck one of two cars approaching from theopposite direction and which had been forced off the road on the incorrect side.
The pantechnicon collided with the following car which was off the bitumen on
his correct side. The large vehicle turned over crushing the second car beneath it.A passenger travelling in the crushed car was killed, while the driver of this car,
and the two occupants of the other car, suffered abrasions and severe shock. Rexwas charged with manslaughter but indicted of culpable driving of which he wasfound guilty. Rex is a married man with one newly born child. He was educatedto third year secondary school level, leaving school at the age of 16. His parentswere divorced when he was 14 and he had lived with his mother until hismarriage. Upon leaving school, Rex was employed for eighteen months as afisherman but left this occupation after being shipwrecked. From then until thetime of his conviction, he was employed by the same ﬁrm of furniture removersas a truck driver. His employers describe him as an excellent worker and theycontinued to employ him after ‘the accident and pending his trial. Rex has noprevious convictions, is not addicted to intoxicating liquor and is said to keepgood company. He did, however, admit to having a couple of drinks before heleft on the fatal journey — say 2 hours before the accident.
He was regarded as an earnest, unintelligent, good natured person who was
criminal by accident.
CASE No. 9
PAUL (aged 26 years) pleaded not guilty to a charge of culpable driving. The
charge is based on the driving of a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. The car driven by Paul struck and killed a female pedestrian.
Afterwards, Paul drove on, without stopping, to the flat which he shared. He
told his room mate that he thought he might have killed someone and was
persuaded by his room mate to return to the scene of the accident. He did this,
found the body of the deceased woman, and then summoned the police.
Apparently the woman was struck while walking uphill with her back to the
oncoming traffic. It was stated that, before coming to the point where the
woman was struck, Paul would have gone down a steep but very short descent
and then travelled up a steep but very short ascent before the road swung to the
left at the point where it is believed that the woman met her death. Police
admitted that this was “a bit of a danger point”. Paul admitted having had eight
middies of beer between 4 pm. and 7 pm. on the day in question. A witness
estimated that at the time of the accident. Paul was travelling at a speed of
between 40 and 45 mph. The accident occurred in a built up area with a speed
restriction of 35 mph. Paul stated, “The first thing I knew she was only about
four feet in front of me and I could not miss her. I didn’t have a chance to
swerve or apply the brakes.”
Paul has an IQ. of 117. He had a high school education to leaving
standard. Subsequently, he studied chemistry on a part-time basis at Technical
College. He worked as a laboratory chemist for three years and for the past six
years has been employed as an Assistant Foreman Melter. He is well regarded by
his employers and is of good character. He is not addicted to alcohol and has noprevious convictions. He is unmarried. Nevertheless, he is an anxious persontending always to be on the defensive and possibly drinking more than is good
for him, for this reason.
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TABLE OF RESULTS REACHED BY SENTENCING SYNDICATES
 
 
              
SYNDI CASE NO.
CATES 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9
3 yrs. 4 yrs.
1 yr.
A susp. NP 21/2 yrs. CLB IP CLB 2—3 yrs.
NC CLB NP 6 m.
10 yy.each*
2—3 yrs. 1—le yrs. 2—5 yrs. NP 5 yrs. 2
yrs.
B NP 5.18 m. 2 WS- 5- 556A CLB NP 6-9 m. No NP CLB NP 6—12 m.5 y.each
NP 1 yr.
2 yrs. 11) 6 m. 1 yf- 6 m. 1 yr. Life CLB 1V2 YI'S-
C NP 9—12 m. :11]: susp. susp. susp. susp. each NP 9 m.
3 yrs. 3-5 yrs _ 6—9 m. 1—1‘/2 yrs.
5—10 yrs. 2 yrs. 2‘/2—3 yrs.
D NP 18 m.. No P. CLB CLB susp. NP 6 m. No NP . NP 3m NP 6—9 m.
2V2 yrs. 4 yrs. 1 yr. 1‘/2 yrs. 10 yrs. 1 yr.
3 yrs.
E NP 9 m. NP 2 yrs. CLB CLB NP No NP 63°“ No NP NP 1 yr.No NP
1‘/2-3 yrs.* CLB* 5 yrs.
* each CLB
F NP 6—18 m. 2 yrs. cur CLB* - 1 yr 1—1‘/2 yrs. NP 2 yrs. 1—1‘/2 yrs.
' 4 yrs. NP 1 YR 1 yr. 1V2 Y‘S- susp. NP 6—12
m. 2‘/2 yrs.each 2 yrS. NP 6 m.
susp. NP 1V2 yrs.
NP 9 m.  
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TABLE OF RESULTS REACHED BY SENTENCING SYNDICATES — continued
 
 
 
            
SYNDI- CASE NO.
GATES 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9
‘ 2 yrs.‘ 2 atyrs. 10 rs.4‘YYS- NP6m. y 2yrs.
G NP 1 yr. 1p CLB 6 m. 1P each CLB NP 6 m.
‘ s susp. NP 4 yrs.
5“ p. sent.
4 yrs 7 yrs.
1? CLB & Hc' CLB CLB CLB IP each CLB CLB
NP 3V2 yrs.
Life each _ 1I 2132;31 yrs. 3 y/rs CLB CLB 6 m. 272—3 yrs. NP CLB 1 1/2 yrs.
- 8 m. NP 1 2 yrs. susp. NP 18 m. 10_15 yrs. NP 6—9 m.
CLB 8 yrs. (F)
J- :uigs' N; its. CLB 9 m' 6 m' 2 yrs' 7 yrs.'(M) CLB CLBD. yrs. susp. susp. susp. No NP
I.
Notes on table: CLB — Common Law Bond NP — Non-parole period
HC — Habitual criminal NC _' No comment
IP — Insufficient particulars
Conditions of bonds are not recorded owing to limitation of space.
* Majority decision.
 
 ADDRESS BY THE HON. SIR STANLEY BURBURY, K.B.E., CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
Professor Shatwell, Mr Minister and Gentlemen,
I would like most warmly to congratulate the Institute of Criminology for
arranging this highly successful and interesting seminar. The Institute should be
most encouraged by the attendance of the Chief Justice and the Minister of
Justice.
I might say that I have taken great comfort from the reports of the various
syndicates for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that those reports indicate to me that the
uneasy feeling which everyJudge has from time to time that if the man before
him happened to come before some other Judge he might be dealt with
differently need not worry us as much as sometimes we think, because what was
most remarkable in the reports was that there were very few instances of any
great divergence. There were one or two, which might be expected. And also I
got great comfort from this; that I had written down against some of these nine
cases the kind of sentence that I would impose and I found that in most of the
cases [would have done very much what you people here do, allowing for some
differences between the criminal law in Tasmania and New South Wales.
Perhaps before I make one or two observations on the kind of thing we
might have done in Tasmania with respect to some of these criminals I'might
refer to some of the differences between the powers that judges and magistrates
have in Tasmania and those that you have here, because, with the greatest
respect Mr Minister, Tasmania has achieved a number of what Ibelieve to be
worthwhile reforms in this sphere which New South Wales has lately been
copying! For instance, for some time we have had power~to impose a ﬁne as well
as putting someone on probation, and we have had power to impose a ﬁxed
sentence followed by a period of probation. We also have had power for a long
time to suspend a sentence upon any conditions which we think are germane to
the particular offence. There is no limitation on the conditions which we may
impose, and we may also not only suspend the whole of the sentence, but part
of it. That is a power which is exercised very frequently, particularly in the case
of a young offenderhand we are told by the Probation Ofﬁce that it is very
effective. For instance, in the case of Alfred mentioned here, it would be likely
in Tasmania that he would receive a.substantial term of imprisonment — up to
three years I would imagine — but that possibly one-half of that would be
suspended subject to him committing no similar serious offence for a period of
perhaps two or three years and subject to him placing himself under the
supervision of the Probation Ofﬁcer. We have a highly successful system of
probation in Tasmania, and indeed it is true to say that we led Australia in the
establishment of a probationary system. We have got a number of very ﬁne
Probation Ofﬁcers. So we ﬁnd that although we do not have a Parole Board and
the system you have of prescribing a period before prisoners can be paroled, we
nevertheless achieve this by way of suspending part of a sentence. That of course
is something which a Judge has to do beforehand and he has to determine what
he thinks is the appropriate period for the man to spend in gaol. There is
provision for parole in the sense that the Governor, in the exercise of a real
discretion, and not a discretion exercised on the advice of the Executive Council,
may grant parole to any prisoner. In practice the recommendation to the
Governor comes from the Attorney General, and it comes to the Attorney
General from the Controller of Prisons, but many Governors in Tasmania have
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 taken a very great interest in this matter, and we feel- that in a small State this
system \works verywell.
‘Another thing perhaps of interest to you would be that under our Criminal
Code in Tasmania, by an amendment‘introduced two or three years ago, a Judge
may disquany a convicted criminal from holding a driving licence if in the
course of the commission of any crime he has used a motor car. This is
something we took from New Zealand and South Australia, and it is a power we
have exercised quite often in the case of the common breaking and entering case
because, as you all know, in most breaking and entering cases a motor car is
used. It may be a car which is being illegally used or it may not be. And
sometimes it is not a case only of taking away the driving licence of the actual
driver. The Court has power to take away the driving licence of anyone who is a
participant in the crime, so that in a typical case of two or three young men
getting together and either stealing a car or using the car of one of the parties to
do a breaking and entering job .they may end up ﬁnding that they are all
disqualiﬁed from holding driving licences for 'a certain period. There is, Mr
Chairman, a difference of opinion in Tasmania as to whether this power ought to
be exercised in the case of a sexual offence committed with the aid of a motor
car, and some judges think that it would be unsportsmanlike and not germane to
the offence for a young man’s driving licence to be taken away because he has
used a car for this kind of nefarious purpose!
Having regard to those distinctions between our law and yours', may [say
that there is to my mind a remarkable equation between the kind of thing we
would do in Tasmania and the kind of thing you have done in these cases.
In case No. 1 I imagine that Alfred would certainly have got a gaol
sentence, having regard to the number of offences, which personally I could not
possibly regard as covered by this magical phrase “a single escapade”. I'would
think that he would get perhaps about 3 years and perhaps half of that would be
suspended subject to his being placed on probation for the remainder of the
period and going out from gaol knowing that if he did this sort of thing again he
would serve the remainder of the sentence. I might say, with regard to one of the
remarks made here tonight, that we are somewhat careful when we suspend a
sentence, or part of it, to guard against the possibility of the sentence being put
into execution, or the balance of it being put. into execution, because of the
commission of some minor crime. Usually we say it is suspended subject to the
condition that the criminal commit no serious crime of a similar character for a
deﬁnite period, leaving the Judge some discretion if a further crime is committed
whether the rest of the sentence should be put into execution.
With regard to Case No. 2, without knowing the precise circumstances of
the conviction for breaking entering and stealing I Would be in difﬁculty, but
assuming that it was of a serious character I would impose a sentence, I should
think, .in the order of 2 years (our sentences for breaking and entering in
Tasmania are somewhat less than yours), but I would direct an enquiry as to
whether this man ought tobe declared an habitual criminal. I don’t know what
your law is here, but our Court of Criminal Appeal in Tasmania has held that a
man may not be declared an habitual criminal without investigation, and that is
a real investigation in which evidence is heard from Police Ofﬁcers, as to‘what
the man has been doing. The Court has to be satisfied that crime has become his
habit and that during the periods when he is not in gaol he has not been earning
an honest living.
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 Case No. 3. I think that here this young man would unquestionably be
given another chance. I imagine that he would be ﬁned and his licence would no
doubt be taken away for some time. Possibly a Judge might think that it would
be appropriate to give him a suspended sentence.
Case No. 4. Some of you have taken a much harsher view here than I
would have imagined any Judge in Tasmania would take. I might perhaps tell
you about another difference in our law. In Tasmania the age of consent is the
unduly high age of 18, which means that many young men coming from other
States ﬁnd they are working under the wrong Act! I think that the suggestion of
some of the syndicates was that this man might be put on probation, but we
don’t think in Tasmania that it is really worthwhile putting a young sexual
offender on probation. It has become somewhat popular amongst us to impose a
ﬁne in cases of this kind — carnal knowledge cases — I think on the view that it
is not a good thing simply‘to place someone on a bond for this kind of offence,
because he is inclined to laugh at it; but in the case of a young man, particularly
a young unmarried man who is on a pretty good wage, we think it is a good idea
to hit him in the pocket, and we impose a fairly substantial ﬁne. You will ﬁnd, I
think, a brochure on this subject from the Institute of Criminology at
Cambridge; it is concerned with sexual offences and I believe I am right in saying
(although Dr Chappell will know a lot more about this) that ﬁnes have been
imposed quite often in England in respect of sexual offences of this kind.
I make no comment on Case No. 5, because we have no problem with drug
addicts in Tasmania.
So far as Case No. 6 is concerned I would think a prison sentence would
certainly be imposed, but I would think it likely that he would not be regarded
as beyond reform, and part of his sentence might be suspended.
Case No. 7. I think this case would undoubtedly be regarded by us as a
case for the imposition of a substantial term of imprisonment, and I imagine that
it would be 7 — 10 years.
Case No. 8. In this case the driver has not been convicted of dangerous
driving. If convicted of dangerous driving a gaol sentence should be‘imposed and
it ought to be something in the order of 6 — 9 months, or in a serious case
perhaps 12 months. Our Court of Criminal Appeal has said that it ought to be
less than the punishment for manslaughter; and here again I may add that our
sentences are somewhat lighter than yours. If a jury convicts of motor
manslaughter in Tasmania, which of course it very seldom does, the period of
imprisonment is not likely to be more than 18 months or 2 years; the Court of
Appeal has said that to be right. The offence of dangerous driving is less serious
and will possibly not be visited with a punishinent greater than 6 — 12 months.
And these same considerations would, I think, guide us with regard to Case No.
9.
I consider Mr Chairman, that Ican take some comfort from the fact'that I
myself was substantially in agreement with the syndicates on a number of these
cases. I think it illustrates that we as judges and magistrates do accept pretty
well-settled principles of punishment as to the necessity for the protectionof the
public and as to the considerations which lie behind the concept of general
deterrence.
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 CONCLUDING ADDRESS BY THE HONOURABLE J. C. MADDISON,
MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR NEW SOUTH WALES
Chief Justice and Gentlemen:
First of all, may I say thank you for giving me the opportunity of saying
just a few words for the conclusion of this most interesting three-day seminar. I
think possibly what we have all learned that we didn’t know before is that we
are really all engaged in what is, I suppose, a very inexact science — if you can
have an inexact science. It is certainly an inexact technique that is being used by
courts. At one time I wondered, Chief Justice, whether it was right and proper
that I be here, but following the discussion that has ensued tonight I am now
conﬁrmed that I should be, because it has become clearer as a result of that
discussion that the administration has been tried and found wanting in more
ways than one. There is a very deﬁnite advantage so far as the administration of
the courts is concerned that I should be here and hear the views of those who are
confronted with these problems on a day-to-day basis. Of course, as you all
know, I am confronted with somewhat the same problems from time to time in
an administrative way when the prerogative of mercy has to be considered.
Consequently I suppose that it is appropriate that I should be here and listen to
the words which came from the various speakers, from the members of the
magistracy and the judiciary, in telling me what are the factors which weigh in
their minds when they reach a decision.
As you know, I was in America earlier this year, and I think one of the
most impressive experiences I had while I was there was in talking to so many
people concerned with the administration of the law on the question of seminars
and on the question of sentencing councils — which is a matter somewhat
touched on by Judge Harvey Prior tonight and on one previous occasion in the
seminar. I was directed to some remarks made by a Federal District Court judge
as long ago as 1962, and I want to quote what he said because I think it puts in
perspective the type of thing we have been talking about for three evenings. It
was Judge Talbot Smith who said this in 1962 in a seminar on sentencing:
“The real problem is not the problem of disparate sentences. We will
have them, and rightfully so, just as long as we have disparate offenders.
The crucial problem is the problem of the inappropriate sentence, whether
too harsh or too lenient.”
And I think we don’t want to be carried away by this concept of disparity.
I think we want to have a look at what he was directing attention to, namely,
the inappropriate sentence.
One of the problems that confronts all of you gentlemen, and confronts
me too, is who is to judge the inappropriateness of a sentence, and I can only 'say
that the only people who can judge it and are in a position to judge it are the
judges and magistrates themselves. Certainly it should not be the members of the
Executive Government who should set themselves up as a kind of ﬁnal arbiter of
the appropriateness of a sentence. And more particularly, if I may say so, it is
not the press. I feel that we have a problem in our society at the moment which
is a pretty real one, and it relates fairly and squarely to the continued-
independence of the judiciary and the magistracy from executive control and
executive criticism; and while we accept (perhaps sometimes with a swallowing
71
 of pride) criticism from the press, nevertheless we have always held that there
should be in our democratic society a clear line between the Executive
Government and the judiciary and the magistracy. But sometimes it is very
difficult for ministers to keep out of this controversy, especially when the press
go into it. I think lit_is important therefore that we continue to hold these
seminars for the purpose of trying to get to a situation where we don’t get
inappropriate sentences, because if we are going to have a proliferation of
inappropriate sentences, then it is going to be difficult for the Executive to keep
out of the controversy.
I wanted to draw your attention to the fact that the judicial seminar
technique has been used in the United States now for well 'over ten years, and it
has been used at all levels of the judiciary. It has been said to me by some people
that it is necessary over there because of :the election ofjudges and magistrates,
and to some extent this is true. But nevertheless when you find that the Federal
District Court judges. of the United States are prepared to come together on an
annual basis to discuss their problems you will realize that this criticism is not
valid at all. ‘
If I could just return to the Sentencing Council for one moment Iwould
like to read from a published press announcement in The Law Bulletin, No. 246,
of 18th December 1963, by Judge Campbell, the Chairman of the 6th, 7th and
8th Judicial Circuits of Illinois, relating to the establishment of a Sentencing
Council: '
The Seminar and Institute on Sentencing Disparity for the 6th, 7th
and 8th Judicial Circuits, held at Highland Park on October 19, 1961,
focused attention upon the idea of sentencing councils.
Such councils, voluntary in nature, provide a method for judges to
pool their knowledge and experience in sentencing.
“The Northern District of Illinois now becomes the second judicial
district in the United States to adopt sentencing council procedures,”
Judge Campbell said. “The Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit)
established a council in 1961. The decision here was made following a
study of sentencing problems by the Court under the chairmanship of
Judge Edwin A. Robson.
“Judge Robson and his committee presented a proposal to all the
judges of this district at a recent meeting which recommended among
other things that two voluntary panels of five judges each be convened f6r
the purpose of considering all factors relative to the sentencing of
defendants. The report of the committee was adopted by the court . . . .
“The discussion of cases at panel meetings will be based on such
factors as the offense, information disclosed during the trial, and upon
pre-sentence investigation reports prepared by the federal probation
ofﬁce,” Judge Campbell said.
“Each judge will prior to the meeting read the pre-sentence
investigation report of the probation officer noting the seriousness of the
offense, prior record, relationship of the defendant to his family, his
health, his employment and military service, and all other pertinent data.
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 “In addition, the case of each defendant will be studied from the
standpoint of his attitude toward the offense, the community, and
himself. Important considerations are always the welfare of the
community and the deterrence of others.
“While there will be great value in discussing each case in the
Sentencing Council, the decision as to disposition will and must rest solely
with the judge to whom the case is‘assigned.
“This Court has been well impressed by the experience of the
Sentencing Council of federal judges in the Eastern District of Michigan.
That council was established on November 21 , 1960.”
Now, Gentlemen, I discussed with the judges of this District how this was
working out in practice, and I understand that it has now become the practice
for the judges of the court to meet at the beginning of each week to discuss
around the table the cases which have been remanded for sentence and are
awaiting sentence in that following week, and it was stressed to me that the
independence of the judges was not denied in this situation. The practice was for
the chief probation officer to be present at the meeting. He was there to do
nothing more really than to record the proceedings and to answer questions put
to him on the presentence report. As a matter of practice that Court, as a senior
Court, never proceeded to a sentence without a remand for three weeks to allow
a presentence report to be obtained, and this was the invariable practice. As a
result of this kind of council there had been a removal of much of the press and
public criticism which flowed from inappropriateness of sentences as between
one offender and another. Now, as l have said, I don’t wish to be thought to be
advocating this system precisely. What I merely want to do is to bring it to your
attention as being something which is not quite so “way out” as we might
initially think it is, particularly as it has been in vogue in America, and
particularly in this city, for some five,,six or seven years. There is, I think, a lot
that we can learn from this principle.
I said that I thought as a result of what has been said here, particularly this
evening, that the Administration had been tried and found wanting. I am the
first to admit that from what. I can gather from my departmental advisers there
is a complete gap in our statistical knowledge. This is a matter which it has been
said (quite rightly I think) is possibly for the courts and the prison system to
throw up-in the first instance. What the police can do in throwing up other
information is another question, but I think we have quite a lot to do in this
area.
Secondly, I think that as a result of our failure to have proper statistical
information we are at the moment unable to provide judges and magistrates with
any satisfactory information such as Dr Chappell referred to when he mentioned
the fact that a publication in England had been brought out called The Sentence
and the Court, which sets out some statistical propositions indicating the success
or otherwise of -various sentencing options. I think that we have a lot to do, and
I think that if the seminar has served no other purpose than to point up our
deficiencies, then we have been well served. 4
I want to say to you, Chief Justice, that the Institute of Criminology of
Sydney University is to be thanked by all of us for producing such stimulating
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 discussion. I join with you in trusting that this will not be the one and only
seminar. I don’t think it will be, by any means. I think we have to go our several
ways persuading our colleagues, whether-they be on the judicial bench or the
magisterial bench or in the administration, that there is great value to be attained
from the continuation of this principle. I am sure that Iam not exaggerating in
what I said to you early in my remarks — that I believe that the independence of
the judiciary and the magistracy is at stake unless this problem of
inappropriateness of sentence is resolved. I' think that it would be highly
disastrous for any administration to get itself into a position of interference.
This is as far away from my thought as it could ever be, but nevertheless there
are strong pressures — community pressures, people who write the most
imflammatory letters to the administration following decisions of judges and
magistrates, press comment — and the administration remains in the background,
and silent. Therefore, if for no other reason, I think this problem has to be
resolved, and it has to be resolved earlier rather than later.
Thank you indeed for listening to me. There are many other thingsithat I
would like to say, but I see that time has well and truly caught up with us. I
thank you again for the opportunity of speaking to the seminar.
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 SEMINAR ON FITNESS TO PLEAD
CHAIRMAN’S OPENING ADDRESS
The Hon. SIR LESLIE HERRON*
Ladies and gentlemen:
I will make my opening remarks at this seminar extremely short, because
this is a technical problem and it does not require me to say very muc
h of a
general nature. But ﬁrst 1 did want to pay some tribute to the Institute
of
Criminology of the Sydney University Law School. For many years we h
ave
been handicapped in the law by a want of collective thought being brought
to
many problems, and the Institute of Criminology, under the direction o
f a
committee of which 1 have the honour to be the Chairman, suggests many top
ics
of great value which can be discussed amongst the legal profession and the
judges. As you know, we have held a very successful series of seminars on drug
abuse, which is a tremendously important matter and one that had not be
en
tackled before, and we had discussions among police, judges, law ofﬁcers of
the
Crown, parliamentarians, members of the medical profession, and the like. Th
en
we decided that it was high time we gave some thought to confessio
nal
statements by arrested persons, and I suppose there is no matter in law
courts
which is of greater importance than that —— the value of the evidence given
by
police officers in regard to a person who has been arrested. We have
done a
mighty work in connection with that and it has taken up a lot of time
of
experts, including the police, who I am glad to say were the ﬁrst in line to wa
nt
to discuss it and to try to bring in some solution to the apparently compl
ex
problem. Then we moved on to another matter which is always difﬁcult for
judges and on which there has not been a great deal of knowledge collectively or
individually, and that is the principles of sentencing, because I suppose that
if
sentences are inappropriate they can cause much trouble amongst think
ing
members of the community as well as to the criminals.
Now we come to the fourth very important matter, which is possibly a
sealed book to a great number of the legal profession, the magistrates and judg
es,
and that is the question of the ﬁtness to plead. My own experience of it,
like
that of most judges, has not been great, and although 1 have sat in
the
Darlinghurst Court and in the country on a great number of criminal trials wh
en
l was a primary judge, nonetheless the occasions on which fitness to plead ca
me
up for decision were very few and I myself cannot claim to have made
a
complete study of them, so I would be the ﬁrst to welcome an analysis
of the
problems involved in the subject.
1 have read the prepared papers with great interest and I must
say that
already I am much better informed than I was before. Might I
say that "I am a
great believer in these matters being done by courts. 1 don’t think that
it is a
good thing for matters even of such an abstract and obscu
re nature as mental
illness to be dealt with other than by courts if it ca
n be avoided. I know that
there are great inadequacies in jurymen trying these cas
es, but they have to face
up to problems just as difﬁcult in civil and criminal cases,
because very many
 
* K.B.E., C.M.G., LL.B., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New
South
Wales.
  
criminal cases involve the question of intent, which is a matter of the human
mind, and as far as I know jurymen do their very utmost under the judge’s
direction to bring in the right result.
I am rather inclined to believe that it is better for law courts to keep
control of these matters because although jurymen are guided very often by
psychiatrists,. the psychiatrists differ very often amongst themselves and I think
that the directions that judges give to juries do keep the matter as nearly as
possible to simple propositions. It is just the same as if you have a plea of mental
illness. Although it is difﬁcult to say that jurymen should shoulder the burden of
a decision when psychiatrists and lawyers differ, nonetheless I think it is a matter
that they can deal with satisfactorily enou , and it has always been their
province to deal with matters such as the M Naghten Rule. I think that if they
keep these matters in due perspective nothing but good can come of it. '
But the main thing is that we should all inform ourselves as well as we can
about these problems and how to approach them. What is the real nature of a
ﬁtness to plead issue? It is not, of course, a contest in the real sense between the
Crown and the accused, and once we keep that in mind I think that all will be
well; I don’t say that the system is perfect, but I do think that it is the right of
jurymen to judge whether or not their fellows are mentally ill. ,
I will thank in advance the speakers who have been so kind as to prepare
these papers. You will see that they are a very learned panel of speakers'and very
experienced on this subject. And I would also thank Professor Shatwell, because
he is the guiding hand behind this Institute of Criminology and he has been
working mightily for some years now to have these various seminars on this and
other subjects broUght together.
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 THE LEGAL BACKGROUND T0 FITNESS TO PLEAD
IN NEW SOUTH WALES -
R.P. ROULSTON"
It has long been recognized that no man can be charged for a cri
me unless
he is in a position to defend himself, and that includes his be
ing in a mental
condition to defend himself. The prisoner must be of sufficient int
ellect to
comprehend the course of the proceedings of the trial, so as to m
ake a proper
defence, properly to understand the proceedings, to challenge a ju
ror to whom
he may wish to object,-to understand the details of the evidenc
e, to instruct
counsel if he has counsel or to defend himself if he be without counse
l.
As early as Hale’s Pleas. of the Crown (vol. 1 pp. 34—35) we ﬁnd it st
ated:
‘_‘If a man in his sane memory commits a capital offence and
before
arraignment becomes absolutely mad he ought not by law to be arraigne
d
during his frenzy, but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be
removed, the reason is because he cannot advisedly plead to the
indictment and if such person after his plea and before his tria
l
become of non-sane memory he shall not be tried.”
The expressions “non-sana memoria”, “non-sane memory” and “no
t of
sound memory” appear in the older works of authority.
Although it is likely that the plea was originally developed in relation to
persons who were clearly insane the notion of insanity came to be understo
od as
covering all persons who from whatever cause were unable to plead, und
erstand
the proceedings or conununicate with other persons.
In 1800 the Criminal Lunatics Act was passed'which in terms speaks of
persons who “shall be insane and shall upon arraignment be found so to be”.
The Act was considered to be merely declaratory of the common law and
the word insane was construed with reference to the question whether
the
prisoner can or cannot be tried upon the indictment.
In R. v. Dyson 7 c. & P. 305 n,ParkeJ. directed the jury that —
“if they were satisfied that the prisoner had not then, from the
defect of her faculties, intelligence enough to understand the proceedings
against her, they ought to find her not sane”.
In R. v. Pritchard 7 C. & P. 303, where the prisoner was deaf and dumb,
Alderson B. in addressing the jury said:
“Upon this issue, therefore, if you think that there is no certain
- mode of communicating the details of the trial to the prisoner, so that
he
can clearly understand them, and be able properly to make his defence to
the charge, you ought to find that he is not of sane mind. It is not enough
that he may have a general capacity of communicating on ordinary
matters.”
 
* LL.M. (Tas.), LLB. (Sydney), Senior Lecturer in Criminal Law in the
University of Sydney.
  
Similarly in R. v. Berry 1 Q.B.D. 447 where the prisoner was a deaf mute
and in R. v. Governor ofStafford Prison ex parte Emery (19.09) 2 K.B.'81 where
the prisoner was deaf and could neither read nor write a ﬁnding that the prisoner
was not capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings amounted, in
point of law, to a ﬁnding of insanity.
In England the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 s. 2 has been replaced by the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s. 4 (see Annexure 1) and in New South
Wales the matter is now governed by the Mental Health Act 1958.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK IN N.S.W;
The provisions of Part VII of the Mental Health Act 1958 appear to
provide a comprehensive code for the disposition of persons indicted for or
convicted of an offence who are mentally ill or otherwise unfit to plead and can
be properly regarded as the successor provisions to s. 2 of the Criminal Lunatics
Act 1800 and the various earlier Lunacy Acts in this State. It is convenient at
this stage to set out the more important provisions at length.
Section 23 provides:
(1) If any person indicted for any offence is mentally ill, and, upon
arraignment, is found to be so by a jury lawfully empanelled for that
purpose, so that such person cannot be tried upon any such indictment, or
if upon the trial of any person so indicted such person is found by the jury
before whom he is tried, to be mentally ill, the judge before whom any
such person is brought to be arraigned or tried as aforesaid, may direct
such finding to be recorded, and thereupon may order such person to be
kept in strict custody in such place and in such manner. as such judge may
think ﬁt until he is dealt with as provided by section 24 of this Act.
(2) In all cases where it is given in evidence upon the trial of any person
charged with treason, felony or misdemeanour, that such person was at the
time the act or omission, the subject of the charge was done, or omitted to
be done, mentally ill, and such person is acquitted, the jury shall be
required to ﬁnd specially whether such person was at such time mentally
ill and to declare whether such person was acquitted by them on the
ground that he was at such time mentally ill.
In this subsection “mentally ill” means, in relation to any person
charged as aforesaid, so insane as not to be responsible, according to law,
for the act or omission the subject of the charge.
(3) If the jury ﬁnd that such person was at the time the act or omission the
subject of the charge was done or omitted to be done mentally ill as
aforesaid, the judge before whom such trial is had shall order such person
to be kept in strict custody, in such place and in such manner as to such
judge seems ﬁt, until the Governor’s pleasure is known, and thereupon the
Governor may give such order for the safe custody of such person during
the Governor’s pleasure in a prison as the Governor deems ﬁt.
(4) Upon the receipt of certiﬁcates from two medical practitioners in or to the
effect of the form of schedule 3, the Governor by warrant under his hand,
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may direct that such person be conveyed to and detained in a mental
hospital during the Govemor’s pleasure.
Section 24 provides:
0)
(2)
When any person committed to take his trial for any offence is certified by
two medical practitioners to be mentally ill, such certiﬁcates to be in or to
the effect of the form of schedule 3, or is upon arraignment found by
verdict to be mentally ill, the Minister may direct by order under his hand
in or to the effect of the form of schedule '4, that such person be removed
to, and detained in, a mental hospital until such person is certiﬁed by the
Superintendent and the Director, or by the Superintendent and two
ofﬁcial visitors, to be not mentally ill, whereupon the Minister shall order
his removal to a prison in order to be tried for such offence or if he is not
to be so tried order that he be discharged.
Such detention for any period shall not operate as a bar to his subsequent
indictment and trial for such offence.
Section 26 provides:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
In any case in which a person charged with an offence for which he has
not been tried (in this section referred to as “the person charged”) is
detained in a mental hospital the Attorney-General, if he is of opinion that
the question whether the person charged is ﬁt to plead if put upon his trial
should be determined by a jury, may by order under his hand direct that
the person charged be removed from such hospital to some pri
son
appointed by the Attorney-General and speciﬁed in the order.
Such order shall be a sufﬁcient warrant for the removal of the person
charged from the hospital in which he is detained and for his detention in
the prison appointed by the Attorney-General and speciﬁed in the order.
The Attorney-General may further order that a jury of twelve persons be
empanelled for trial of an issue whether the person charged is ﬁt to plead
if placed upon his trial.
The said issue shall be tried at a time and place
appointed by the
Attorney-General before a judge of the Supreme Court o
r a Chairman of
Quarter Sessions.
The Governor of the Prison in which theperson charged is d
etained shall
procure the attendance of the person charged at the time and pl
ace
appointed for the trial of such issue.
At the request of the Clerk of the Peace the sheriff shall sum
mon
thirty-six persons, chosen by him from the list of jurors for the jurors
’
district within which the place appointed for the trial of the said issue i
s
situated, to attend at the time and place appointed for the trial of the
said
issue.
A jury of twelve persons shall be empanelled from the jurors in attendance
at the court and the said issue shall be tried in accordance with the-
83
  
 
procedure adopted at a criminal trial where upon the trial of an indictment
the question is raised whether the accused is ﬁt to plead. The judge
presiding at the trial shall have power to make any order including a power
of postponement and give any directions which in his opinion are
necessary for the trial of the issue. The jurors empanelled to try the issue
shall be sworn in such manner as the court shall direct.
(8) If the jury ﬁnd that the person so charged is not ﬁt to plead he shall be
returned to the hospital from which he was removed.
(9) If the jury ﬁnd that the person charged is ﬁt to plead he shall be returned
to prison.
(10) If a bill is found against him he shall be placed upon his trial.
(11) If a bill is not found against him a certiﬁcate shall be issued by the
Attorney-General to the judges of the Supreme Court and in accordance
with the provision of section 358 of the Crimes Act (1900 as amended by
subsequent Acts. and any of the said judges may thereupon direct the
gaoler in whose custody the person charged may be to discharge him from
custody. '
(12) At the trial of the said issue the person charged shall be entitled to give
evidence on oath or to make an unsworn statement.
(13) If the jury ﬁnd that the person charged is ﬁt to plead and he is placed
upon his trial he shall be entitled to set-up the defence that he was, at the
time the act or omission the subject of the charge was done or omitted to
be done, mentally ill. ,
In this subsection “mentally ill” has the meaning ascribed thereto in
subsection (2) of section 23 of this Act.
It should also be noted at this stage that the term “mentally ill person” for
the general purposes of the Mental Health Act ‘is deﬁned in section 4 in the
following way:
“‘Mentally ill person’ means a person who owing to mental illness requires
care, treatment or control for his own good or in the public interest, and is
for the time being incapable of managing himself or his affairs and
‘mentally ill’ has a corresponding meaning.”
However, for the purposes of sections 23 (2) and 26 (13) the subsections
speciﬁcally state that the meaning of “mentally ill” for the purposes of these
subsections is that the person is “so insane as not to be responsible, according to
law,” thus preserving for the purposes of these two subsections the M’Naghten
Rules criteria of criminal responsibility in relation to mental illness.
SOME INCIDENTAL DIFFICULTIES
Before proceeding to an examination of the trial of an issue of ﬁtness to
plead, there are certain incidental difﬁculties in relation to the above provisions
of the Mental Health Act which may be mentioned at this stage.
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 (1)
(2)
(3)
Under section 23 (3) the Governor is empowered to give. such orders for
the safe custody of a person found not guilty on the grounds of mental
illness (i.e., M. Naughten mad) during the Governor’s pleasure.
Section 24 empowers the Minister to direct by order under his hand
that‘a person upon arraignment found mentally ill within the genera
l
deﬁnition of section 4 be removed to and detained in a mental hospital
until he is found to be not mentally ill whereupon the Minister must orde
r
his removal to a prison in order that he be tried or if he is not to be tri
ed
to be discharged.
Under section 26 it is the Attorney-General who may order that -a
person charged with an offence who has not been tried and whose ﬁtness
to plead is contested may order his removal from a mental hospital to
prison in order that this issue may be tried.
This proliferation of the authorities given different powers under the
Act is not, at least self evidently, an efﬁcient or useful division of
authority.
Section 26 may be thought to be somewhat defective in that it provides no
adequate machinery for the question to be brought to the notice of the
Attorney-General. It is, I think, clear that before the Attorney-General
would make any such order somebody must seek the making of such an
order from him. It may happen that the mental hospital authorities are not
prepared to certify the accused’s being of sound mind and not prepared to
recommend to the Attorney—General that s. 26 should be invoked. In these
circumstances the only practical way of seeking such an order is by the
accused himself or someone on his behalf. The accused would be at
something of a disadvantage in the light of the mental hospital authorities’
‘ refusal to certify that he is of sound mind and in the absence of inﬂuential
friends the Attorney-General may well be reluctant to make such an order.
Mental illness is a term which it is notoriously hard to deﬁne and the
’ definitions Contained in S. 4 of “mentally ill" and “mentally ill persons”
do not appear to make the task any easier. It is hardly helpful to be told
that a ffmentally ill person” is someone who has a “mental illness” and
that “mentally ill” is “mental illness”. In the context of an issue of ﬁtness
to plead the matter is further complicated by requiring as part of the
deﬁnition that the person requires care, treatment Or control for his 'own
good or in the public interest, and is for the time being incapable of
managing himself or his affairs. It is suggested that a person may well be
unfit to plead without satisfying all or indeed any of the requirements of
the deﬁnition.
However, if one takes the‘ view I have expressed earlier that the Mental
Health Act can be treated as the legitimate successor to the common law and the
Criminal Lunatics Act_l800_tl1gr1_the conclusion can, be reached (admittedly
tenouslyi and somewhzi artiﬁciallyl “that a person is deemed to be “mentally
,_ ill” and unfit to plead even if the reasons and physical condition which make
him unﬁt to plead are unrelated to any mental illness.
It is clear from the authorities referred to at the beginning of this paper
that it is not merely defects of the mind which may bring about this result.
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Defects of the senses and intellect whether or not combined with some defect of
the mind can be sufficient,
The authorities are 'clear that, if there‘ are no certain means of
communication with the prisoner or that there are no certain means of making
sure that he will follow so much as it is necessary he should follow of the
proceedings at his trial, then he should be found mentally. ill and unﬁt to plead.
(see R. v. Roberts (1953) .37 CAR. 86). Thiswould include the untrained as
well as the diseased mind and include certain classes of aborigines and,
immigrants as well as the deaf—dumb and illiterate.
The necessity for this rather involuted line of reasoning has been
eliminated in. England by replacing the concept of “insanity” or “mental illness”
by the concept of “disability” (see Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964
reproduced in Annexure 1) and similar legislation is desirable in this State.
METHODS AVAILABLE FOR RAISING THE ISSUE
OF FITNESS T0 PLEAD UNDER THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT
There appear to be \four different methods provided for by the Act
whereby a person may be found to be unfit to stand his trial.
Firstly, under s. 24 (l), a person committed to take his trial for any
offence may by order of the Minister upon the certificate of 'two medical
practitioners be removed and detained in a mental hospital until such person is-
certiﬁed not to be mentally ill.
Secondly, if a person who is indicted for any offence is mentally ill and
upon arraignment is found to be so by a jury lawfully empanelled for that
purpose, so that such person cannot be tried on such indictment, the Minister
may similarly direct.
Thirdly, it would appear that under s. 23 (1).,if during the trial of any
person indicted forany offence it is found by the jury before conviction or
acquittal that he is mentally ill or unﬁt to stand his trial then the Minister may
similarly order.
Finally by invoking the power vested in the Attorney-General by virtue of
s. 26 to order that a person charged with an offence for which he has not been
tried be put upon his trial to determine the issue of whether he is now fit to
stand upon his trial. '
It may be that the first of these procedures is essentially the most
hazardous to the accused person. It does sometimes happen that after an accused
person has been committed to trial it appears that his mental condition is such
that he cannot properly instruct his counsel nor enter a plea to the charge. He
may then be certiﬁed by two medical practitioners to be mentally ill as provided
by s. 24 and removed to a mental hospital. If this is» done, that appears to be the
end of the matter unless and until he is certiﬁed to be not mentally ill or the
powers of the Attorney-General are invoked under s. 26.
Disposition of the issue by the method provided by s. 23 (l) of the Mental
Health Act is the procedure most commonly adopted. Normally, I am informed,
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the issue will be raised by the Crown, after the Consultant Psychiatrist has
indicated his opinion that the accused is unﬁt to plead. The issue is tried by an
ordinary criminal jury (either Supreme' Court or Quarter Sessions according to
the venue of the case) summoned in the usual way and a jury may not be
summoned ad hoc.
The verdict is either “sane and ﬁt to plead” or “mentally ill and unﬁt to
plead”. If the former, the accused is forthwith arraigned and his plea taken; if
the plea is one of “guilty”, sentence is passed; if the plea is one of “not guilty”,
he is either tried forthwith or more commonly remanded for trial and he may be
allowed bail.
If the accused is found unfit to plead the trial judge orders that the ﬁnding
be recorded and that the accused be kept in strict custody “in such place and in
such manner as such judge sees fit” (usually the State Penitentiary at Long Bay)
until dealt with as provided by s. 24 of the Mental Health Act.
The third method of disposition is unusual but it is open to the trial judge
before indictment or during the trial if it appears that the accused had become
unﬁt to plead, to call upon the jury to make a special ﬁnding on this issue and if
its ﬁnding be “unﬁt to plead” to proceed under the second procedure.
In R. v. Dashwood (1943) KB. I it was emphatically stated that:
“It is a cardinal principle of our law that no man can be tried fo
r a
crime unless he is in a mental condition to defend himself....and
it shohld
be known, if there is any person who is not aware of it that t
he court acts
in such a case on information conveyed to it from any quarter
. It does not
matter whether the information comes to the court from th
e defendant
himself or his advisers or the prosecution or an independent pe
rson....”.
And in R. v. Podola (1960) 1 QB. 325 it was said:
“Indeed if a court becomes aware, either before or during a trial,
that the accused person’s sanity is doubtful, it is the duty of the court to
have the doubt resolved before beginning or continuing the trial”.
The fourth and rarely used method of disposition occurs at the initiative
of the Attorney-General. If a person charged with an offence is in a mental
hospital, having been certiﬁed under s. 24, either without or after the trial of the
issue of his ﬁtness to plead, it may of course happen that at some stage he will
recover his sanity and be certiﬁed to be of sound mind. He will then be returned
to prison and committed for trial and may then be tried for his offence.
However, it may happen that although the mental hospital authorities are
not prepared to certify the accused as being of sound mind, the
Attorney-General considers that the question of his fitness to plead and stand his
trial should be determined by a jury. In such a case, the Attorney-General by
. virtue of s. 26, may make an order directing that the accused be removed t
o a
prison, that a jury be empane led, either in the Supreme Court or in Quarter
Sessions, to try the issue of his itness to plead.
87
  
THE DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE UNDER SECTION 23
The usual time to raise the question of the prisoner’s fitness to be tried is
before he pleads although, exceptionally, it may arise during the conduct of the
trial after the accused has pleaded. The normal way in which the issue is raised is
by report from the Government Consultant Psychiatrist that the accused is unfit
to plead. The case is simply listed for trial of the issue of fitness to plead in the
same way as any ordinary trial before a jury summonsed in the ordinary way.
The accused is arraigned but is not asked to plead.
The Crown Prosecutor requests the judge’s permission for the trial of the
issue and asks that ajury be empanelled for that purpose.
In R. v. Roberts (1953) 2 All ER. 340; (1954) 2 0.8. 329, the accused
was deaf and dumb and had been charged with murder. Mr Justice Devlin
allowed the trial of the issue of fitness to plead to be postponed at the request of
the defence until after the trial of the general issue. The accused was in fact
found, by direction, not guilty and the issue of ﬁtness to plead was not
proceeded with. There is much to be said in favour of this practice as the
accused is not thereby deprived of the possibility of being acquitted. There are
also reported cases where persons found unfit to plead, and later tried, have been
acquitted. For example, one Clive Pickering, charged with murder in June, 1958
was found unfit to plead and sent to Broadmoor. He made such progress that in
November, 1958 he stood his trial and was acquitted. (Lancet, 13 December,
1958, 1282). From a psychiatric point of view.also it is generally regarded as
undesirable for a patient to have hanging over his: head the fear of belated
criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, such a course seems incompatible with the principle
that no man should be tried unless in a condition to defend himself and Mr
Justice Byme in R. v. Benyon (1957) 2 QB. 111 declined to follow this practice
and held that the law had always been that an insane person could not be tried
and that, if the court was aware of the fact that there was a preliminary issue of
fitness of the prisoner to plead, it was the duty of the court to see that the issue
was tried before the general issue irrespective of the wishes of the prosecution or
of the defence. This is the view that appears to be currently adopted in this
State.
It may be noted that in England a compromise between Roberts and
Benyon seems to have been reached by virtue of section 4(2) of the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (see annexure 1). Twelve jurors are called and it
is not the usual practice to allow challenges, since the accused’s ability to
challenge is one of the matters to be considered, and the Crown has only the
same right of challenge as the accused. However, it does appear that on occasion
defence counsel has been permitted to exercise the accused’s right of challenge
and no rigid practice appears to have been established either way.
Thejury is then sworn as follows:
“You shall diligently inquire, and true presentment make, for and on
behalf of our sovereign lady the Queen, whether (the name of the
accused), the accused, who stands indicted for (short title of offence) is by
reason of mental illness unfit to plead or not; and a true verdict give
according to your understanding. So help you God
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 If the contention that the accused, is. unfit to plead is raised by the
prosecution, as it usually is, the Crown Prosecutor opens outlining the nature of
the issue to be tried, and the evidence he proposes to call. If however the
contention is put forward by the defence and contested by the prosecution, then
the defence would open.
It was held in R. v. Podola (1960) QB. 325, that if the contention is put
forward by the defence and contested by the prosecution, there is a burden on
the defence of satisfying the jury of the accused’s insanity, which will be
discharged if the jury is satisfied on the balance of probabilities.Conversely,if the
prosecution alleges and the defence disputes insanity, there is a burden on the
prosecution of establishing it. Whether this burden is the normal criminal onus
of proof beyond reasonable doubt or merely the civil onus on the balance of
probabilities was not expressly stated, the court being content to say:
“Conversely if the prosecution alleges and the defence disputes insanity, there is
a burden upon the prosecution of establishing it.”
It is at first sight attractive to support the contention that the onus on the
prosecution should be the same as on all other issues (with limited exceptions) in
a criminal trial, namely, proof beyond reasonable doubt, but on reﬂection this
would not seem to be altogether satisfactory and it may be questioned whether
there is or should be any burden imposed by law on either side when in reality
the proceedings are in the nature of an inquiry only, and particularly bearing in
mind that the issue may be raised by the judge himself against the wishes both of
the prosecution and the defence, it is difficult to see what the burden of proof
should be in such circumstances. It is indeed rather startling to think of any onus
in such‘a context.
The Consultant Psychiatrist will usually be called by the Crown as a
witness at the trial of the issue as will one or more of the other psychiatrists who
visit The State Penitentiary; sometimes also the resident medical officer of the
State Penitentiary. Inappropriate cases some of the evidence given at the
committal which throws light on the accused’s condition will also be called.
I am informed that it is the practice of the Crown where they raise the
issue to ensure that the accused is legally represented at the hearing, and if he
has no legal adviser, legal aid is assigned. Naturally, the opinions of the accused’s
own legal advisers are very material and weight will naturally be given to them
and very often the accused’s solicitor will give evidence on the question of
whether the accused is able to give a coherent and rational account of himself, so
as to be able to instruct his counsel in order that his defence may be placed
before the court. Also, whether the accused has some appreciation of the
functions of the judge and the jury with his right to challenge jurors.
At the close of the evidence, counsel for the defence and for the Crown
Prosecutor address and the judge instructs the jury. Examples of some of the
more classical directions to the jury are the following:
(a) You are not trying whether the accused is guilty of any crime. There is a
charge pending against the accused, but you can eliminate that from your
minds altogether. These proceedings are merely to determine whether or
not he is fit to stand his trial.
 
  
(b) The law is careful to see that a man is not prejudiced and that he has every
opportunity to present his case to the jury. If a-man’s mind is_in such a
state that he does not know what is going on the law says that it would be
unfair and improper that he should be tried. In that sense he would be
unﬁt ‘to plead.
(c) The only question for you is whether he has sufficient balance to follow
and appreciate the procedures at the trial, to prepare a proper defence, and
for that purpose to instruct those called upon to defend him, to give
counsel the necessary information to answer the matters which may be
adduced in evidence against him. The question is, is his mind and
understanding sufficient to enable him to do justice to himself. That is the
broad principle. When you return you will be asked whether he is sane and
fit to plead or mentally ill and unﬁt to plead.
The verdict by the jury is taken in the following terms:
“Gentlemen’ of the jury, have you agreed upon your verdict? How
say you, is the accused (name) sane and fit to plead, or mentally ill and
unfit to plead? So says your foreman, so say you all.”
If the prisoner is found unﬁt to plead, the ﬁnding is recorded and the
accused is ordered to be kept in strict custody until dealt with as provided by s.
24 of the Mental Health Act. If the accused is found sane and fit to plead, he is
forthwith arraigned on the indictment, and his plea taken. If he pleads guilty he
is dealt with in the ordinary way. If the plea is “not guilty”, he may be tried
forthwith but is usually remanded for trial, and if so remanded, he may be
allowed bail. '
Under Section 26:
The procedure is initiated by the making by the Attorney-General of an
order directing the removal of the patient (as the accused is referred to in the
section) from the mental hospital to a prison. The office of the Clerk of the
Peace is informed by an order of the Attomey-General directing the empanelling
of a jury for the trial of the issue of the patient’s ﬁtness to plead. The office of
the Clerk of the Peace ascertions who is the patient’s legal representative and if
he has none, arranges for the assignment of legal aid. In consultation with
defence counsel arrangements are made for a date for the trial of the issue in the
court specified in the Attorney-General’s order and arrangements are made for
the attendance of the witnesses.
At the time and place appointed the accused is brought before the court
and if a bill has been found, the accused is arraigned, but is not asked to plead. If
no bill has been found, of course the accused is not arraigned. The Crown
Prosecutor informs the judge of the issue to be tried and tenders the original of
the Attorney-General’s order for the empanelling of a jury.
Twelve jurors are called and sworn as follows:
“You shall diligently inquire, and true presentment make, for and on
behalf of our sovereign lady the Queen, whether (name of patient) who
stands indicted for (short title of offence) (this phrase is omitted if a bill
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 has not yet been found) is ﬁt to plead or notg'and a true ver
dict give
according to your understanding. So help you God.”
The matter proceeds in the same way as an ordinary trial of the issue
of
fitness to plead with the important proviso that as the proceedi
ngs are in the
nature of an inquiry it seems quite clear here at least there is no burden of
proof
cast upon either side and that it is merely up to the jury to ﬁnd o
ne way or the
other and it is assumed that the Crown Prosecutor acts in effe
ct as counsel
assisting the court.
.
The verdict of the juryis taken as follows:
“Gentlemen of the jury, have you agreed upon your verdict? H
ow
say you, is the patient (name) fit to plead, or not fit to plead? So s
ays
your foreman, so say you all.” '
If the patient is found ﬁt to plead, he must be returned to prison to awa
it
his trial in pursuance of subsection (9) and there appears to be n
o power to grant _
bail pending trial. If the patient is found not ﬁt to plead, he must b
e returned to
the mental hospital from whence he was removed by order of
the
Attorney-General in pursuance of subsection (8). If the patient is fo
und fit to
plead and there has been no committal for trial, the papers are referred
to the
Attorney-General regarding an ex ofﬁcio indictment. If a bill is not
found
against him the procedure set out in subsection (1 1) is followed and the priso
ner
is discharged from custody.
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. ' ANNEXURE A. .
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 (U.K.)
Section 4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) '
(6)
Where on the trial of a person the question arises-(atthe instance of the
defence or otherwise) whether the accused is under disability, that is to
say under any disability such that apart from this Act it would constitute'a
bar to his being tried, the following provisions shall have effect.
The court, if having regard to the nature of the supposed disability the
court are of opinion that it is expedient so to do and in the interests of the
accused, may postpone consideration of the said question (hereinafter
- referred to as ‘the question of fitness to be tried’) until any time up to the
opening of the case for the defence, and if before the question of ﬁtness to
be tried falls to be determined the jury return a verdict of acquittal on the
count or each of the counts on which the accused is being tried that
question shall not be determined. '
Subject to the foregoing subsection, the question of ﬁtness to be tried
shall be determined as soon as it arises.
The question of ﬁtness to be tried shall be determined by a jury; and — p
(a) where it falls to be determined on the arraignment of the accused,
then if the trial proceeds the accused shall be tried by a jury other
than that which determined that question;
(b) where it falls to be determined at any later time it shall be
determined by a separate jury or by the jury by whom the accused is
being tried, as the court may direct.
Where in accordance with subsection (2) or (3) of this section it is
determined that the accused is under disability, the trial shall not proceed
or further proceed.
For the purpose of providing an appeal against a finding of the jury that
the accused is under disability, section 2 of this Act (see post, paragraph
864A) (except subsection (3)) shall apply as if references to a special
verdict included references to such a ﬁnding; and —
(a) where the question of fitness to be tried was determined later than
on arraignment, an appeal under section 2 of this Act against a
finding that the ,accused was under disability, may be allowed
(notwithstanding that the finding was properly come to) if the Court
of Criminal Appeal are of opinion that the case is one in which the
accused should have been acquitted before the question of ﬁtness to
be tried was considered.
(b) if the court are of that opinion, the court shall, in addition to
quashing the finding, direct a verdict of acquittal to be recorded.
(c) subject to paragraph (b) above, where an appeal is allowed against a
ﬁnding that the accused is under disability, the appellant may be
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tried accordingly for the offence with which he was charged, and the
court may make such orders as appear to the court to be necessary
or expedient pending any such trial for his custody, admission to
bail or continued detention under the Mental Health Act, 1959.
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ANNEXURE B. .
EXTRACTS FROM THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE MODEL
PENAL CODE
Section 4.04. Mental Disease 0r Defect Excluding Fitness to Proceed.“
\
No person who as a- result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be ‘
tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission 'of an offence so long as such
incapacity endures.
Section 4.05 Psychiatric Examination of Defendant with Respect to Mental
(1)
(2)
(3)
Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility. or Fitness. to
Proceed.
Whenever the defendant has ﬁled a notice of intention to rely on the
defence of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility or there is
reason to doubt his ﬁtness to proceed, or reason to believe that mental
disease of defect or the defendant will otherwise become an issue in the
cause, the Court shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or shall
request the superintendent of the Hospital to designate at least one
qualified psychiatrist, which designation may be or include himself, to
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. The
Court may order the defendant committedto a hospital or other suitable
facility for the purpose of the examination for a period of not exceeding
sixty days or such longer period as the Court determines to be: necessary
for the purpose and may direct that a qualiﬁed psychiatrist retained by the
defendant be permitted to witness and participate in the examination.
In such examination any method may be employed which is accepted by'
the medical profession for the examination of those thought to be
suffering from mental disease or defect.
The report of the examination shall include the following:
(a) a description of the nature of the examination;
(b) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant;
(c) if the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, an opinion
as to his capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to
assist in his own defense;
(d) when a notice of intention to rely on the defense of irresponsibility
has been filed, an opinion as to the extent, if any, to which the
capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired at the time of the criminal conduct charged; and
(e) when directed by the Court, an opinion as to the capacity of the
defendant to have a particular state of mind which is an element of
the offense charged.
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If? the examination can not be conducted by reason of the
unwillingness of the defendant to participate therein, the report shall so
state and shall include, if possible, an opinion as to whether such
unwillingness of the defendant was the result of mental disease or defect.
The report of the examination shall be filed in (triplicate?) with the
clerk of the Court who shall cause copies to be delivered to the district
attorney and to counsel for the defendant.
Section 4.06 Determination of Fitness to Proceed; Effect, of Finding of
(1)
(2)
Unﬁtness; Proceedings if Fitness is Regained.
When the defendant’s fitness to proceed is drawn in question, the issue
shall be determined by the Court. If neither the district attorney nor
counsel for the defendant contests the ﬁnding of the report filed pursuant
to section 4.05, the Court may make the determination on thebasis of
such report. If the finding is contested, the Court shall hold a hearing on
the issue. If the report is-received in evidence upon such hearing, the party
who contests the ﬁnding thereof shall have the right to summon and to
cross-examine the psychiatrists who joined in the report and to offer
evidence upon the issue.
If the Court determines that the defendant lacks fitnessto proceedltthe
proceeding against him shall be suspended and the Court shall commit him
to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction to be placed in an
appropriate institution of the Department of Correction [or of Mental
Hygiene or Public Health ?] for so long as such unﬁtness shall endure.
When the Court, upon the application of the Commissioner of Correction
[or the district attorney ?] determines, after a hearing, that the defendant
has regained fitness to proceed, the proceedings shall be resumed. If,
however, the Court is of the view that so much time has elapsed since the
commitment of the defendant that it would be unjust to resume the
criminal proceeding, the Court may dismiss the charge and may order the
defendant to be committed to an appropriate institution of the
Department of Correction or of Mental Hygiene [Public Health] or
discharged.
Section 4.07 Determination of Irresponsibility on Basis of Report; Access to
(1)
(2)
Defendant by Psychiatrist of His Own Choice; (Form of Expert
Testimony When Issue is Tried.
If the report filed pursuant to Section 4.05 finds that the defendant at the
time of the criminal conduct charged suffered from a mental disease or
defect which substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law, and the Court is satisfied that such impairment was sufﬁcient to
exclude responsibility, the Court shall enter judgment of acquittal on the
ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.
When, notwithstanding the report filed pursuant to section 4.05, the
defendant wishes to be examined by a qualiﬁed psychiatrist of his own
choice, such psychiatrist shall be permitted to have reasonable access to
the defendant for the purposes of such examination.
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(3)
(4)
Upon the trial, thepsychiatrists who ﬁled a report pursuant to Section‘
4.05 may be called as witnesses by the prosecution, the defendant or the
Court and the jury may be informed that they were designated by the
Court or by the Superintendent of the Hospital at the request of the
Court, as the case may be. If called by the Court, the witness shall be
subject to cross-examination by the prosecution and by the defendant.
Both the prosecution and the defendant may summon any other qualified
psychiatrist to testify but no one who has not examined the defendant
shall be competent to testify to his opinion as a psychiatrist with respect
to the mental condition or responsibility of the defendant, as distinguished
.from the validity of the procedure followed by, or the general scientiﬁc
propositions stated by, another witness. a
When a psychiatrist who has examined the defendant testiﬁes concerning
his mental condition, he shall be permitted to make a statement as to the
nature of his examination, his diagnosis of the‘mental condition of the
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense: charged and his
opinion as to the extent, if any, to which the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law or to have a particular state of mind which is an
element of the offense charged was impaired as a result of mental disease
or defect at that time, He shall ,be permitted to make any explanation
reasonably serving to clarify his diagnosis and opinion and may be
cross-examined as to any matter bearing on his competency or credibility
or the validity of his diagnosis or opinion. -
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PROBLEMS RELATING TO FITNESS TO PLEAD
IN SUPERIOR COURTS
Judge A. J. GORAN‘Ir
SUMMARY
1. OUTLINE oE THE GENERAL LAW
According to the Common Law it is essential for a jury to ﬁnd an accused
insane before ﬁnding him unfit to plead. The Common Law is now expressed in
Statute in both England and New South Wales. Here the word “insane” has now
been replaced by the phrase “mentally ill”.
The New South Wales Mental Health Act, 1958—1965 now governs the
position. Section 4 deﬁnes the phrase “mentally ill person” as a person who
owing to mental illness requires care, treatment or control for his own good and
in the public interest, and is for the time being incapable of managing himself or
his affairs. Semble, a mere defect of reason not measuring up to this deﬁnition is
insufficient for a jury to ﬁnd an accused unﬁt to plead.
Sections 23 and 26 of the Act deal with the trial of the issue of ﬁtness to
plead. The former provides for the recording of the fmdjng that an accused is
mentally ill and unﬁt to plead and for an order that the accused be kept in
custody. The latter provides for a trial of the issue on the direction of the
Attorney-General when an accused who has not been tried is an inmate of a
mental hospital.
2. THE TRIAL IN‘PRACTICE
The issue as to whether an accused is mentally ill is generally determined
on the evidence of psychiatrists. The jury decides whether the accused is
mentally ill. If he is, the jury has to make up its mind as to whether he is ﬁt to
stand his trial, or unfit because he either —
(a) cannot understand the nature of the charge, or
(b) cannot give coherent or rational instructions to Counsel so as to make a
proper defence, or
(c) cannot understand the nature of or course of the proceedings, or because
of any combination of these reasons. '
3. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
In the majority of cases there is little difficulty in practice. Frequently
Crown and defence agree on the issue, or the evidence is overwhelming one way
or the other.
Where there is no such agreement or where the evidence is seriously in
conﬂict, real problems arise. There are conﬂicting judicial pronouncements and
some of the principles laid down are at times based upon doubtful logic.
* LL.B., Q.C., A Judge of the District Court of New South Wales.
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 (a) Onus of Proof.
This is not a live issue where Crown and defence a ree as to the
issue (sed ,qu'aere, ~.Russellgv. H: M. Advocate: .1946 S.C. 5.) 37. Where
there is a real conﬂict the Courts have had difficulty. See Dyson (1831) 7
C. & D. 305n; Pritchard (1836) 7 C. & P. 303; Turton (1854) 6 Cox CC.
385, which place the onus on the accused. In Russell (supra) Lord Cooper,
delivering the judgment of the Court said:
“The onus is always on the accused to justify a plea in bar of
trial . . . .”.
Ley (1828) 1 Lew. CLC. 239;Davies (1853) 3 Car. & Kir. 328 and Sharp
(1958) l A.E.R. 62; 41 CAR. 197, place the onus on theCrown.
In R. v. Podola‘(1959) 3 A.E.R. 418, the Court of Criminal Appeal
held that the last three cases were wrongly decided. The following
principles were laid‘ down: "
(1) 1f the defence contends that the accused is insane and the
prosecution disputes this, the defence bears the onus of proof : the
standard of proof is the civil standard.
(2) If the prosecutipn alleges insanity and the defence disputes insanity,
the prosecution bears the onus of proof.
The Court was silent as to the standard of proof required in this
case.
Where does the onus lie when the Court itself, as it- may do, questions the
ﬁtness of the accused to plead?
It is submitted that this problem reveals a fundamental fallacy in the
history of the law on unfitness to plead, which has continued through the
decision in Podola ’s Case.
The trial of this issue is an inquiry into the accused himself. There
are, strictly speaking, no parties. There is no lis. It is a preliminary
inquiry,.commenced before any plea on arraignment, which antecedes the
trial itself of guilt or innocence.
The confusion of the older authorities, carried into modern
decisions, is that the raising of the issue of unfitness is a plea in bar of the
indictment: see Russell (supra). Pleas in bar, e.g., autrefois convict and
autrefois acquit, are essentially pleas raised by the defence. It is difficult to
see how the prosecution, let alone the Court, could raise a plea in bar.
If the raising of the issue is not a plea in bar, there can be no
question of onus of proof. What is required is a proceeding in the nature of
an inquiry, (cf. Coronial Inquiries, Royal Commissions of Inquiry) into
whether the accused is ﬁt to plead, the whole of the evidence available
being examined by the jury, without reference to who adduces the
evidence.
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 (b)
(6)
Standard of Proof.
Despite the silence of the Court of Criminal Appeal as to the
standard of proof required of the Crown when it bears the onus, the
principle is generally accepted that where the Crown alleges unfitness to
plead, the standard required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
If, as is submitted above in (a), there should be no onus required of
anyone, the double standard of proof disappears. What standard should
always apply? It is submitted that since there is no question of guilt
involved in this trial, there should be no question of proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
As a matter of commonsense and safety an accused should not be
required to stand trial if it is shown that more probably than not he is
mentally ill and unfit to plead.
Unfitness withoutmental illness.
If the Mental Health Act codiﬁes the law on the subject, there can
never be an issue of fitness to plead unless there is also the issue as to
whether the accused is mentally ill. Certainly this proposition is laid down
by the Common Law. However, the Act contemplates no other form of
mental illness than that which complies with the deﬁnition in section 4. In
this sense it restricts the Common Law and any extension which a New
South Wales Court may contemplate.
The typical example which now ’would be excluded under New
South Wales law is the deaf mute who cannot write or understand
sign language and so cannot make a proper defence. In R. v. Pritchard
(1836) 7 C. & P. 303 Alderson B. told the jury in such a case that if the
jury thought the prisoner could not understand the details of the trial so
that he could not properly make his defence to the charge, it ought to find
that he was not of sane mind.
This is an artificial extension of insanity. The law would be better
without it, so that cases of unﬁtness to plead without mental illness would
be sufﬁcient to prevent trir‘l. Another example is the case of the mental
defective who cannot make a proper defence.
With the development of modern psychiatry other conditions, falling
short of insanity, may be recognized as rendering an accused unﬁt to
plead. Genuine amnesia, caused by trauma or hysteria, is an important
example of this. In Russell and Podola a loss of memory as to events which
may prevent the accused from making an answer to the charge, however
genuine the condition may be, has been held not to render an accused
unfit to plead. 1t isdifﬁcult to understand the reasoning behind these
decisions, although it is quite obvious that the Court in each case was
moved by a desire to prevent an easy way for the accused to avoid justice
by a false claim to loss of memory.
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Can an accused “make a proper defence” in such a case? In Russell
the Court held that she could “even though that defence has the
peculiarity of including in its features that the accused has forgotten the
period of the events dealt with in the c.harge”.‘lt was said that this
handicap on the part of the accused “plays its full part . . . .in increasing
the onus on the Crown”. .
It is submitted that this theory is insufficient to avoid a possible
miscarriage ofjustice.
Trial bymy.
The trial by a jury of the issue of unﬁtnessto plead may well be
unsatisfactory. The examples submitted are limited to casesrwhere the
evidence is conﬂicting and there is a live issue before the jury:
(1) Certain psychiatric conditions, e.g., hysteria, are difficult for a jury
to understand, particularly when -
(a) they are associated in a layman’s mind with mere displays of
temperament; or . . -
(b) when there is a suspicion that they may be feigned.
(2) When the charge against the accused is one which involves notorious
or publicized facts, giving rise to public alarm or indignation, a jury
is already prejudiced and may be unwilling to allow the accused to
. avoid an immediate trial by finding him unﬁt to plead.
A jury consisting of experts in the field with a Judge either part of
it, or guiding it, would not be open to such criticism. Is it more desirable
to have something in the nature of a medical tribunal to decide the issue of
ﬁtness to plead?
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 LEGAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS RELATING TO
FITNESS TO PLEAD IN MAGISTRATES’ COURTS.
W. J. LEWER*
The notion of ﬁtness to plead has difficulties in a context where there is
room to suppose that no-one is called on to plead at all. It will be convenient
to consider separately what may be done under Division 1 of the Justices Act
from that which may be done under Division 2.
INQUIRIES
When a person is charged by information under section 21 of the Justices
Act with treason or an indictable offence, the prosecution evidence is required
to be taken as 5.41 of the Act sets forth. Section 21 provides that an information
may be laid before a Justice in any case where a person has committed or is
suspected of having committed any treason or other indictable offence.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Section. 41 reads:
Whenever a person charged with an offence upon an information under
section twenty—one of this Act appears or is brought before a Justice or
Justices voluntarily upon summons or upon apprehension under or
without warrant or in custody for such or any other offence, the Justice or
Justices shall, in the presence of the defendant, take the evidence for the
prosecution in manner hereinbefore provided.
After all the evidence for the prosecution has been taken the Justice or
Justices shall —
(a) if he or they is or are of opinion that such evidence is not sufficient to
warrant the defendant being put upon his trial for an indictable offence,
forthwith order the defendant, if in custody, to be discharged as to the
information then under inquiry: =
(b) if he or they is or are of opinion that a prima facie case has been made
out, proceed as hereinafter provided.
Repealed.
Provides that where the evidence for the prosecution has in the opinion of
the Justice or Justices, established a prima facie case the defendant shall be
cautioned and asked if he wishes to make a statement — and the recording
and subsequent use of the statement are also provided for.
(i) After. the defendant has made such statement, 'or if he makes no
statement, the Justice or Justices shall ask him if he desires to give
evidence himself or to call any witness on his behalf.
(ii) Any evidence then given by or on behalf of the defendant shall be
taken by the Justice or Justices in manner hereinbefore provided in
respect of evidence for the prosecution.
* LL.M. (Sydney), a Stipendiary Magistrate of the Metropolitan Bench.
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 (6) When all the ev'idenc'é for.the proSecution andfor the defence has been
taken the Justice OrvJustices‘ﬁhall;
(a) if he or they is or are of opinion that on such evidence the defendant
ought not to be put upon his trial for an indictable offence,
forthwith order the defendant ifin custody, to be discharged as to
the information then underinquiry.
(b) if he or they is or are of opinion that the evidence is sufﬁcient to
warrant the defendant being put on his trial for an indictable
offence, or if the evidence raises a strong or probable presumption of
the guilt of the accused, commit the defendant for trial
From this it is clear that what is envisaged is an inquiry rather than a trial
in any meaningful sense. It does not appear from the Act, in terms at any event,
that the information is required to be stated to the defendant at the
commencement of the proceedings. Certainly he is not required to plead to it.
Section 51A, which provides that at any stage of the proceedings the defendant
may plead guilty, does contain the tacit assumption that the charge is known to
the defendant during the proceedings.
Under the old law it mattered nothing that a man had .not his sanity if a
Justice were inquiring into an allegation of a capital offence or a treason against
him. (In the old books capital offence seems to be used where we would say
felony). Hale — Historia Placitorum Coronae, Ch. lV' seems to think it of little
importance in most cases to try what we would call an issue of fitness to plead.
At p 33 he says.
“If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense and before
his arraignment he becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be
arraigned during such his phrenzy, but be. remitted to prison until that
incapacity be removed; the reason is, because he cannot advisedly plead to
the indictment; and this holds as well in cases of treason, as felony, even
tho the delinquent in his sound mind were examined, and confessed the
offence before his arraignment .And if such person after his plea, and
before his trial, become of non sane memory, he shall not be tried.
“But because there may be great fraud in this matter, yet if the
crime he notorious, as treason or murder, the judge before such respite of
trial or judgment may do well to impanel a jury to enquire ex officio
touching such insanity,- and whether it be real or counterfeit”.
By 1838 it was regarded as settled that the question of whether Compos
mentis or not is a question of fact for thejury at the trial. In R v. Hodges 8 C. &
P. 195 (decided in that year) it was said that it was wrong for a grand jury to.
throw out a bill on the ground that a person charged with murder was insane.
Atkinson’s The Magistrates’ General Practice (1916) at p. 848 states the
common law position thus:
“Sometimes it appears that a crime has been committed by a person
alleged to have been insane at the time when the act was done, or alleged
to have become insane since the commission of the crime and before the
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 date of the trial, and, consequently to be unﬁt to plead. When the offence
is indictable, it is no part of the duty of the justices to decide whether or
not the allegation of insanity is well founded; that issue can only be
decided by a jury. But it may be mentioned that every man is presumed to
be sane and responsible for crimes committed by him until the contrary be
proved”.
In N.S.W. now, the situation is governed by the Mental Health Act,
1958—1961. Part VII of the Act has the appearance of being a complete code
covering the matter. Section 23 (1) makes provision for what is to be done with
a person found by a jury to be mentally ill upon arraignment. Section 24
provides that a person conmﬁtted for trial may be certiﬁed by two medical
practitioners to be mentally ill. Such a person, and persons found to be mentally
ill upon arraignment, may be removed to and detained in 3 Mental Hospital by
order of the Minister. The section also provides that in the event of such a
person ceasing to be mentally ill the Minister may order his removal to a prison
in order that he may be tried.
Section 26 provides that the Attorney-General may order that a person
detained in 21 Mental Hospital who has been charged with an offence for which
he has not been tried be removed to a prison and that the issue of his fitness to
plead be tried by a jury.
These sections may be thought to achieve the same result vis-‘a-vis the
examining justices as does the common law. '
It may be fairly submitted'that if a Justice has reason to suppose that a
person tendering a plea of guilty under s. 51A of the Justices Act be then
mentally ill, he ought to reject the plea and commit for trial as provided for by
subsection (1) (3).
SUMMARY TRIALS
In the procedure provided for summary trials before Justices by Division 2
of the Justices Act there may be discerned areas of uncertainty.
Section 78 provides that where the defendant appears at the hearing the
substance of the information or complaint shall be stated to him and he shall be
asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted or why an
order should not be made against him as the case may be. If he thereupon admits
the truth of the information or complaint and shows no sufficient cause why he
should not be convicted or why an order should not be made against him then
the Justices present at the hearing shall convict him or make an order against
him. If he does not admit the truth of the information or complaint then the
Justices shall hear the case. '
Whatever this may mean, it is clear that something different in form from
arraignment and pleading to an indictment is contemplated by the section,
notwithstanding the marginal note to it reads “Defendant to plead”.
The section is in substantially the same form it had as s. 144 of Act 11 and
12 Victoria Ch. 43 (The Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1848) which was adopted
in‘N.S.W. by the Justices of the Peace Adopting Act, 14 Victoria No. 43 of
1850.
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A century and a half ago The Justice of the Peace and Parish Ofﬁcer by
Richard Burn LL.D. was as famous as Wilkinson’s Australian Magistrate nearer
our own time. In 26th edn. Vol. 1 at p. 829 Burn gives an account of the
procedure used before section 14 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act came into
being, but it is convenient first to look at a passage on p. 813:
“The power of a justice of the peace to convict an offender in a
summary way without trial by jury is in restraint of the common law, and
in abundance of instances a tacit repeal of that famous clause in the Great
Charter, that a man shall be tried by his equals, which also was the
common law of the land long before the great charter, even from time
immemorial, beyond the date of histories and record. Therefore generally
nothing shall be presumed in favour of this branch of the office of a justice
of the peace; but the intendment will be against it. For which reason
where this special power is given to a justice of the peace by act of
parliament, it must appear that he hath strictly pursued it, otherwise the
common law will break in upon him, and level all his proceedings. So that
where a trial by jury is dispensed withal, yet he must proceed nevertheless
according to the course of the common law in trials by juries, and consider
himself only as constituted in the place of both judge and jury”.
He goes on to speak of the formalities to be observed in summary trials:
“Therefore there must be an information or charge against a person;
then he must be summoned or have notice of .such charge and have an
opportunity to make his defence; and the evidence against him must be
such as the common law approves of, unless the statute specially directeth
otherwise;-then if the person be found guilty, there must be a conviction,
judgment, and execution, all according to the course of the common law,
directed and inﬂuenced by the special authority given by the statute; and
in the conclusion, there must be a record of the whole proceedings,
wherein the justice must set forth the particular manner and
circumstances, so as if he shall be called to account for the same by a
superior court, it may appear that he hath conformed to the law,'and not
exceeded the bounds prescribed to his jurisdiction”.
At p. 829 he sets out the procedure:
“The information (if one have been drawn up in form) is ﬁrst read
to the defendant; or if no information have been drawn up, then the
charge is read to him from the summons or warrant: and he is asked what
he has to say to the charge thus made against him. Sirch information must
be read or stated to the defendant, who should be apprized of the charge
against him, and put to plead thereto; (per Grose .l 2 TR. 23;) after this}
the defendant either confesses the charge or denies it, and makes defence
immediately or prays time”.
And at p. 830:
“If the defendant confess the charge, the magistrate then, after
taking a formal minute of such confession, passes judgment, and imposes
the penalty or punishment”.
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And at p. 831:
“If the defendant denies the charge, or neglects to appear, after
being duly Summoned, in the latter case, after due proof of the summon
s,
the next step is to substantiate the information by testimony”.
It will be seen then that the procedure we at present follow is of some
antiquity and something akin to pleading has been required of a defen
dant who
is charged with a summary offence for about two centuries.
The practical English, it is of interest to note, have swept away
the
difficulty by repealing the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 and prov
iding a new
code in the Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1952. Section 13 reads:
(1) On the summary trial of an information, the court shall, if the a
ccused
appears, state to him the substance of the information and ask h
im
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty.
(2) The court, after hearing the evidence and the parties, shall convi
ct the
accused or dismiss the information.
(3) If the accused pleads guilty, the court may convict him without h
earing
evidence.
In R. v. Dashwood (1942) A.E.R. 586 at p. 587 the Court (Humphreys,
Hilbery and Tucker JJ.) said:
‘
“It is a cardinal principle of our law that no man can be tried for a
crime unless he is in a position to defend himself, and that includes his
being in a mental condition to defend himself, and that matter was present
to the minds of his counsel when this man pleaded not guilty. It was open
to them at that time, if they had so desired, indeed it was their duty if
they so thoright, to insist that the question of the prisoner’s ability to
plead be put to the jury. It should be known that the court acts in such a
case upon any information conveyed to it from any quarter. It may come
from the defendant himself, or his advisers, or from the prosecution
, or
from an independent person, such as the medical officer of the prison
where- the prisoner has been conﬁned. If anyone suggests to the presiding
judge that this preliminary question ought to be tried: Is this person in a
condition of mind to enable him properly to understand the proceedings,
to instruct counsel, if he has counsel, or to defend himself if he be without
counsel, then the procedure is that that question should be tried by a
jury”.
I should think it not open to argument that, mutatis mutandis, this passage
applies equally to summary trials. The difficulty lies in the practical application.
What is the test to be applied? There will be, I submit, agreement that a person
who is mentally ill is unfit to plead. What is mentally ill? Section 4 of the
Mental
Health Act, 1958—1961 has this definition:
“‘Mentally ill person’ means a person who owing to mental illness
requires care, treatment or control for his own good or in the public
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 interest, and is for the time being incapable of managing himself or his
affairs and ‘mentally ill’ has a corresponding meaning”.
Here one stumbles on the petitio principii — “who owing to mental
illness”. The definition makes sense only if a tacit reference to some external
standard such as clinical mental illness, whatever that is, be assumed. Perhaps the
Legislature has taken the view that we can all recognize a morbid state of the
mind such as to be able to be called mental illness.*
Of course a- Psychiatrist, if called in aid, will usually give his opinion
whether or not an accused person is likely to be able to understand the
proceedings and instruct counsel or conduct his own defence. However valuable
this may be, it is no more than evidence, and the decision must be that of the
Magistrate, exercising the function of a jury.
Occasions do arise when an accused person appears in a state less than
mentally ill, but nonetheless in an unfit state of mind to make his plea and
conduct his defence (very often from disturbance of the emotions). Such cases
are best dealt with in the way that the physical illness of a defendant is dealt
with, i.e., by adjournment.
Let it now be supposed that a court is confronted with a defendant whose
demeanour suggests, or of whom it is suggested, that he is mentally ill. There is a
presumption, but a presumption of fact only, that a man is sane until the
contrary be demonstrated. Against this must be set the court’s duty to do justice
and to do it so that it appear to be done. If circumstances are such as to put a
magistrate in doubt then it is surely reasonable that he inquire into the
defendant’s mental ﬁtness. The obvious case of difficulty is the unrepresented
defendant. Legal practitioners may be relied upon to inform a court if they
think a client is mentally unﬁt to make his plea. Commonly they go further than
this and themselves obtain a psychiatric opinion, even arranging for treatment.
Where the defendant is unrepresented and indigent, the court’s only
recourse for the ascertainment of his mental fitness is to make use of the powers
of adjournment and remand contained in ss. 68 and 69 of the Justices Act, and
request his examination by the Consultant Psychiatrist at the Prison. One notes
that s. 69 provides for a committal to “some other safe custody” and it is greatly
to be regretted that, whatever the framers of the section may have
contemplated, none other is provided. This practice has received some judicial
criticism in recent times, but with all proper respect to those who made it,
circumstances mostly render it impossible to do anything else. Great care ought
to be taken by Magistrates and Psychiatrists in this area. Magistrates ought to
make it clear that the report is required for the purpose of determining the
defendant’s ﬁtness to plead, and the Psychiatrist, in his turn, ought to be careful
to say nothing about matters pertaining to the actual charge.
What happens if after such an examination it transpires that the defendant
is mentally ill? Very often the Consultant Psychiatrist will complete a form
Schedule Two under the Mental Health Act, and the Police, with the court’s
approval, will take the defendant to an Admission Centre. If, in the opinion of
the authorities at the Admission Centre, he is not mentally ill (nOt a common
*Cf. In the matter of an Alleged Incapable Person, 76 W.N. 477 p. Myers J. esp.
at p.478.
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 occurrence) the Police will usually recover him and return him to the
court,
which is left with the problem of whether to try him or not. If in the cour
t’s
opinion he is not ﬁt to plead, nothing remains but to release him. If
he is
detained at the Admission Centre, as is most common, the court is usually
content to mark the record “not before court —— in mental hospital” and
in
nearly every case this is an end to the matter, although there appears to
be
nothing to prevent his being brought back to court for trial if he ultimat
ely
recover his mental health. It is clear that to mark the court’s record in this way is
not a conclusion to the proceedings in accordance with S. 80 of the Justices Ac
t,
but it is hard to imagine exception being taken to it.
Section 12 (2) of the Mental Health Act provides a means whereby if the
prosecutor, or some other person, give the Magistrate the required informati
on
on oath, the Magistrate may himself order a defendant to be taken
to an
Admission Centre. Although this is sometimes done in other States 1 ha
ve not
heard of it having been done here. It does not appear convenient and it m
ay be
doubted whether the section was intended to be used in this way.
From the foregoing it may be thought more convenient to consider
insanity when met with in summary trials as one problem, rather than as t
wo,
the first being ﬁtness to plead and the second, insanity going to the question
of
guilt. Summary trials do not ordinarily involve contention by the defence t
hat
the defendant is insane. The punishments likely to be inflicted are not usua
lly
such as to make it worthwhile avoiding them by assuming the stigma of insani
ty.
If the question be raised it is most likely to be so by the Police or by the co
urt
itself, after the evidence is in, because the nature of the facts disclosed p
oints to
it.
There can be little doubt that if in a summary trial a court decides that the
defendant did the act charged, but was mentally ill in the sense that th
is
expression has in s. 23 (2) of the Mental Health Act (“so insane as not to
be
responsible, according to law, for the act or omission the subject of the cha
rge”)
then the information must be dismissed. Section 23, by its terms, does not app
ly
to a summary trial.
For the statement that the information must be dismissed there is
abundant authority. For present purposes it is sufficient to notice what was s
aid
by Sir Owen Dixon in his paper, “A Legacy of Hadfield, M’Naghte
n and
Maclean” 31 A.L.J. 255 esp. at p. 256, and by Dr Glanville Williams, Cr
iminal
Law, 2nd edn. p. 475.
From many viewpoints this situation can hardly be thought satisfactory. A
person may be more dangerous to his fellows, though he have, so far, com
mitted
only a summary offence, than say, a person who has killed a relative while
in a
state of depression. I recall a man charged with discharging a firearm in
a public
street who was subject to delusions of a most dangerous kind. i recall a
nother,
charged only with vagrancy, who was intercepted in a most purposeful
journey
from Victoria to Parramatta, being armed with an expensive and high p
owered
riﬂe, his concern to kill a man whom he fancied once had connection
with his
wife. Both were admitted to mental hospitals by way of form Schedu
le Two
from the Consultant Psychiatrist. Again, many vagrants and other similar p
etty
criminals are schizophrenics, mental defectives, sufferers from brain dam
age
from alcohol, sufferers from senile dementia, or otherwise less than mentall
y
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healthy. It is no kindness to set them free to exist as best they can without help.
Whether we will or not, more is expected of a magistrate than that he merely
conduct trials. He is, more often than is comfortable, 3 place of almost 'last
resort for the homeless and the helpless. It is surely his concern to make sure
that gaol is not the last resort if something more appropriate may serve.
I think it to have been demonstrated that the situation of makeshift above
described indicates a serious lacuna in the law. If more were wanted a
consideration of how the problem has been met in England is profitable.
Section 30(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1952 reads: '
“Where a person is charged before a magistrates’ court with any act
or omission as an offence punishable on summary conviction with
imprisonment and the court —
(a) is satisﬁed that he did the act or made the omission charged; and
(b) is satisfied on the evidence of at least two duly qualiﬁed medical
practitioners that he is of unsound mind; and
(c) is also satisfied that he is a proper person to be detained, the court
may, instead of dealing with him in any other manner, by order
direct him to be received and detained in such institution for persons
of unsound mind as may be named in the order, and may...” (make
suitable arrangements to that end).
Section 26 confers wide powers of remand for purposes _of diagnosis and
also deals with releases on recognizance with conditions relating to treatment.
These powers were made more ﬂexible in 1959 by part V of the Mental
Health Act of that year, and a useful discussion of the situation thus created
may be found in Williams, op cit., p. 460 ff. His opinion generally appears
favourable. I have elsewhere heard that some difﬁculties have arisen in practice.
Dr Williams also sees some anomalies, nonetheless he says (p. 275):
“‘The procedure in magistrates’ courts is superior to that obtaining in
trials on indictment”. After referring to the legislation he continues: “The
practice is that if the defendant appears to be insane, he is remanded for a
medical report; and if the report indicates insanity which needs hospital
treatment, the defendant is discharged without trial, with a view to his
admission to hospital. This procedure does duty for both the inquisition of
fitness to stand trial and the insanity defence; and it enables the court to
act of its own volition even though the insanity is not such as to prevent
the defendant from following the proceedings”.
I have made inquiry of magistrates in other States and in New Zealand and
from what they have told me it appears that what is done there is much the same
as what we do here. The various statutes have a broad similarity.
For a conclusion I submit that the law relating to insanity in summary
trials is in sore need of re-appraisal.
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 PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE DUTIES OF
AN ADVOCATE ON PLEAS OF UNFITNESS TO PLEAD
J. J. DA VOREN*
The role permitted to myself this evening is to deal with the legal problems
as they arise on a plea of unﬁtness to plead in relation to the duties of an
advocate. It seems to me that there is no occasion to cover in my remarks the
relevant law or the appropriate legal procedures that have to be followed. All I
should do is to make some reference to the particular problems as they affect
the advocate on an occasion when he has to consider the appropriateness or
otherwise of such a plea.
This problem will arise either immediately upon delivery of his brief and
because of the instructions it contains or because of information given to him by
his instructing solicitor, who may have fortiﬁed his views by the obtaining of a
psychiatrist’s report before delivery of the brief, and it may well be that that
report and his solicitor’s collection of outside evidence as well as his own
observations may pass doubt on the capacity of the defendant to qualify as
being ﬁt to plead; or it may be that this doubt as to his ﬁtness to plead may for
the ﬁrst time become apparent to counsel in conference or by virtue of some
information that comes to him at some later stage through the observations of
others, or it may come to him because he feels the need for a report from some
psychiatrist with regard to the defendant’s mental condition.
If that situation has either arisen before delivery of the brief or arises after
delivery and during his conference or later consideration of the matter, it seems
to me that his problem is solved by making available to the Crown the evidence
in his possession, including a copy of the psychiatrist’s report, that has created in
his mind the doubt as to ﬁtness to plead, placing all the evidence before them
and inviting from them their own evidence available relevant to that problem.
Then I would irnagine‘that if there is any substance at all in the information that
he has and the view that he has formed he will have the co-operation of the
Crown, so that in the normal course of events I suppose the propriety of events
on the part of counsel would involve the accused being informed of the views
that have been taken as to his condition and he should be advised that it is
intended to recommend that the trial of the issue of ﬁtness to plead would be a
preliminary one arranged by agreement with the Crown.
It may happen that in such a case an accused may react very unfavourably
to that suggestion and may insist that there is no question about his ﬁtness and
that he is completely ﬁt to plead. If the evidence seems to be substantial enough,
and presumably it has already appeared to counsel-that it is substantial enough, I
consider that the proper course would be, notwithstanding the objection of his
client, to place the evidence before the Crown and if he has their agreement he
should endeavour to have that issue raised for trial notwithstanding the client’s
spoken instructions.
Or. the other hand the Crown may feel that it is not sufﬁciently
substantial to warrant that issue being tried. In such a case I concede it to be the
duty of counsel to put his evidence and the evidence of the Crown before the
judge in chambers as a preliminary and then later to raise it before the judge
* Q.C., LL.B., a member of the New South Wales Bar.
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 when the trial is called. That is a somewhat unusual course to take, because
normally counsel is bound by his instructions, but as there is a duty cast upon
the judge where he considers it proper that ﬁtness to plead should be a
preliminary issue for trial by a jury I feel that the judge is entitled to the
assistance of counsel and to the provision of all the evidence that is at hand to
counsel to allow him to decide whether the trial on the ﬁtness to plead issue
should be directed.
That, it seems to me, is the only real problem that arises in advocacy. Once
the issue is decided upon and the trial of that issue goes on, then counsel will
discharge his usual functions in the normal way. ‘
 
 PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS FOR THE EXPERT WITNESS
C. RADESKI. *
I assume that prior to my paper the legal issues will be competently and
exhaustively covered by those dealing with the legal aspects. 1 also assume that
later papers will deal with the even more important aspect as far as the
defendant is concerned, i.e., what will happen to him as a result of the finding of
the jury. The role of the witness is brief, though signiﬁcant, and he is asked to
give an opinion on an accused at a particular point in time, possibly only
touching indirectly on the matter of the charge against him.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
The psychiatrist must bear in mind certain principles:
A person, sane or insane, has a right to plead to a charge against him.
A decision against him pleading is made in this jurisdiction by a jury.
The answer inevitably turns on the defendant’s ability to communicate in
a limited area.
The question of fitness to plead has no direct bearing on the. alleged
offence.
Psychiatric evidence is almost reduced to evidence of fact, not opinion.
Psychiatric authorities vary in the 'phraseology and, to some extent, the
content of criteria used in determining fitness to plead. They are brieﬂy:
(a)
(b)
(C)
(d)
He must have some understanding of the function of a court and its
officers.
He must be able to distinguish between a plea of guilty and not guilty.
He must be able to understand to a reasonable degree the allegation,
evidence, and if necessary be able to examine witnesses or make a
statement.
I do not intend to dwell on these and other matters, e.g., challenging
jurors, as the next criterion arises out of (c), and it seems that any
argument about doubt of fitness revolves around —-
He should be able to instruct counsel in his defence and advise on matters
arising out of (c).
Should psychiatric evidence be taken into account in determining fitness to
plead?
Against (1) Psychiatric prejudgment may occur.
 
* M.B., B.S., D.P.M., Consultant Psychiatrist, Prison Medical Services.
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(2) The decision turns on a question of fact which can be tested
by laymen or the legal profession.
(3) The accused.
For (1) Gross inconsistencies in thinking, sufﬁcient to affect pleading,
may not be obvious to counsel.
(2) May reveal presence of unconscious motivations, e.g., wish for
death, which will distort defendant’s conduct of trial.
(3) Recognition of illness such as depression or brain tumour
which could affect judgement so that defendant might not
care to challenge evidence.
(4) Conversely, to give an opinion that defendant is not ill‘but
simulating illness. ‘
(5), It is possible that material be provided for a defence of
insanity, previously unsuspected, although not sufficient to
justify the ﬁnding of unfit to plead.
The expert witness, notwithstanding that he is not asked aboutresponsibility for an alleged offence, must carry out a'full history andexamination, as an opinion on one aspect of a problem bears some relationship
to the totality of the patient.
It is then likely that the psychiatric opinion may be biased because of thistotality, and opinion may tend to ﬁnd a defendant unﬁt to plead because ofknowledge of his delusions, rationalizations and defences. It is likely that apsychiatrist may tend to ﬁnd a patient unﬁt to plead because of delusional ideaswhich resulted in his offence and which will cause his counsel grave difﬁculty inconducting a defence based on these still existent delusional ideas. The oppositeview may be held that a defendant is entitled to put forward his delusions and tohave them examined at his trial,’ assuming he pleads not guilty, and that theoutcome may be that he is ﬁt to plead his delusional‘ideas but will be found tobe insane at the time~of his offence, implying that the end result may well be thesame. However, the situation can be envisaged wherein a patient is ﬁt to pleadguilty, because he had done an act, but unﬁt to plead not guilty because thereasoning behind his act is psychotic.
It is in this borderline situation in which the psychiatrist is uncertain. Hisorientation and training may condition him to look beyond the simple criteria ofﬁtness to plead and justify an opinion that the defendant is not ﬁt to plead.
The psychiatrist is unlikely to consider that there is a difference, forexample, in the position in which the determination of ﬁtness to plead depends
upon the plea to be made.
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 Many difficulties arise out of the two differing disciplines of 'law and
medicine. I feel that there are always likely to be some points of difference in
cases, a fundamental problem being the need of the lawyer to preserve basic
rights and the need of the psychiatrist to protect a person, not necessarily a
patient, from the consequences of his illness, -
I propose to add other considerations in my paper, e.g., the point that the
psychiatrist cannot see the relevance in the disposal of patients not pleading to
indictable offences on the one hand and the procedure adopted in indictable
offences. '
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PSYCHIATRIC PROBLEMS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE ACCUSED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT
J. L. EVANS. *
As a generalization, when the problems of the Courts, of Counse
l, and of
the expert witness are over, those of the mental hospital
psychiatrist and
administrator are only beginning, and, as another generalization, th
ey last a good
deal longer.
The accused who has been found by verdict to be mentally
ill upon
arraignment, is, under the provisions of section 23 of the Men
tal Health Act
1958, ordered by the judge to be kept in strict custody until
he is dealt with
according to section 24. Section 24 provides that persons found t
o be mentally
ill upon arraignment, and persons committed for trial who are c
ertified by 2
medical practitioners to be mentally ill, shall be removed to and
detained in a
mental hospital by order of the Minister ior Health.
The Mental Health Act clearly distinguishes between “ordinary” patients
,
if one may use such a term, and those who are admitted from the pe
nal system.
These latter patients, who include those unﬁt to plead, those found
not guilty
on the grounds of mental illness, and those certified to be mentally
ill while
serving sentences, are grouped together as “Mentally Ill Persons under
Detention
for Various Offences” in part VII of the Act. These patients as a g
roup are
denied many of the privileges which other patients possess. They
cannot be
discharged at the discretion of the medical staff, but only unde
r carefully
specified conditions. They cannot be grantéd leave except in
specified
emergencies, under the most stringent safeguards, and with the approva
l of the
Minister for Health.
Section 33 of the Act also directs that these patients shall be subj
ect to
such security conditions as appear necessary. This is fair and r
easonable, but it
should be remembered that we are, running hospitals wh
ose prime aim is
treatment of the mentally ill. Consistent with this primary aim
, patients under
detention are subject to such security measures as are a
ppropriate to a
psychiatric hospital. They are housed in the first instance
in our most secure
ward, which is well-staffed by male nurses (not by. guards), and
which although
not 100 per cent escape-proof is difﬁcult to get out of — despi
te a good deal of
misinformed press publicity in recent months. In this setting, the
patient receives
such psychiatric treatment as ‘his condition necessitates. Sh
ould the patient’s
progress and behaviour warrant such a course, the patient may
be transferred to
an open ward where there is much less emphasis on security. T
his step is taken
only in a minority of cases, and after a very much longer pe
riod of observation
and much greater deliberation than would be required in
the case of an
“ordinary” patient. I should add that these carefully-selected
patients have very
rarely abused this trust, and our problems have been with those
who have evaded
our more stringent security measures.
Just to get the facts straight, and to reassure any careful reade
rs of the
afternoon newspapers who might imagine that Callan Park is
packed full of
dangerous insane criminals all clamouring to escape and slaughter e
verybody, let
* M.B., B.S., D.P.M., F.A.C.M.A., M.A.N.Z.C.P., Medical Superintende
nt of
Callan Park Hospital.
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 me point out that at the time of writing this paper we had only 15 patients out
of a total hospital population of 1,480 patients who are subject to the provisions
of part VII of the Mental Health Act. Of these 15, 10 were unﬁt to plead. I
should add that another group of male patients, on the whole more disturbed
than those at Callan park, is housed at Morisset, and female patients, a very small
group, are housed at Parramatta.
Perhaps we should now return to the patient who is in hospital because he
is unﬁt to plead. It is obvious that 3 things can happen to him:
(1) he may recover from his illness;
(2) he may improve so that although still mentally ill he is ﬁt to plead;
(3) he may remain mentally ill and unfit to plead, or may become worse.
Apart altogether from the fact that the patient is regularly seen and
assessed by the medical staff in the course of treatment, the Mental Health Act
has built-in safeguards in the interests of the patient against unnecessary
detention. Section 29C provides that the patient shall be regularly examined by
the Superintendent or his nominee to determine “whether or not such person is
still mentally ill and his continued detention in a mental hospital is necessary”.
Section 298 provides that if the patient is still in hospital 6 months after his
admission he shall be examined by a Mental Health Tribunal in order to
determine whether ‘or not he should be detained in the mental hospital or be
discharged. The Tribunal consists of a psychiatrist, a medical practitioner and a
barrister or solicitor, who have no other connection with the hospital.
Where the patient has recovered from his illness, the provisions of section
24 are usually invoked. This states that when the patient has been certified to be
no longer mentally ill by the Superintendent and the Director of State
Psychiatric Services, or by the Superintendent and 2 Official Visitors, the
Minister for Health “shall order his removal to a prison in order to be tried”, or
if he is not to be tried order that he be discharged. A Mental Health Tribunal has
the same powers, but they are rarely used to discharge one of these patients, as
the Superintendent usually takes the initiative himself.
The case of the patient who. while remaining mentall ill. improves to
the point where he is fit to plead, is covered by section 6 of the Mental
Health Act. In addition to the safeguards in the Act against unnecessary
detention, the Attorney-General seeks an annual report on each unconvicted
person detained in a mental hospital. Acting on these reports or other evidence,
the AttorneyCeneral “if he is of the opinion that the question whether the
person charged is ﬁt to plead if put upon his trial should be determined by a
jury, may by order under his hand direct that the person charged be removed
from such mental hospital to some prison appointed by the Attorney-General
and specified in the order”. The mechanisms of arranging the trial are then set
out. As a general principle, it is desirable that persons should be brought to trial
where possible, and not have the prospect of trial looming before them for
lengthy periods of time. In addition, the mentally ill patient who is found fit to
plead and is then tried for his offence, is likely to be better off than if he
continues to be indefinitely detained as an unconvicted person. At his trial:
(I) he may be acquitted, in which case he is clearly better off:
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 (2) he may be convicted and sentenced, in which case he will probably be
certiﬁed to be mentally ill and returned to a mental hospital. Unless he has
received a life sentence, he will haVe a determinate sentence, at the end of
which the provisions of part VII of the Mental Health Act will no longer
apply, and he will become an “ordinary” patient;
(3) he may be acquitted on the grounds of mental illness, in which case he is
ordered to be kept in strict custody during the Governor’s Pleasure. Even
in this case he is better off, because the Governor is given a wide discretion
under section 29 to liberate the patient under such terms and conditions as
he may think ﬁt, whereas no powers exist under the law as it stands to
make any similar decision in the case of a person who is detained by
reason of being found unﬁt to plead.
There remains a small group of patients who in the present state of
psychiatric knowledge do not recover or improve in hospital. These patients
cannot be brought to trial, and they remain indefinitely subject to the security
measures prescribed by the Act. These patients are by and large pretty disrurbed
people and no major injustice seems to be done to them.
There is, however, one anomaly in the Act as it stands at present. It' does
not affect a large number of patients, but that is no reason for doing
nothing about it. This group consists of patients who are not seriously mentally
ill (the majority are high-grade mental defectives, or reasonably intact chronic
schizophrenics) but who are unlikely ever to recover completely, and whose
charge has been withdrawn by the Attorney—General. They have no charges to
answer, but they cannot be discharged from the provisions of part VII of the Act
because they cannot be certified to be no longer mentally ill. Section 24 states
that the patient concerned shall be “detained in a mental hospital until such
person is certiﬁed by the Superintendent and the Director, or by the
Superintendent and two Ofﬁcial Visitors, to be not mentally ill whereupon the
Minister shall order his removal to a prison in order to be tried for such offence
or if he is not to be tried order that he be discharged”. These people need to
remain in hospital but under the “ordinary” provisions of the Act, which allows
the medical staff some discretion about granting the patient leave from hospital,
and such other privileges as his condition warrants. It should be easy to devise a
simple form of words to amend the Act, so that when the charges are withdrawn
the patient is no longer subject to the provisions of part VII. This has already
been done in the case of patients whose sentence expires while they are in
hospital.
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FITNESS T0 PLEAD: ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
J. A. MORONY*
The present considerations are directed solely to those cases in which the
issue is one of fitness to plead, not of mental illness as a defence to an
indictment.
This premise can be alternatively stated administratively as being
concerned with the condition of the accused at the time of trial, not at t
he time
the offence was alleged to have been committed.
The following observations are proferred:
1. It need not necessarily be a mental illness which gives rise to the issue of
fitness to plead; 1 am aware of one case in which quadriplegia, caused by
an injury sustained in ﬂeeing from the offence, was found by jury to
constitute an unfitness to plead because he could not adequately prepare a
defence. This led to an endless circle until death intervened and solved the
problem.
2. A recent. case of one S. reveals problems of a legislative rather than o
f an
administrative nature. S. presented some psychiatric symptoms although
my Department’s psychiatrists did not consider that he was unfit to plead.
However, the jury found that he was unfit to plead and the Clerk of the
Peace reported the verdict to the Minister for Health in accordance with
section 24 of the Mental Health Act 1958. The Minister considered the
case, obtained further opinions and some months later exercised the
discretion c0nferred upon him by the section by not directing removal. He
had been tried by a jury on an issue; he was still in prison without status.
Eventually, he was again tried and ultimately was released on probation.
The question is of Ministerial discretion overriding the consequences of a
jury’s verdict.
3. Following on the question in (2), one must look to related sections 23 an
d
26. Movement of “criminally mentally ill” is divided between the
Governor-in-Council, the Minister (for Health) and the Attorney-General.
Quaere, in particular, should not the Minister for Health exercis
e the
power conferred in section 26 (1) and leave subsection 3 to the
Attorney-General. Subsection 2 is possibly not a matter for either Minister
for Health or the Attorney-General.
In practice, the Attorney-General, after receiving reports from
psychiatrists in the Department of Public Health, can, and often does,
involvefother psychiatrists likely to be called at the trial. This is done while
the accused is still in a Mental Hospital and causes both inconvenience,
delay and, at times, risks to security.
4. If a jury finds a person to be unfit to plead, there is, prima facie, mental
illness of substantial degree. Should not the Court’s order be for the
accused to be placed in a psychiatric hospital, specified by the Director (or
 
* F.R.1.P.A., Comptroller-General of Prisons for New South Wales.
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 some other person) within seven days of verdict, rather than leave him in
prison for an unspecified period awaiting the exercise of a Ministerial
discretion not as to where but as to whether he should go to a Mental
Hospital. There are long delays at times.
5. There is, of course, the general. question of Whether a juryof laymen is
the proper authority to determine the issue of ﬁtness to plead. l have
assumed that this is so but am aware that thereis a-strong body of opinion
which does not think this is true. The alternatives would present other and
difficult issues because adversary trials carry also some requirement of
adversary psychiatry.
6. This leads to the case of the “gibbering idiot” arrested for a serious
indictable offence. It has been laid down by a previous Minister and
followed departmentally, that an accused should not go to a psychiatric
hospital without a jury verdict except in emergent circumstances and even
then a prima facie case should have been established in relation to the
offence. This can have the effect of keeping in prison — perhaps of
producing in court — a person obviously quite out of place in either
environment.
What powers could a magistrate have paralleling those of a jury on the
issue of ﬁtness to plead? Does he need these in both summary and indictable
matters?
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SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION
This seminar was devoted to problems encountered in the State of New
South Wales in the context of the issue of ﬁtness to plead, and all the speakers
were well-known authorities in their several ﬁelds. As Mr Roulston pointed
out
in his paper, the question of an accused’s ﬁtness to plead in light of his mental
condition involves for the lawyer a simple and clear-cut problem, namely, the
prevention of the injustice which would arise from proceeding with the trial of a
person who is under some signiﬁcant disability in conducting his defence.
Against the background of twentieth century knowledge of mental
illnesses the courts have made an increasing use of expert psychiatric evidence
with the purpose of delineating as accurately as possible the nature of a mental
illness in relation to the legal context in which it is raised. In the case of the issue
of ﬁtness to plead, this does not always work to the accused’s, or even to
society’s, advantage, and in some American jurisdictions it appears that the
persistence of a mental disorder as certiﬁed by a psychiatrist is sufﬁcient to
prevent an accused person standing his trial at all when he wishes to do so and
when the practical relevance of his disorder to the conduct of the trial has not
been determined by a jury. Many would be reluctant to see such an extension of
psychiatric inﬂuence here.
A consequence of the greater attention now paid to psychiatric opinion is
the tendency for some psychiatric evidence actually to state that a particu
lar
accused is unfit to be tried, or to imply that this or that sympton or disor
der
renders an accused person incapacitated in respect of his trial. While
a
psychiatrist as a doctor and a human being may well have an opinion about what
should be done with an accused person, and whether he would be better or
worse off if found unﬁt to plead, the legal speakers held that such an opin
ion
was superﬂuous to the trial of fitness, where the proper function of the
psychiatrist was to assist the Court in relating the accused’s mental state to
the
common law tests. The evidence of the psychiatrist is of course indispensa
ble
about whether an accused .comes within the deﬁnition in s. 4 of the New So
uth
Wales. Mental Health Act (1958—64), but if too much is made of this, the
attention of the jury can be distracted from the more relevant question of
the
practical effect of such a disorder upon the accused’s capacity to be tried. For
that determination, commonsense, and the difficulties when trying to get
instructions, for example, to which the accused’s solicitor can testify, are
as
useful as psychiatry.
This is not to argue that to give dispassionate psychiatric testimony is easy,
as the psychiatric speakers pointed out. At the conclusion of several diagnostic
interviews, the accused is seen as a patient and opinions are formed about
matters other than the ﬁtness issue. Such opinions are likely to colour
the
emphasis given to parts of a testimony, unless great care is taken. Moreov
er,
certain questions, legally simple, give rise to psychiatric difficulty. To be asked
whether a person is certiﬁable under the current Mental Health Act invites a
conditional reply, since patients without homes or families to care for them
might be “certiﬁed” far more readily than patients with plentiful domestic
support. Then again to the psychiatrist a discussion of an accused’s ﬁtness to
plead is incomplete without a consideration of the likelihood of the mental state
improving. For example, a mentally subnormal lad, if found unfit to plead in
1968, is no more likely to be able to give coherent intructions one, two or three
years later, when his already unreliable memory of the material events will have
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 deteriorated further. It might be better for everyone if the legal issue could be
dealt with promptly, so that treatment care directed to his needs could be
instituted. Furthermore, a point often escaping attention is that some accused, if
they decide to plead guilty, can satisfy the common law criteria for ﬁtness, yet
they would give delusional instructions to legal representatives if they decided to
plead not guilty. A more subtle distinction still is that in a few such cases the
guilty plea while apparently rational, genuine and contrite can result from a
depressive illness in which the subject’s awareness of “wrong within” is of
delusional quality and strength so that false confessions can be made for
expiatory reasons. Thus the accused may have overheard acquaintances
discussing an intended offence. If depressed, he may be persuaded to “confess”
that he planned and initiated the whole enterprise. He feels such a wicked and
depraved person, that he believes he must have been responsible and may even
believe his guilt extends to other offences of which he had no previous
knowledge.
Procedural questions received treatment at the hands of several speakers. It
seemed inequitable that those found unfit to plead and placed in hospital should
have to be treated throughout under the most strict security conditions
notwithstanding any improvements there might be in their mental condition,
and there exists the anomalous situation whereby patients of this type, charges
against whom have been dropped, cannot be released from hospital while any
vestige of their original disorder remains, although their actual mental state
would often permit this. Several speakers indicated that a provision similar to
the United Kingdom Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act, (5.2), 1964, might be an
advantage to defence counsel. This reﬂected a' general feeling that there would
be an advantage in having means of getting the evidence in before questions of
the accused’s mental condition were raised. A subtle point alluded to was that
insanity could not be led without the accused’s consent but that the issue of
fitness could, so that this defence had special value for accused unable to
recognize that they were seriously mentally disturbed. In View of the other
disadvantages of being found unfit to plead, provision for the trial Judge to
introduce the issue of insanity might avoid some of the problems for defence
counsel posed by the insightless accused. Administratively speaking it was argued
that a ﬁnding of unfitness to plead should result in an immediate and automatic
placement in hospital.
Opinion was divided on the proper disposal of persons whose mental
condition would have justified their being found unfit to plead to a charge of an
indictable offence and who appeared in a lower court charged with an offence
capable of summary jurisdiction. The comparatively trivial nature of many of
these offences hardly requires the full rigour of the “fitness” procedure, yet for
there to be a group of persons with whom the Court cannot deal points perhaps
to a deficiency in the law. Possibly the answer may lie in placing persons of this
kind in the care of the Mental Health services, with a requirement from the
Court that the accused’s needs be investigated and met. The provisions of the
United Kingdom Magistrates’ Court Act (1952) 5.30 (1) might be adopted for
use here for this purpose. This specific problem is no doubt one aspect of the
serious one of vagrancy in modern cities.
It is understood that the Harvard Law School is participating in an
interdisciplinary study of the whole concept of fitness to plead, and something
of the kind may be pertinent here. Fundamental principles seem unclear, as for
example, whether the concept is to assist the Court, or whether it is to protect
the accused. The place of psychiatry has yet to find its proper emphasis, and
better procedural machinery is required in several places.
0. V. Briscoe.
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 REPORT OF THE INSTITUTE OF CRIMINOLOCY
FOR THE YEAR 1967
During 1967 a very full programme of teaching, seminar and research work
was carried out within the Institute, details of which are set out below.
UNIVERSITY COURSES
The courses offered within the formal University framework, which are set
out in detail in the Handbook of the Institute, comprise:
1. One course in Criminal Law and Criminology as a compulsory requirement
for the LLB. degree, and a further optional course in Criminology for
LL.B. students.
Advanced studies in Criminology leading to the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy for students qualiﬁed for admission to candidature under the
University By-laws.
Four courses in Criminology for law graduates proceeding to a LL.M.
degree.
Courses leading to a Diploma in Criminology for graduates of any
approved university and other candidates with special qualiﬁcations or
experience in the ﬁeld of criminology, such as Magistrates and Ofﬁcers of
the Departments of Police and Prisons and of the Parole, Probation and
Child Welfare Services.
EXTENSION ACTIVITIES
An extension course of twenty lectures is conducted in the Law School for
selected N .S.W. Police Officers. .
Members of the staff give a number of lectures in the N.S.W. Police
Department’s Potential Officers’ CoUrse and the Detectives’ Training
Course.
Members of the staff take part in the teaching programme of the
Australian Police College at Manly. Professor Shatwell is a member of the
Board of Control of the College.
Mr Hawkins participates in the teaching programme of the Prison Officers’
Training School of the N.S.W. Department of Prisons.
SEMINAR PROGRAMME
The Admissibility of Confessional Statements. A Committee set up under
the chairmanship of the Chief Justice, Sir Leslie Herron, to review the
Police Commissioner’s instructions to Police Officers on the conduct of
interrogations. This committee met at intervals throughout the year and is
preparing a draft set of instructions to replace the existing ones.
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2. Sentencing. A Seminar conducted in three sessions, consisting of (a) a
' presentation of papers dealing with various aspects of sentencing; (b) a
sentencing exercise for syndicates of judges and magistrates, and the
presentation of reports by syndicate chairmen;land (c).discussion of the
syndicate reports, led by a selected panel of experts in various ﬁelds.-
3. Fitness to Plaid. A closed seminar dealing with the legal, psychiatric and
administrative problems involved in the question of fitness to plead in the
N.S.W. courts.
PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC
Dr Briscoe has conducted a regular psychiatric clinic at the Law School
throughout the year for patients from Magistrates’ _Courts for post-trial
pre-sentence reports. The clinic also provides a psychiatric consulting service for
the Adult Probation Service, whose ofﬁcers may attend for discussion or bring
probationers for psychiatric survey.
PSYCHIATRIC CASE DEMONSTRATIONS
Dr Briscoe has arranged psychiatric case demonstrations at Callan Park
Hospital approximately monthly throughout the year. These are attended by
judges and magistrates.
RESEARCH
1. An investigation of sentencing practices in the superior courts of the
Sydney metropolitan area. A four-year project under a grant from the
Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law. An advisory committee
consisting of Mr Justice J. H. McClemens, Judge A. Levine and Mr W. J.
Lewer, S.M., has been set up, and Mr Ward has completed a preliminary
analysis of 8,000 pre-sentence report records.
2. Prediction studies. 'Two long-term projects arranged by Mr Ward, involving
prediction studies in collaboration with the Prisons Department and an
analysis of statistical data in collaboration with the Adult Probation
Service.
3. Community survey ofamphetamine taking. A survey by Dr Briscoe of the
usage of amphetamines in certain groups in the Sydney community.
4. Some properties ofdrugs. A study by Dr Briscoe of the crystal structure of
phenothiazine and phenothiazine derivatives and the haemolytic properties
of various commonly used phenothiazine drugs.
5. Relations between the police and the public in Australia andNew Zealand.
A survey carried out under a Nufﬁeld Foundation grant by Dr Chappell in
collaboration with Mr P. Wilson.
6. The effectiveness of sentences for serious motoring offences. A study
conducted by Dr Chappell under a grant from the Road Safety Research
Board.
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7. Uniform crime statistics. Mr Ward has had discussions with the
Commonwealth Statistician’s Department relating to the problem of
securing greater uniformity in the reporting of crime and prison statistics
throughout Australia.
PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF STAFF
The Legality of Eugenie Sterilisation in Australia (1967). Briscoe, O.V., Ilbery,
P.L.T., & Wood O.Med. J. Aust. ii 185.
The Abuse of Drugs (1967). Briscoe, O.V.Mental Health in Australia, 248.
The Institute of Criminology, Sydney University Law School (1967). Hawkins
G. J.Brit. J. C‘rim. 6 319.
Sociological Studies in the British Penal Services (1966). Hawkins, G. J. Aust.
N.Z. J. Social.
The Need for Criminology in Australia (1967). Hawkins, 0.]. & Chappell, D.40
A.L.J. 307.
Compensating Victims of Violent Crime (1967). Chappell, D.41 A.L.J.3.
Police Public Relations (1967). Chappell, D. & Wilson, P. Australian Journal of
Politics. 2 256.
Validating Prediction Scales —- The Case of the False Technique (1967).Ward,P.
G. Brit. J. Crim. 736.
OVERSEAS VISITOR
Mr Torsten Eriksson, Director of Corrections in Sweden, on a visit to
Australia in connection with the Fourth National Conference of the Australian
Prison After-Care Council, paid a visit to the Institute and delivered a paper at
the ﬁrst session of the Sentencing Seminar.
OVERSEAS CORRESPONDENTS
Professor L. Radzinowicz, Director of the Institute of Criminology in the
University of Cambridge.
Professor Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology in the
University of Chicago.
Mr Donald H. Goff, General Secretary of the Correctional Association of New
York.
K. O. SHATWELL
Challis Professor ofLaw
127
  
